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This book presents important aspects of the New-Keynesian theory of monetary policy and its implications for the practical decision-making of central bankers today. Bridging the theory and practice of monetary policy, it provides an exposition on the key elements of the New-Keynesian approach, outlines important lessons for policymakers, and points to new directions for further research. Important policy implications of the New-Keynesian approach such as the case for forecast targeting as a strategy for monetary policy, the combination of model-based forecasts with cyclical analysis, and strategies for cross-checking model-based policy recommendations are presented in detail. The book brings together new contributions from leading scientists and experienced policymakers presented at an academic symposium on the occasion of the awarding of the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2007 to Professor Michael Woodford. With contributions by: Josef Ackermann, Deutsche Bank AG; Günter Beck, Goethe University Frankfurt; Jordi Galí, Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Stefan Gerlach, Goethe University Frankfurt; Domenico Giannone, European Central Bank; Otmar Issing, Goethe University Frankfurt; Hermann-Josef Lamberti, Deutsche Bank AG; Patrick Lane, The Economist; Bennet T. McCallum, Carnegie Mellon University; Frederic Mishkin, Columbia Business School; Francesca Monti, Université Libre de Bruxelles; Lucrezia Reichlin, London Business School; Norbert Walter, Deutsche Bank AG; Celia Wieland, wieland EconConsult; Volker Wieland, Goethe University Frankfurt; Michael Woodford, Columbia University.

Das Working Paper bietet die zusammenfassende Stellungnahme von Prof. Volker Wieland zum Ankaufprogramm der Europäischen Zentralbank für Anleihen des öffentlichen Sektors (Public Sector Purchase Programme, PSPP) am Bundesverfassungsgericht am 30.07.2019. Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Frage der Einordnung des PSPP als monetäre, geldpolitische Maßnahme und der Verhältnismäßigkeit des Programms und seiner Umsetzung. Ebenfalls wird kurz auf die weiteren Fragen zur Umsetzung, insbesondere Ankündigung, Begrenzung und Abstand zum Primärmarkt für Staatsanleihen eingegangen.

Das Working Paper bietet die zusammenfassende Stellungnahme von Prof. Volker Wieland zum Ankaufprogramm der Europäischen Zentralbank für Anleihen des öffentlichen Sektors (Public Sector Purchase Programme, PSPP) am Bundesverfassungsgericht am 30.07.2019. Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Frage der Einordnung des PSPP als monetäre, geldpolitische Maßnahme und der Verhältnismäßigkeit des Programms und seiner Umsetzung. Ebenfalls wird kurz auf die weiteren Fragen zur Umsetzung, insbesondere Ankündigung, Begrenzung und Abstand zum Primärmarkt für Staatsanleihen eingegangen.

Für ein Ende der expansiven Geldpolitik ist es zu früh. Doch wenn die Inflationserwartungen steigen, muss die EZB trotz aller Widerstände den Leitzins erhöhen.

Unter der Überschrift "Ich kaufe griechische Staatsanleihen weil." sollten Persönlichkeiten aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur kurz begründen, warum sie griechische Staatsanleihen gekauft haben bzw. kaufen werden--idealerweise unter Nachweis ihres finanziellen Engagements. Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt kaufe ich keine griechischen Staatsanleihen.

Recent evaluations of the fiscal stimulus packages recently enacted in the United States and Europe such as Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009) and Cwik and Wieland (2009) suggest that the GDP effects will be modest due to crowding-out of private consumption and investment. Corsetti, Meier and Mueller (2009a,b) argue that spending shocks are typically followed by consolidations with substantive spending cuts, which enhance the short-run stimulus effect. This note investigates the implications of this argument for the estimated impact of recent stimulus packages and the case for discretionary fiscal policy.

This paper reviews the rationale for quantitative easing when central bank policy rates reach near zero levels in light of recent announcements regarding direct asset purchases by the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Empirical evidence from the previous period of quantitative easing in Japan between 2001 and 2006 is presented. During this earlier period the Bank of Japan was able to expand the monetary base very quickly and significantly. Quantitative easing translated into a greater and more lasting expansion of M1 relative to nominal GDP. Deflation subsided by 2005. As soon as inflation appeared to stabilize near a rate of zero, the Bank of Japan rapidly reduced the monetary base as a share of nominal income as it had announced in 2001. The Bank was able to exit from extensive quantitative easing within less than a year. Some implications for the current situation in Europe and the United States are discussed.

This paper reviews the rationale for quantitative easing when central bank policy rates reach near zero levels in light of recent announcements regarding direct asset purchases by the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Empirical evidence from the previous period of quantitative easing in Japan between 2001 and 2006 is presented. During this earlier period the Bank of Japan was able to expand the monetary base very quickly and significantly. Quantitative easing translated into a greater and more lasting expansion of M1 relative to nominal GDP. Deflation subsided by 2005. As soon as inflation appeared to stabilize near a rate of zero, the Bank of Japan rapidly reduced the monetary base as a share of nominal income as it had announced in 2001. The Bank was able to exit from extensive quantitative easing within less than a year. Some implications for the current situation in Europe and the United States are discussed.

Recent evaluations of the fiscal stimulus packages recently enacted in the United States and Europe such as Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009) and Cwik and Wieland (2009) suggest that the GDP effects will be modest due to crowding-out of private consumption and investment. Corsetti, Meier and Mueller (2009a,b) argue that spending shocks are typically followed by consolidations with substantive spending cuts, which enhance the short-run stimulus effect. This note investigates the implications of this argument for the estimated impact of recent stimulus packages and the case for discretionary fiscal policy.

This paper introduces adaptive learning and endogenous indexation in the New-Keynesian Phillips curve and studies disinflation under inflation targeting policies. The analysis is motivated by the disinflation performance of many inflation-targeting countries, in particular the gradual Chilean disinflation with temporary annual targets. At the start of the disinflation episode price-setting firms' expect inflation to be highly persistent and opt for backward-looking indexation. As the central bank acts to bring inflation under control, price-setting firms revise their estimates of the degree of persistence. Such adaptive learning lowers the cost of disinflation. This reduction can be exploited by a gradual approach to disinflation. Firms that choose the rate for indexation also re-assess the likelihood that announced inflation targets determine steady-state inflation and adjust indexation of contracts accordingly. A strategy of announcing and pursuing short-term targets for inflation is found to influence the likelihood that firms switch from backward-looking indexation to the central bank's targets. As firms abandon backward-looking indexation the costs of disinflation decline further. We show that an inflation targeting strategy that employs temporary targets can benefit from lower disinflation costs due to the reduction in backward-looking indexation.

Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence in a simple macroeconomic model, which incorporates rational learning by the central bank as well as private sector agents. Two conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew the true parameters. In the dynamic version, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy. I find that the optimal policy that balances the cautionary and activist motives typically exhibits gradualism, that is, it still remains less aggressive than a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions occur when uncertainty is very high and in inflation close to target.