Suchergebnisse

Trotz eines starren Alterssicherungssystems Bismarck'schen Zuschnitts unterlag das deutsche Rentensystem einem graduellen Wandel. Tobias Wiß analysiert die bisher unzureichend erfasste Rolle der Sozialpartner (Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeber) im Rentenreformprozess und innerhalb der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge. Während die Sozialpartner einen Einflussverlust im Gesetzgebungsprozess zu verzeichnen haben, eröffnen sich in der tarifpolitischen Arena neue Gestaltungsspielräume durch Tarifverträge und kollektive Versorgungswerke. Insgesamt stehen die neuen Formen der Alterssicherung trotz der Rentenprivatisierung einer hohen Regulierungsdichte gegenüber.

Pension reforms and the changing public/private pension mix of the last decades are well documented. However, a more detailed look at the design of occupational pensions reveals remarkable differences even in countries that are usually treated as similar in the literature. Germany and Austria share many similarities and are having to cope with similar reform pressure. However, the design of occupational pensions varies substantially. Why? In Germany, trade unions are regularly involved in occupational pension schemes and benefits are calculated on the basis of defined contributions (DC), but with minimum return guarantees preventing losses in times of financial turmoil. By contrast, trade unions rarely participate in Austrian occupational schemes. In Austria, pure DC schemes without guarantees resulted in heavy occupational pension cuts during the recent financial market crises. Following the method of difference, the article explains this difference by trade union structure, unions' strategic thinking and (lacking) reform threats supported by employers.

AbstractAlthough studies have examined the distribution and conditions of employer‐provided work–family arrangements, we still lack a systematic investigation of how these vary for different countries and industries. Based on the European Working Conditions Survey 2010, this study examines the conditions under which firms provide family‐friendly working time arrangements and what the differences are across four countries (Austria, Denmark, Italy and the UK) and four industries. The impact of employee representatives, employee involvement, manager support and female managers varies across countries and industries because of the institutional environment (prevailing family model, industrial relations) and workforce composition (gender). The impact of employee representatives depends on their co‐determination rights, and the direction of their effect on the prevailing family model (e.g. negative in conservative countries such as Austria) and the gender composition of the workforce (negative in male‐dominated production, but positive in services). Employee involvement in the work organization is significantly positive in Austria and Denmark (both with co‐operative industrial relations), while manager support has the strongest effect in the UK (liberal regime). At the industry level, female supervisors are positively associated with family‐friendly working time arrangements only in the male‐dominated production industry. These findings suggest that the effects of agency variables and their direction vary depending on the institutional context.

Studies analysing welfare have previously focused on countries as units. In the course of pension cuts and the increasing importance of occupational welfare, our traditional understanding of a homogeneous welfare state is being challenged. In this article, I distinguish between both economic individual power (employee skills) and political collective power (trade unions), and their relation with different occupational pensions. A combined analysis by both factors is not common, where employee skills and power resources are traditionally treated as separate, rival explanations of public welfare. Combining the 'method of difference' with the 'method of agreement', the article first presents the within-country variety of occupational pensions in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Denmark. Occupational pensions in the same economic sectors across countries are then used as the units of analysis in order to illustrate the plausible determinants of economic individual power and political collective power.

Studies analysing welfare have previously focused on countries as units. In the course of pension cuts and the increasing importance of occupational welfare, our traditional understanding of a homogeneous welfare state is being challenged. In this article, I distinguish between both economic individual power (employee skills) and political collective power (trade unions), and their relation with different occupational pensions. A combined analysis by both factors is not common, where employee skills and power resources are traditionally treated as separate, rival explanations of public welfare. Combining the 'method of difference with the 'method of agreement, the article first presents the within-country variety of occupational pensions in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Denmark. Occupational pensions in the same economic sectors across countries are then used as the units of analysis in order to illustrate the plausible determinants of economic individual power and political collective power. ; Refereed/Peer-reviewed ; (VLID)3557003 ; Version of record

Studies analysing welfare have previously focused on countries as units. In the course of pension cuts and the increasing importance of occupational welfare, our traditional understanding of a homogeneous welfare state is being challenged. In this article, I distinguish between both economic individual power (employee skills) and political collective power (trade unions), and their relation with different occupational pensions. A combined analysis by both factors is not common, where employee skills and power resources are traditionally treated as separate, rival explanations of public welfare. Combining the 'method of difference' with the 'method of agreement', the article first presents the within-country variety of occupational pensions in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Denmark. Occupational pensions in the same economic sectors across countries are then used as the units of analysis in order to illustrate the plausible determinants of economic individual power and political collective power.