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AbstractMany supporters of democratic reform in the UK propose both a change in the electoral system to proportional representation (PR) and a shift to a formal (codified and entrenched) constitution. In principle, these two proposals are deeply complementary. There is, however, also a potential tension between them. Specifically, if a future UK government were to treat PR as a matter of ordinary legislation, this would conflict with the democratic constitutionalist principle that major constitutional changes require a more direct and/or robust test of public support, in addition to parliamentary approval—such as in a confirmatory referendum. The article discusses seven possible approaches by which a future progressive Parliament might advance PR. It assesses their strengths and weaknesses with an eye on this tension and other factors. It concludes that the emerging politics around this tension underscores the need for a formal constitution to prevent the UK's constitutional politics becoming subordinated to partisan conflict.

This article discusses the potential for constitutional impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom's constitution. Some argue that Brexit entails the restoration of effective parliamentary sovereignty and, thereby, a reaffirmation of the UK's traditional constitution. However, Brexit increases pressure on unstable points in the traditional constitution, making other outcomes possible. One possibility is the emergence of a 'populist' democracy which, while retaining the legal framework of the traditional constitution, gives the UK executive greater power relative to the UK parliament, judiciary and devolved governments. The institution of referendum might also have a distinctive place within this new populist democracy, though the constitutional status of the referendum remains very unclear. In this scenario, UK developments have something in common with shifts towards 'post-liberal' and 'populist' polities in other nations. Alternatively, the pressures increased by Brexit might yet push the UK – or post-UK – further in the direction of democratic constitutionalism, ultimately making it a more 'normal' – ironically, perhaps a more 'European' – democratic state.

Abstract
When (if ever) does justice require that individuals have exemptions from general laws on grounds relating to religion? In Liberalism's Religion, Cécile Laborde argues that the focus ought not to be 'religion' but 'integrity', an interest shared by religious and non-religious people. Integrity-protecting commitments (IPC s) include commitments expressive of the individual's sense of what they are obligated to do ('obligation-IPC s') and commitments that, while not a matter of obligation, are nevertheless crucial to the individual's identity ('identity-IPC s'). Laborde argues that justice permits and requires exemptions from general laws so as to secure these commitments and, thereby, the individual's underlying interest in integrity. This paper considers whether there is a class of integrity-related commitments which Laborde's approach fails to accommodate - a class of commitments related to ideals of 'self-transcendence'.

There is growing interest in the United Kingdom in holding a constitutional convention (CC) to deliberate possible reforms to the political system. What form should a CC take? Having identified a range of possible models, we examine their merits according to stated normative criteria, focusing specifically on (1) how CC membership is determined, (2) whether a CC should have agenda-setting power and (3) whether it should have power to send proposals to binding referendum. We find good reasons to support a 'citizen majority' membership (chosen in a near-random fashion from the general public), agenda-setting power and referendum power. However, none of these features is likely to be the most appropriate in all contexts. Further design issues concerning citizen-majority conventions, such as whether they ought to include politicians as a minority or exclude them, are also considered. While the immediate focus of discussion is the United Kingdom, the core argument has wider relevance.

Stuart White argues that the people, rather than parliament, must settle urgent questions about the basic composition of the UK's political system and the state's relationship to society. But settling on the design and remit of the required constitutional convention(s) may be a fraught process.