Suchergebnisse

What explains the attempts of different regime types, particularly different types of authoritarian regimes, to resolve international disputes peacefully, especially through legally binding methods? This study argues that the institutional structure of different types of authoritarian regimes—mainly the size of the winning coalition—influences the probability of resolution attempts. Regimes that have larger winning coalitions are more likely to seek peaceful dispute resolution because they can provide public goods that result from territorial concessions in dispute settlement. Likewise, regimes that are better able to promise public goods are expected to be more likely to do so through institutionalized, binding means in order to avoid domestic punishment. Analyzing two different datasets of authoritarian regime types, combined with data on territorial disputes from 1946–2007, the study finds that single-party regimes are generally more likely than other types of authoritarian regimes to pursue peaceful dispute resolution, specifically legally binding resolution methods.

"Conflict Management of Territorial Disputes" published on by Oxford University Press.

In 2012, South Korea and Japan came very close to signing a bilateral security agreement that would help to address mutual security threats: China's rise in power and North Korea's missile testing and nuclear status. Yet the South Korean government halted the signing of the agreement due to domestic opposition, putting a stop to this and other future security agreements for now. Why have South Korean governments been unable or unwilling to pursue security agreements with Japan? This research first examines whether the security agreements are necessary, and second, the role of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets territorial dispute as a major symbolic deterrent for such security agreements. I argue that security agreements are necessary, yet domestic accountability in South Korea regarding the Dokdo islets and related tensions with Japan strongly oftentimes impedes furthering security relations with Japan. An examination of Korean domestic public opinion, actions of civil society groups, and actions and decisions of South Korean politicians demonstrate that domestic accountability has played a major role in preventing further security relations with Japan. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

This article seeks to explain factors that make mediation attempts more or less likely in territorial, maritime, and river disputes. I argue that the intensity of the dispute and the salience of disputed territory have strong influence on mediation attempts. The study further examines the impact of these factors on the type of mediation strategy (directive, procedural, or communications). Hypotheses about mediation attempts are tested with theicowdata set of interstate territorial, maritime, and river disputes from 1816 to 2001. Findings indicate that intensity of the dispute and salience of disputed territory have a strong impact on the selection of mediation in the first place, and second, that salience of disputed territory makes the directive strategy more likely, while intensity of the dispute makes procedural or communications strategies more likely.

This article seeks to explain factors that make mediation attempts more or less likely in territorial, maritime, and river disputes. I argue that the intensity of the dispute and the salience of disputed territory have strong influence on mediation attempts. The study further examines the impact of these factors on the type of mediation strategy (directive, procedural, or communications). Hypotheses about mediation attempts are tested with the ICOW data set of interstate territorial, maritime, and river disputes from 1816 to 2001. Findings indicate that intensity of the dispute and salience of disputed territory have a strong impact on the selection of mediation in the first place, and second, that salience of disputed territory makes the directive strategy more likely, while intensity of the dispute makes procedural or communications strategies more likely. Adapted from the source document.

States involved in territorial disputes are more likely initiate militarized interstate disputes to threaten or use force (MIDs) compared to states involved in other types of interstate disputes, when the disputed territory has strategic or ethnic value, and when the opposing states are contiguous, rivals, or have relative power parity. Though useful, these factors are static or rarely change over time, so they cannot explain the timing of an MID in a territorial dispute. It is not clear why a challenger state would threaten or use force at one point in the dispute, but not at another point. This study proposes that challenger states sometimes use MIDs not only to signal resolve to the opposing state in the territorial dispute, but to credibly demonstrate resolve to other adversaries in other disputes – an attempt to transfer reputation for resolve. To tackle the debate about transferability of reputation for resolve, the study empirically analyzes all territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995 and finds support that challenger states are more likely to initiate territorial MIDs as costly signals of resolve and credibility around the same time as another MID with a different adversary. Further analysis indicates that in terms of intensity level, challenger states are more likely to use threats, displays of force, or low intensity uses of force when initiating an MID to signal resolve to other states.