1. 'The central values of civilization are in danger' -- 2. There is no such thing as 'the economy': on social and economic rights -- 3. Neoliberalism, human rights and the 'shabby remnants of colonial imperialism' -- 4. Human rights in Pinochet's Chile: the dethronement of politics -- 5. Powerless companions or fellow travellers? human rights and the neoliberal assault on post-colonial economic justice -- Afterword: human rights, neoliberalism and economic inequality today.
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Around 1882, the photographer Albert Fernique photographed a group of Parisian workers gathered around trestles and benches inside a workshop. The floor is strewn with piles of wood and the ceiling beams tower above the workmen. Even so, the space is dwarfed by a massive, sculpted shoulder, draped in Roman robes, which dominates the background of the photograph; two workers watching the scene from a beam just below the roof appear to be perched on it like sparrows. The shoulder belonged to the statue, Liberty Enlightening the World—a gift to the United States from the France of the Third Republic. Work on the statue began here, in the workshop of the sculptor Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi, only a year after the suppression of the Paris Commune. More people were killed in that one Bloody Week (la semaine sanglante) in 1874 than were executed in the entire Reign of Terror following the French Revolution. If the statue was supposed to symbolize liberty, this was to be an orderly liberty far removed from the license of the armed Parisian workers and their short-lived utopian government. Unlike her ancestor Marianne, immortalized by Eugène Delacroix's Liberty Leading the People, the statue does not wear the red cap that, since ancient Rome, had symbolized freedom from slavery. In the wake of the Paris Commune, the Third Republic banned the cap and sought to banish the unruly freedom it represented.
Friedrich Hayek repeatedly stressed the centrality of submission to his own account of spontaneous order. In what he depicted as the rationalist refusal to submit to anything beyond human comprehension, he saw a threat to the "spontaneous order" of a market society. Kyong-Min Son's criticism of my account of the neoliberal subject provides me with an opportunity to further specify my understanding of the submissive disposition of the Hayekian subject. In this brief reply, I defend the claim that Hayek saw the complexity and opacity of the market order as constraining the possibility of collective political intervention that aims to alter the outcomes of market competition. While Hayek theorized a subject who was actively invested in the competitive "game," the premise of this investment was submission to the rules of the market and acceptance of its outcomes as a form of fate.
Friedrich Hayek's account of "spontaneous order" has generated increasing interest in recent decades. His argument for the superiority of the market in distributing knowledge without the need for central oversight has appealed to progressive democratic theorists, who are wary of the hubris of state planning and attracted to possibilities for self-organization, and to Foucaultians, who have long counseled political theory to cut off the King's head. A spontaneous social order, organized by an invisible hand, would appear to dispense with arbitrary power and foster creativity and individual liberty. This article challenges this view by highlighting the centrality of submission to Hayek's account of spontaneous order. It shows that Hayek struggles to obscure the providentialism underpinning the account of social order he derives from Adam Ferguson and the Scottish Enlightenment. Nonetheless, his own account of spontaneous order relies on faith in the workings of the market, and submission to unintelligible market forces.
Reflecting on the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Lebanese UN delegate Charles Malik noted that what was at stake was "the determination of the nature of man." Perhaps surprisingly, this debate revolved around the figure who epitomizes the myth of "natural man": Robinson Crusoe. This article situates this debate in the context of Karl Marx's critique of those political economists who had previously used Robinson Crusoe to naturalize new, historically specific, capitalist social and economic relations. In opposition to this naturalizing move, I suggest that close attention to the debates that preceded the UDHR allow us to resist the utilization of the language of human rights to make the possessive individualism of contemporary neoliberal capitalism appear eternal.
