Suchergebnisse

We analyze normatively determined distributions of language rights in multilingual settings. It is shown in a welfare-maximizing model where rights today influence the status of a language in the future, that the "naive" ex ante cost-benefit analysis has to be augmented in various directions. This has its roots in the dynamic aspect of the rights and the resulting endogeneity of preferences as well as in the discrete character of rights. It is shown how efficiency and distribution considerations are affected by these considerations.

We analyze various normatively determined distributions of language rights in multilingual settings. A general model for the analysis of language rights over time in a model with overlapping generations is set up. This model is then first used to find efficient allocations of rights in the tradition of Wicksell. It is shown that, when rights today influence the status of a language in the future, the "naïve" static analysis has to be augmented in favor of further-reaching minority rights in order to take into account the dynamic aspect. It is then demonstrated that a traditional welfare-economic analysis generally goes even further in the support of minority rights. If a possible externality on other communities is taken into account, however, these results are reversed in a pure efficiency analysis. If redistribution arguments are taken into account, this provides an effect in the opposite direction again.

It is assumed that language policy can influence the language in which parents choose to raise their children. A basic model of language transmission in the family is outlined and the effect of different policies on the vitality of a minority language is analyzed. It is argued that the habitation patterns and numerical strength of the minority have a strong influence on the cost effectiveness of various policy measures. It is shown that by classifying language policies into four distinct categories we can assign different policies to different minorities in a cost-effective manner, based on the size of the jurisdiction where the minority lives and its numerical strength within it. We provide a general intuitive discussion and a specific example to support the general analysis.

Abstract
In this note, we outline various possible long-run effects of an English-only acquisition policy in the European Union. The point of departure is how individual behaviour adapts to constraints in the environment. This leads to changes in collective behaviour, which becomes part of the environment, again influencing individual behaviour. Possible equilibria of this feedback mechanism are discussed. It is argued that domain loss and diglossia may result. The process is further characterized by external effects. Looking at language knowledge as a merit good, path dependencies and multiple stable equilibria can be explained.

We analyze normatively determined distributions of language rights in multilingual settings. It is shown in a welfare-maximizing model where rights today influence the status of a language in the future, that the 'naive' ex ante cost-benefit analysis has to be augmented in various directions. This has its roots in the dynamic aspect of the rights and the resulting endogeneity of preferences as well as in the discrete character of rights. It is shown how efficiency and distribution considerations are affected by these considerations.

We analyze various normatively determined distributions of language rights in multilingual settings. A general model for the analysis of language rights over time in a model with overlapping generations is set up. This model is then first used to find efficient allocations of rights in the tradition of Wicksell. It is shown that, when rights today influence the status of a language in the future, the naïve static analysis has to be augmented in favor of further-reaching minority rights in order to take into account the dynamic aspect. It is then demonstrated that a traditional welfare-economic analysis generally goes even further in the support of minority rights. If a possible externality on other communities is taken into account, however, these results are reversed in a pure efficiency analysis. If redistribution arguments are taken into account, this provides an effect in the opposite direction again.