Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Post-communist states of East Central Europe face the authoritarian challenge to their young democracies, the sources of which are both historical and contemporary. Economic underdevelopment, the retarded process of nation-building and several decades of communist rul made countries of the region less well prepared for democratic transformation than their Western neighbors, but better than former Soviet Union. Combination of economic and social tensions, nationalism and religious fundamentalism creates conditions conducive tom the crises of democracy, but such crises can be overcome if liberal and socialist forces join hands.

The Russian revolution of 1917 was one of the turning points in world history, even if its radical (communist) stage proved to be a historical blind street. There was just one revolution – not two, as it had been interpreted by the Soviet historiography. The uniqueness of the Russian revolution results from the fact that the radical seizure of power in November 1917 turned to be the beginning of a long process of totalitarian dictatorship, which lasted for mor than seventy years. Today, it is the heritage of the victory in the Second World War that constitutes the founding myth of modern Russian state.

Political scientists discussed the role of the smaller states in several studies published in the 1960s and 70s. They focused on policy choices a small power faced when joining multinational alliances and within them. Recently, attention has focused on how many a small powers can influence political developments both within the alliances they belong to and outside them. Poland's involvement in the negotiated solution of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2004 shows that a smaller power can use its assets to influence events. When the political scene in Ukraine polarized between two camps (respectively represented by Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko) Russia tried to influence the outcome by giving support to Yanukovych. The United States and the European Union remained neutral in the crisis, mostly due to their unwillingness to damage their relations with Russia. When the run-off election had been rigged and Yushchenko's supporters began street protests, Polish public opinion solidly sided with the Ukrainian opposition. Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in a series of visits to Kiev, helped both sides of the Ukrainian crisis to reach a negotiated compromise. The run-off results were declared void by the Supreme Court and in the repeated vote Yushchenko won the presidency. Poland was able to help her neighbour to chose a democratic solution to the crisis and continues to support Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union. In the long run such policy serves Poland's interests but its immediate consequence has been a deterioration in Polish-Russian relations.

Do leaders make a differenceΠDo they actually leadΠThere is a rich body of theoretical literature in which one can find many different responses.1 The question can be dealt with on the level of the philosophy of history as well as on the basis of empirical political sociology. The present paper takes the second road. Using data from the behavioral research conducted in Poland since 1966,1 particularly from the four studies conducted since the beginning of democratic reforms, I shall try to illustrate the importance of reformist leadership in Poland's local politics.

Poland's experience in democratic transformation is to some degree different from that of other post-communist nations because of its having been the first country to depart from a communist regime. It therefore had a relatively long period of power-sharing, negotiated at the Round Table conference in early 1989. The first parliament (1989-91) reflected the contractual arrangements of the Round Table and was not fully representative. The second parliament (1991-93) was paralyzed by extreme fragmentation. The third parliament, elected in 1993, is more consolidated but suffers from the absence of right-wing parties due to their failure to reach the required electoral threshold. During Lech Walesa's presidency (1990-95), relations between the president and parliament were tense, particularly after the left's victory in the 1993 election. Nonetheless, parliamentarism has survived in Poland and the democratic system has avoided constitutional crises. Poland's experience confirms the superiority of parliamentarism over presidentialism in new democracies.

One of the most notable characteristics of the political life in Poland during the crisis of 1980-1981 was the political mobilization of previous non-activists-young people, workers, and peasants-as well as greater political involvement of previously nominally politicized citizens. Political mobilization was due to changes in the institutional framework, particularly the emergence of new forms of political expres sion, and increased interest in politics resulting from everyday consequences of economic crisis. Public opinion polls indicated a greater sense of political involve ment. Institutional consequences of political mobilization included democratization of existing structures, particularly of the Polish United Workers Party; formation of new political organizations; and intensification of political cleavages. Mobilization, combined with political radicalization, deepened the political crisis and contributed to the collapse of attempts to build a "contractual democracy."