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Although psychological warfare was practiced to a greater degree in the Vietnam conflict than in any other war in history, virtually nothing has been published about it. Perhaps few wished to be identified with such activity, or it may be that security considerations prevented discussion of the operations. At any rate, the end of the Cold War has made it possible to take a brief look at a hitherto unknown (or undiscussed) subject. This article, however, does not make a pretense of being comprehensive for the whole war, but rather reflects personal observations during one brief period of intense fighting—the summer of 1966.

It was hyp'ed that there is an optimal COMM- attitude discrepancy which yields maximum change, & that this discrepancy is intermediate between the extremes. A COMM advocating stronger production & marketing controls in agriculture was presented to 4 groups whose stands on the issue differed from that presented in the COMM. The position of group (A), composed of farmers, was quite close to that presented in the COMM, while a group of Coll S's (B), & one of adults (C), held positions of greater discrepancy. A 4th group (D) of farmers held extremely opposed positions. A before-after test of attitude revealed that group (A) changed little. Greater change occurred among those in groups (B) & (C) while the farmers in group (D) changed negatively (boomerang effect). The result showed that there is a curvilinear relationship between discrepancy & change. Small discrepancies yield small change. Increasing the discrepancy beyond that point results in decreased change & finally, negative or boomerang effects when the discrepancy is extreme. The size of the optimal discrepancy, however, must be defined by the position of the audience on the issue before hearing the COMM. Modified AA.