Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1: Introduction -- References -- Chapter 2: Genesis -- Dealing with Defeat -- Between Alliance and Unification -- The Crucible of War -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Military Federalism -- An Army of Contingents -- Guardians and Go-Betweens -- Celebrating Kaiser and King -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: The Need for Compromise -- The Unlikely Conqueror of South Germany -- A North German Bridgehead in the South? -- A Tougher Nut to Crack -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5: Warrior Princes -- Passing the Martial Baton -- Encouraging Particularism -- Double Standard -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: The Danger Within -- A Divided Contingent -- Out of Reach but Not Out of Sight -- A Gathering Point for Particularism -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: Fighting Together but Apart -- Familiar Tropes -- New Problems -- Thinking About the Future -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: Conclusion.

1.6 ConclusionsReferences; Chapter two The phases of an oil spill and scientific studies of spill effects; 2.1 Introduction and overview; 2.2 The phases of an oil spill; 2.3 Studies in Phase 1: release and immediate response; 2.3.1 Issues addressed; 2.3.2 Data collection; 2.4 Studies in Phase 2: cleanup; 2.4.1 Issues addressed; 2.4.2 Data collection; 2.5 Studies in Phase 3: recovery; 2.5.1 Issues addressed; 2.5.2 Data collection; 2.6 Lessons learned; References; Part II Oil in the environment; Introduction; Chapter Three Oil in the water column; 3.1 Introduction.

Th is paper examines the relationship between two of the "lesser" contingents of the army and the Supreme Command during the First World War. In contrast to Prussia, which simply by virtue of its geographical size and large population dominated both the army and the empire, and Bavaria, whose monarch possessed virtually unrestricted control over his army in peacetime, the Saxon and Württembergian contingents were subject to frequent and sometimes humiliating interference from Berlin. In the decades before 1914, only two native Württembergers rose to command the XIII Army Corps, a formation which was composed almost exclusively of men from the South German kingdom. This interference created anxiety. As late as autumn 1911, the Saxon ministry of war was desperate to seek confi rmation from its Prussian counterpart that rumours of a new, less favourable military convention between the two states was indeed fabricated. The resentment of Prussian interference and the suspicion of Prussian intentions only increased during the war. As a result, Saxon and Württembergian officers dedicated considerable time and eff ort to defending their monarch's military rights and passing along requests from their capitals to the Prussians. Whereas some of these requests, like the appeal by the king of Saxony in the summer of 1916, fell on deaf ears, others did not. This paper assesses the extent to which Saxony and Württemberg got their way in questions of personnel appointments and troop transfers. In doing so, it highlights the importance of the peculiar military hierarchy of the empire as a reason why some non-Prussian states had a voice in administrative and operational decisions and others were left out entirely.

Numerous philosophers allege that the "general theory of second best" poses a challenge to the Target View, which asserts that real-world reform efforts should aim to establish arrangements that conform to the constitutive features of ideally just states of affairs. I demonstrate two claims that are relevant in this context. First, I show that the theory of second best fails to present a compelling challenge to the Target View in general. But, second, the theory of second best requires ideal theorists to undertake certain kinds of causal and comparative analyses that are typically thought to lie outside the remit of conventional ideal theory.

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund's analysis of 'ability' as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance – that the motivationally deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory – not just nonideal theory – to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund's analysis of 'ability' as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance – that the motivationally deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory – not just nonideal theory – to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.