Suchergebnisse

Social movements and American religion -- Mobilizing America's religious elite in the service of eugenics -- The early liberalizers : the church has a responsibility for the improvement of the human stock -- The supporters : God needed the white Anglo-Saxon race -- The critics : Atlanta does not believe in race suicide -- The silent groups : let the Christian get away from heredity -- The religious promoters of contraception : other people's fertility -- The forgotten half : America's reluctant endorsers of contraception.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- PART I. From Abolition to Eugenics -- 1. American Religious Activism in the Twentieth Century -- 2. Mobilizing America's Religious Elite in the Service of Eugenics -- PART II. Liberalization, 1929-1931 -- 3. The Early Liberalizers: "The Church Has a Responsibility for the Improvement of the Human Stock" -- 4. The Supporters: "God Needed the White Anglo-Saxon Race" -- 5. The Critics: "Atlanta Does Not Believe in Race Suicide" -- 6. The Silent Groups: "Let the Christian Get Away from Heredity" -- PART III. From Legality to the Pill, 1935-1965 -- 7. The Religious Promoters of Contraception: Remaining Focused on Other People's Fertility -- 8. The Forgotten Half: America's Reluctant Contraceptive Converts -- Conclusion: A Century Later -- Notes -- References -- Index

Early proponents of contraception among American religious groups were staunch eugenicists who promoted birth control in the hopes of curtailing the "runaway fertility" of poor Catholic and Jewish immigrants. By the early 1930s, their campaign to legalize contraception was largely successful, but eugenics would soon go from being a sign of progressive politics and enlightened scientific understanding to a dirty word associated with Hitler. By examining the statements of all of the early liberalizers on contraception from 1920 to 1965, this paper demonstrates that although these groups purged their statements on contraception of the word eugenics by the end of WWII, the fertility of "poor others" remained their focus for the next few decades. Talk of "race suicide" changed to talk of "responsible parenthood" as their focus moved away from the whitening Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants to the poor in the Third World and Americans in the inner cities.

What is complex religion and how does it relate to social inclusion? Complex religion is a theory which posits that religion intersects with inequality, especially class, race, ethnicity and gender. The nine articles in this volume examine a wide array of ways that religion intersects with inequality, and how, as a result, it can create barriers to social inclusion. The issue begins with three articles that examine the role of religion and its intersection with race and racialization processes. It then moves to three articles that examine religion's intersection with socioeconomic inequality. The issue closes with three studies of how religion's relationship with the state creates and maintains various status hierarchies, even as some religious movements seek to combat inequality. Together, these articles enrichen our understanding of the complex task before anyone seeking to think about the role of religion in social inclusion.

Part I. Explaining the Council: -- 1. Collective effervescence and the Holy Spirit: the eventful first session -- 2. Who wanted what and why at the Second Vatican Council?: toward a theory of religious change -- 3. How culture mattered at Vatican II: collegiality trumps authority in the councils's "social movement organizations" -- Part II. Case Studies: -- 4. The declaration on religious freedom: ceding power, gaining legitimacy -- 5. The Blessed Virgin Mary: the toughest fight of the council -- 6. The council's failure to liberalize birth control: lackluster progressive effort meets a hesitant pope

Sociology has largely ignored class differences between American religious groups under the assumption that those differences "are smaller than they used to be and are getting smaller all of the time" (Pyle & Davidson, 2014, p. 195). This article demonstrates that profound class differences remain amongst American religious groups. These differences are as large as - or larger than - commonly examined forms of inequality such as the gender pay gap and the race achievement gap. Using the most popular categorization of American religious groups, we find that regardless of the particular measure examined (years of education, income, socioeconomic index score, and proportion of members with at least a bachelor's degree) Jews and Mainline Protestants are at the top of the socioeconomic ladder and Evangelical Protestants, both black and white, are at the bottom. Furthermore, religious group significantly predicts both years of education and the overall socioeconomic standing of respondents by itself with basic controls. Likewise, both socioeconomic indicators and education significantly predict the likelihood of being in a specific religious tradition on their own with basic controls. Some religious groups, namely Evangelical Protestants at the low end and Jews and the high end, are relatively educationally homogeneous. Others, such as Catholics, Mainline Protestants and the nonreligious are much more educationally heterogeneous. The picture is the same when socioeconomic heterogeneity is examined, except that Mainline Protestants emerge as more clearly advantaged socioeconomically. In sum, religious inequality remains in America, it is robust, and it appears to be quite durable.