Stock market crashes and speculative manias
In: The international library of macroeconomic and financial history 13
In: An Elgar reference collection
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In: The international library of macroeconomic and financial history 13
In: An Elgar reference collection
In: The journal of economic history, Band 76, Heft 1, S. 244-246
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: The journal of economic history, Band 76, Heft 1, S. 249-251
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: NBER Working Paper No. w21341
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w18712
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w16825
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In: The economic history review, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 242-243
ISSN: 1468-0289
In: Financial Market Regulation in the Wake of Financial Crises: The Historical Experience Conference, p. 15, 2009
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w15573
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In: Cliometrica: journal of historical economics and econometric history, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 115-144
ISSN: 1863-2513
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12138
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w12661
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Working paper
In: The economic history review, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 636-663
ISSN: 1468-0289
The establishment of a government bureaucracy to collect taxes is regarded as one of the essential features of a modern economy. While Britain is considered a pioneer, France has been treated as a laggard because of continued reliance on tax farming. Focusing on the largest tax farm, France's late transition from private to government tax collection is explained in a principal‐agent context by the difficulties of monitoring employees and borrowing at low cost in the capital market. Tax farmers continued to earn high returns, absorbing the risk of fluctuating collections, leaving the Crown with lower revenue.
The establishment of a centralized government bureaucracy to collect taxes is regarded as one of the essential features of a modern economy. Britain has long been regarded as a pioneer, creating an efficient tax-collecting bureaucracy over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the other hand, France has been regarded as a laggard, continuing to rely heavily on tax farming. Focusing on the largest of the tax farms, the French Crown's slow transition from privatized tax collection to government administered tax collection is explained as a consequence of its inability to adequately monitor employees and absorb the risk of fluctuating revenues and absence of ready access to the capital markets. Consequently, the French Crown failed to capture significant tax revenues as it headed into a fiscal crisis at the end of the eighteenth century.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w6063
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