Suchergebnisse

Not much is known about the Netherlands Signals Intelligence (Sigint) activities, which were executed by the Technisch Informatie Verwerkings Centrum (TIVC). During the Cold War, the Sigint effort was not so much directed at the Soviet Union & its allies but primarily against European nations. It also served other foreign policy objectives. Sigint was used in the Dutch colonial struggle with Indonesia over the control of the island of New Guinea but also in Latin America. After the demise of the Soviet Union, new priorities were formulated, eg, international terrorism, ethnic & religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, transnational organized crime, etc. This article traces the historical evolution of the TIVC in performing its Sigint functions during the Cold War. 3 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

Conflicts of interest between the US and some of the smaller allies in NATO over the last 30 years; based on conference paper. Examines the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Korean Airlines 007 disaster; based on declassified Dutch diplomatic archives, 1960-85.

In a recent issue of the Review John Baylis discussed wartime thinking in Great Britain about a post-war European security group. Baylis's contribution is of great importance to the historiography of wartime and post-war British foreign and security policy, filling a void in our knowledge of these crucial years. However, we would like to make some critical comments on his treatment of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff report 'Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic', which is such a central feature in his contribution. According to Baylis this particular study by the PHPS (an interdepartmental study group created by the British War Cabinet) laid down 'a reasonably coherent set of attitudes' regarding post-war European co-operation. The PHPS, collecting together much of the current thinking in both Foreign Office and military circles, advocated the formation of a Western European-Group as a kind of insurance against a rearmed Germany ors if the world organization failed to materialize, against a potentially hostile USSR. The report marked the formation of a 'consensus' among Foreign Office and military officials involved in post-war planning.