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AbstractResearch on sports betting has generally found a favourite–longshot bias: bets on longshots lose more than bets on favourites. Existing research focuses largely on pari‐mutuel betting, but favourite–longshot bias is also evident in fixed‐odds online betting markets of the type that are growing rapidly around the world. Explanations for this bias in previous work on pari‐mutuel markets cannot explain why it would be a feature of competitive fixed‐odds betting markets. We show how disagreement among gamblers and risk aversion on the part of bookmakers in a competitive market can produce a pattern of favourite–longshot bias resembling the empirical evidence.

Abstract
The EU's Treaties were designed to limit the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. However, over the last decade, the introduction of the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme and its sovereign bond purchase programmes has created some strong linkages between monetary and fiscal policies in the Eurosystem. The ECB's monetary policies have improved fiscal debt sustainability and reduced the probability of sovereign default. However, there may need to be limits to the ECB's purchases of sovereign bonds. This paper discusses the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in the euro area and describes how the arguments raised by the European Court of Justice in the Weiss and Gauweiler cases suggest there may be hard limits on the size of the Eurosystem's sovereign bond holdings. These limits may undermine the positive impact of the OMT announcement and force the ECB into some difficult choices in the coming years.

The EU's Treaties were designed to limit the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. However, over the last decade, the introduction of the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme and its sovereign bond purchase programmes have created some strong linkages between monetary and fiscal policies in the Eurosystem. The ECB's monetary policies have improved fiscal debt sustainability and reduced the probability of sovereign default. However, there may need to be limits to the ECB's purchases of sovereign bonds. This paper discusses the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in the euro area and describes how the arguments raised by the European Court of Justice in the Weiss and Gauweiler cases suggest there may be hard limits on the size of the Eurosystem's sovereign bond holdings. These limits may undermine the positive impact of the OMT announcement and force the ECB into some difficult choices in the coming years.

The EU's Treaties were designed to limit the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. However, over the last decade, the introduction of the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme and its sovereign bond purchase programmes have created some strong linkages between monetary and fiscal policies in the Eurosystem. The ECB's monetary policies have improved fiscal debt sustainability and reduced the probability of sovereign default. However, there may need to be limits to the ECB's purchases of sovereign bonds. This paper discusses the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in the euro area and describes how the arguments raised by the European Court of Justice in the Weiss and Gauweiler cases suggest there may be hard limits on the size of the Eurosystem's sovereign bond holdings. These limits may undermine the positive impact of the OMT announcement and force the ECB into some difficult choices in the coming years.

The euro has had a difficult second decade but the project has still had some important successes. The common currency is popular among the euro area's citizens, intra-European exchange rate instability has been removed and the ECB has successfully achieved its primary goal of price stability. The single currency's popularity has made the euro more resilient than many sceptics thought possible twenty years ago. A number of improvements to the architecture of EMU have been implemented in the past decade but serious tensions remain, relating to fiscal capacity, sovereign default and financial stability. To keep the euro together, Europe's politicians need to make the euro area less crisis-prone and to make it easier for member states to recover from the inevitable cyclical downturns that will happen in the future. The past few years have seen many proposals put forward for future improvements to the economic policy structure underlying the euro. Keeping the euro together may depend on Europe's politicians agreeing to implement them.

The European Commission has recently proposed a new package of reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact. The package contains a number of good proposals. In particular, the increased focus on debt ratios is a very positive suggestion though this should be strengthened further. However, some of the other proposals, such as the new principle of prudent fiscal management and the scoreboard for non-fiscal imbalances, are poorly thought out and perhaps unworkable. A smaller number of well-focused proposals may end up working better than this complex, and perhaps overly ambitious, package. And a coherent policy to allow for orderly sovereign defaults in Euro area member states would probably place more pressure, via bond markets, on states to get their fiscal houses in order than would the proposed system of fines.