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The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those created by rounding, faced by voters in systems of proportional representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour. The first model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximizer) while the second considers a voter who is concerned with the distribution of power in it (power maximizer). We show that under pure PR, seat maximizers do not have any incentives to manipulate, which justifies the Bowler and Lanoue (1992) claim, and that such incentives for seat maximizers appear with the introduction of a threshold. We show that, even in the absence of a threshold, there will always exist circumstances where a power maximizer would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that her incentives to make an insincere vote depend on her attitude towards uncertainty. The introduction of a threshold creates new and stronger opportunities for strategic voters regardless of their attitude towards uncertainty. Finally we discuss the overshooting/undershooting phenomenon, when either too many or too few like-minded voters attempt to manipulate. We use the two models to explain voters' behaviour at the 2005 New Zealand general election and demonstrate that rounding creates not only incentives but also disincentives for strategic voting.

The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those created by rounding, faced by voters in systems of proportional representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour. The first model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximizer) while the second considers a voter who is concerned with the distribution of power in it (power maximizer). We show that under pure PR, seat maximizers do not have any incentives to manipulate, which justifies the Bowler and Lanoue (1992) claim, and that such incentives for seat maximizers appear with the introduction of a threshold. We show that, even in the absence of a threshold, there will always exist circumstances where a power maximizer would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that her incentives to make an insincere vote depend on her attitude towards uncertainty. The introduction of a threshold creates new and stronger opportunities for strategic voters regardless of their attitude towards uncertainty. Finally we discuss the overshooting/undershooting phenomenon, when either too many or too few like-minded voters attempt to manipulate. We use the two models to explain voters' behaviour at the 2005 New Zealand general election and demonstrate that rounding creates not only incentives but also disincentives for strategic voting. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

International audience ; Commercially available fish oil supplements sourced from retail outlets in the UK as well as by mail order, were surveyed in 2000-2 for dioxin (PCDD/Fs) and PCB content. Sampled products were representative of market share. The WHO-TEQ values for these products ranged from 0.18 – 8.4 ng/kg for S PCDD/F and 1.1 – 41 ng/kg for S dioxin-like PCBs. The results suggest a downward trend in the levels of dioxins in fish oil supplements over the last decade, since levels for similar products ranged from 0.3 –10 ng/kg for S PCDD/F WHO-TEQ in 1996. Levels of ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Seas) 7 PCBs in the current study ranged from 8.3 – 267 mg/kg. Subsequent to this survey, EU legislation has been introduced that includes a maximum limit of 2 ng/kg WHO-TEQ for dioxins in fish oil products for human consumption. 12 of the 33 products reported here would have exceeded this limit. Negotiations are in progress to incorporate dioxin-like PCBs into the EU regulations. When manufacturer-recommended doses were applied to the observed levels, the estimated upper bound human exposure to dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs from dietary intake of these products ranged from 0.02 to 7.1 pg WHO-TEQ/ kg bodyweight/ day for adults and 0.02 – 10 pg WHO-TEQ/ kg bodyweight/ day for school children. This level rises to 1.8 – 8.9 pg WHO-TEQ/ kg bodyweight/ day for adults and 1.4 – 14 pg WHO-TEQ/ kg bodyweight/ day for school children when combined with average exposure from the whole diet in 1997. Again subsequent to this survey, the Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment (COT) revised the UK TDI for mixtures of dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs from 10 pg WHO-TEQ/kg bodyweight per day to 2 pg WHO-TEQ/kg bodyweight/day. This is in line with the Tolerable Weekly Intake of 14 pg WHO-TEQ/kg bodyweight set by the Scientific Committee on Food.