In: CESifo economic studies: a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 362-390
Abstract In today's globalized and interconnected world, international relationships are becoming ever more important. This applies not only to political relations but also to transnational attachment, a positive and solidary mutual attitude between the citizens of two countries, which is mainly based on social capital and trust. In particular border areas can benefit enormously when people have a bond with their neighboring country and its inhabitants. Due to their geographic proximity and historically shaped identity, border regions have a high potential for increased economic and social exchange. While empirical work on these characteristics of specific border areas is scarce, this article presents a novel approach which applies the concept of transnational social capital taking the French–German border area as an example. The representative study is based on telephone interviews, which were conducted in the border area and in regions within the two countries as a control for country-level effects. We find strong evidence for border region attachment in form of higher levels of social capital and trust in the border area. Our findings have important implications for borderland economies in general and in particular for cross-border resilience with regard to prevailing risks like upcoming nationalism and disasters such as the Covid-19 pandemic.
In this experimental study we examine the behavior of Bundeswehr officers and officer candidates regarding their willingness to cooperate. Due to the military training which focuses on comradeship and reliable teamwork even under extreme conditions, we expect a strong bond between soldiers and therefore more cooperation among them. Furthermore there are additional norms for soldiers that explicitly call for social responsibility and an appropriate behavior relative to civilians. For that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three established experiments allow us to measure and distinguish between different aspects of social and cooperative motivation. We find that soldiers are on average more altruistic, more cooperative, and more trusting as well as more trustworthy. These results do not only hold for the interaction among soldiers but in most cases also with regard to the behavior of soldiers towards civilians. ; In dieser experimentellen Studie untersuchen wir das kooperative Verhalten von Offizieren (bzw. Offiziersanwärtern) der Bundeswehr. Dabei betrachten wir ihre Interaktionen sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber zivilen Probanden. Unsere Kernhypothesen sind, dass sich die angehenden Offiziere aufgrund ihrer stark auf Gemeinschaftssinn ausgerichteten Ausbildung (Kameradschaft) und einem auf gesellschaftliche Verantwortung hin orientierten Selbstverständnis (Sozialkapital) sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber den zivilen Probanden kooperativer verhalten als eine rein zivile Vergleichsgruppe. Wir ziehen hierfür mit dem Diktatorspiel, dem Ultimatumspiel sowie dem Investitionsspiel (trust game) drei etablierte Standardexperimente heran, mit denen sich jeweils bestimmte Facetten (pro)sozialer bzw. kooperativer Motivation messen und voneinander unterscheiden lassen. Im Experiment verhalten sich Soldaten im Durchschnitt signifikant altruistischer, kooperativer, vertrauensvoller und vertrauenswürdiger. Dies gilt in den meisten Fällen nicht nur für das Verhalten unter Soldaten sondern auch von Soldaten gegenüber Zivilisten.
AbstractDuring pandemics, regular service provisioning processes in medical care may be disrupted. Digital health promises many opportunities for service provisioning during a pandemic. However, a broad penetration of medical processes with information technology also has drawbacks. Within this work, the authors use the COVID-19 pandemic to analyze the chances and the risks that may come with using digital health solutions for medical care during a pandemic. Therefore, a multi-methods approach is used. First we use a systematic literature review for reviewing the state of the art of digital health applications in healthcare. Furthermore, the usage of digital health applications is mapped to the different processes in care delivery. Here we provide an exemplary process model of oncological care delivery. The analysis shows that including digital health solutions may be helpful for care delivery in most processes of medical care provisioning. However, research on digital health solutions focuses strongly on some few processes and specific disciplines while other processes and medical disciplines are underrepresented in literature. Last, we highlight the necessity of a comprehensive risk-related debate around the effects that come with the use of digital healthcare solutions.
In this article, we analyze the phenomenon of flood evacuation compliance from a both decision-theoretic and game-theoretic perspective presenting the Warning Compliance Model (WCM). This discrete decision model incorporates a Bayesian information system, which formalizes the statistical effects of a warning forecast based on the harmonious structure of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The game-theoretical part of the model incorporates the evacuation order decision of a local government and people's compliance regarding their evacuation-decisions. The strengths of this novel approach lie in the joint consideration of probabilistic and communicative risk aspects of a dynamic setting, in the simultaneous consideration of escalation and de-escalation phases and of two differently exposed risk groups, which requires differential risk communication. For each scenario, we derive the explicit and generic solution of the model, which makes it possible to identify the scope for warning compliance and its effects independent from the parameter constellation. Applying empirical data from flood and risk studies yields plausible results for the escalation-scenario of the model and reveal the limits of compliance if people face a Black Swan flood event.
In this article, we analyze the phenomenon of flood evacuation compliance from a both decision-theoretic and game-theoretic perspective presenting the Warning Compliance Model (WCM). This discrete decision model incorporates a Bayesian information system, which formalizes the statistical effects of a warning forecast based on the harmonious structure of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The game-theoretical part of the model incorporates the evacuation order decision of a local government and people's compliance regarding their evacuation-decisions. The strengths of this novel approach lie in the joint consideration of probabilistic and communicative risk aspects of a dynamic setting, in the simultaneous consideration of escalation and de-escalation phases and of two differently exposed risk groups, which requires differential risk communication. For each scenario, we derive the explicit and generic solution of the model, which makes it possible to identify the scope for warning compliance and its effects independent from the parameter constellation. Applying empirical data from flood and risk studies yields plausible results for the escalation-scenario of the model and reveal the limits of compliance if people face a Black Swan flood ...
In dieser experimentellen Studie untersuchen wir das kooperative Verhalten von Offizieren (bzw. Offiziersanwärtern) der Bundeswehr. Dabei betrachten wir ihre Interaktionen sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber zivilen Probanden. Unsere Kernhypothesen sind, dass sich die angehenden Offiziere aufgrund ihrer stark auf Gemeinschaftssinn ausgerichteten Ausbildung (Kameradschaft) und einem auf gesellschaftliche Verantwortung hin orientierten Selbstverständnis (Sozialkapital) sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber den zivilen Probanden kooperativer verhalten als eine rein zivile Vergleichsgruppe. Wir ziehen hierfür mit dem Diktatorspiel, dem Ultimatumspiel sowie dem Investitionsspiel drei etablierte Standardexperimente heran, mit denen sich jeweils bestimmte Facetten (pro)sozialer bzw. kooperativer Motivation messen und voneinander unterscheiden lassen. Im Experiment verhalten sich Soldaten im Durchschnitt signifikant altruistischer, kooperativer, vertrauensvoller und vertrauenswürdiger. Dies gilt in den meisten Fällen nicht nur für das Verhalten unter Soldaten sondern auch von Soldaten gegenüber Zivilisten. ; In this experimental study we examine the behavior of Bundeswehr officers and officer candidates regarding their willingness to cooperate. Due to the military training which focuses on comradeship and reliable teamwork even under extreme conditions, we expect a strong bond between soldiers and therefore more cooperation among them. Furthermore there are additional norms for soldiers that explicitly call for social responsibility and an appropriate behavior relative to civilians. For that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three established experiments allow us to measure and distinguish between different aspects of social and cooperative motivation. We find that soldiers are on average more altruistic, more cooperative, and more trusting as well as more trustworthy. These results do not only hold for the interaction among soldiers but in most cases also with regard to the behavior of soldiers towards civilians.
Abstract In recent years, resilience at and across borders has become a major concern. However, borders are characterized by complexity, emergence and creativity. This implies the need to better understand how disasters and their inherent risks are practically handled in cross-border regions. In this special issue, a diverse range of articles explore the operational, social, and technological challenges inherent to cross-border resilience.
Abstract The rise of social media has led to a new degree of spontaneous volunteering in the aftermath of disasters, even in border areas. However, spontaneous volunteering across national borders creates further obstacles that need to be addressed and prepared for. This paper introduces an agent-based simulation to examine coordination procedures of spontaneous volunteers in crisis scenarios, particularly the specifics of travel restrictions imposed after the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, research is conducted on the effects of insufficient or delayed coordination of the population's offer of voluntary help, which reduces the motivation of volunteers and leads to missed request for help.8. The results show that coordination of spontaneous volunteers is a key factor for helping the affected population, especially in a pandemic, where the possibilities to help are limited. These results are discussed with regard to costs that need to be considered in order to establish coordination, as well as health issues and motivation of spontaneous volunteers in different coordination scenarios.
Collaboration in emergency logistics can be beneficial for governmental actors when supply chains need to be set up immediately. In comparison to research on humanitarian-business partnerships, the body of literature on so-called Public-Private Emergency Collaborations (PPEC) remains scarce. Private companies are only rarely considered within research on emergency collaborations, although they serve as an important chain in the efficient supply of goods given their resources and existing communication networks. Based on this research gap, we contribute to the research field by quantitatively evaluating public-private collaboration in emergency logistics. A framework for public-private emergency collaborations is developed based on logistical and game-theoretical concepts. In addition, we characterize both public and private actors' possible roles in emergency logistics based on literature research and real cases. Furthermore, we provide a structured overview on existing PPECs and the challenges they are confronted with. The game-theoretic PPEC model created in this paper provides more detailed information into the motivation and incentives of the partners involved in emergency collaborations. Inspired by game-theoretic accounts of conventional public-private partnerships, this model sheds light on the partners' participation constraints (which define the scope of collaboration), the effects on the outcome if the partners' contributions are strategic substitutes, and on reputational effects. Finally, we illustrate how a mechanism design approach can be used by the state to transform the firm's incentives into lower levels of undersupply or deprivation.