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Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Problem Of Property -- Chapter 3: Lockean Property Theory: A Menu Of Options For The Justification Of Unilateral Appropriation -- Chapter 4: Lockean Appropriation Assessed -- Chapter 5: Right-Libertarian Appropriation Assessed -- Chapter 6: The Approximation Of A Property Rights Accord -- Chapter 7: Conclusion: The Greater Of Two Goods.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Problem Of Property -- Chapter 3: Lockean Property Theory: A Menu Of Options For The Justification Of Unilateral Appropriation -- Chapter 4: Lockean Appropriation Assessed -- Chapter 5: Right-Libertarian Appropriation Assessed -- Chapter 6: The Approximation Of A Property Rights Accord -- Chapter 7: Conclusion: The Greater Of Two Goods.

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Author -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Universal Basic Income and Its More Testable Sibling, the Negative Income Tax -- Chapter 3: Available Testing Techniques -- Chapter 4: Testing Difficulties -- 1 Community Effects -- 2 The Hawthorne Effect -- 3 Long-Term Effects -- 4 The Streetlight Effect -- 5 The Difficulty of Separating the Effects of the Size from the Effects of the Type of Policy Being Studied -- Chapter 5: The Practical Impossibility of Testing UBI -- 1 Forces Pushing Tests Toward NIT -- 2 Testing Half the Effects -- Chapter 6: BIG Experiments of the 1970s and the Public Reaction to Them -- 1 Labor Market Effects of the NIT Experiments of the 1970s -- 2 Nonlabor-Market Effects of the NIT Experiments -- 3 An Overall Assessment? -- 4 Public Reaction to the Release of NIT Experimental Findings in the 1970s -- Chapter 7: New Experimental Findings 2008-2013 -- Chapter 8: Current, Planned, and Proposed Experiments, 2014-Present -- 1 GiveDirectly in Kenya -- 2 Finland -- 3 Canada -- 4 Y Combinator in the United States -- 5 The Netherlands -- 6 Stockton, California -- 7 Other Experiments -- 8 Will We Refight the Last War? -- Chapter 9: The Political Economy of the Decision to Have a UBI Experiment -- Chapter 10: The Vulnerability of Experimental Findings to Misunderstanding, Misuse, Spin, and the Streetlight Effect -- 1 Working Backward from the Public Discussion and Forward to It Again -- Chapter 11: Why UBI Experiments Cannot Resolve Much of the Public Disagreement About UBI -- Chapter 12: The Bottom Line -- 1 Identifying and Overall Bottom Line -- 2 Issue-Specific Bottom Lines -- Chapter 13: Identifying Important Empirical Claims in the UBI Debate -- 1 Claims Commonly Made by Supporters -- 2 Claims Commonly Made by Opponents -- 3 Conclusion.

Introduction -- Effective control self-ownership: freedom as the power to say no -- Forty acres and a mule? Implications of respecting personal independence -- The importance of independence I: framing the issue -- The importance of independence II: freedom and integrity -- The importance of independence III: market vulnerability -- What good is a theory of freedom that allows forced labor? Independence and modern theories of freedom -- If you're an egalitarian, why do you want to be the boss of the poor? Independence and liberal-egalitarian theories of justice -- On duty -- Conclusion.

Freedom is commonly understood in two different ways: the absence of restriction or interference (scalar freedom) and the absence of slavery or oppression (status freedom). "Independence, Propertylessness, and Basic Income" argues that philosophers have focused too much on scalar freedom and proposes a theory of status freedom as effective control self-ownership--simply, freedom as the power to say no. This exciting new volume argues for and explores the implications of this theory of freedom. It shows that most societies today put the poor in situations in which they lack this crucial freedom, making them vulnerable to poverty, exploitation, and injustice. Widerquist argues that the basic income guarantee is an appropriate institution to help secure status freedom in a modern industrial society

Contributors discuss the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) and Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) as a model both for resource policy and for social policy. This book explores whether other states, nations, or regions would benefit from an Alaskan-style dividend. The book also looks at possible ways that the model might be altered and improved

La plupart des théories de la justice offrent des approches en première intention au problème de l' insider et de l' outsider en supposant que les humains peuvent créer une structure sociale de base que personne ne pourrait raisonnablement rejeter. Cet article soutient qu'il n'existe pas de telles solutions en première intention et que la croyance en de telles solutions désavantage systématiquement les personnes les moins puissantes sur les plans politique, social et économique. L'article présente ensuite une théorie alternative, appelée « la justice comme recherche de l'accord », avec une approche en seconde intention. Dans l'hypothèse où tous les contrats sociaux ne sont pas des contrats d'inclus et d'exclus, y a-t-il quelque chose qui puisse justifier une structure sociale ? L'article suggère et explique trois exigences de justification dans ces circonstances : l'accord le plus large possible (accord exprès plutôt que tacite), l'impact négatif minimal sur les personnes qui ne peuvent être amenées à s'entendre, et la recherche constante de l'accord le plus large.

The article discusses the conditions under which can we say that people enter the economic system voluntarily. 'The Need for an Exit Option' briefly explains the philosophical argument that voluntary interaction requires an exit option--a reasonable alternative to participation in the projects of others. 'The Treatment of Effective Forced Labor in Economic and Political Theory' considers the treatment of effectively forced interaction in economic and political theory. 'Human Need' discusses theories of human need to determine the capabilities a person requires to have an acceptable exit option. 'Capability in Cash, Kind, or Raw Resources' considers what form access to that level of capability should take--in cash, kind, or raw resources, concluding that a basic income guarantee is the most effective method to ensure an exit option in a modern, industrial economy. Adapted from the source document.

Many libertarians make a moral argument that liberty requires the freedom to exercise strong property rights. From this, they argue that no more than a minimal state with sharply limited powers of taxation can be justified. A larger state would supposedly interfere with private property rights and thereby reduce liberty. In response, this article shows how natural rights to property do not entail any particular vision of the state. It demonstrates that the principles of natural property rights support monarchy just as well as they support a capitalist aristocracy. Nothing in the theory of natural property rights rules out government ownership of property or government ownership of the right to tax. Therefore, the natural rights argument does not necessarily imply libertarian limits on the state, but rather the acceptance of whatever state powers and property rights have been in place for a sufficient amount of time. For example, historical property rights in Britain do not imply that private titleholders possess rights that have been subject to interference from the state, as libertarians claim. Instead, they imply that the Queen and her ministers in parliament have a strong claim to at least partial ownership of the whole island of Britain and the property within it. If this argument holds, it poses a serious dilemma for libertarians, forcing them to choose between their account of liberty as the exercise of property rights and their belief that only a minimal state is justifiable.