Suchergebnisse

Since at least the 1960s, the European Union (EU) has offered various kinds of non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries. Originally, these trade preferences had at least two policy goals: (i) to increase export volumes for developing countries and thereby boost their export earnings, and (ii) to facilitate export diversification. While extensive research has confirmed that the first of these goals is typically met, the second goal seems to have been largely forgotten by researchers as well as in policy circles. The aim of this paper is therefore to analyse the impact of the EU's non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries on export diversification. Our estimation results suggest that some trade preference programs, such as the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), are associated with increasing ranges of export products. By contrast, preferences offered to Mediterranean countries typically have no significant effects, and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) preferences actually have negative effects toward the end of our time period, suggesting that ACP countries may respond to preferences by specializing into fewer goods.

Since at least the 1960s, the European Union (EU) has offered various kinds of non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries. Originally, these trade preferences had at least two policy goals: (i) to increase export volumes for developing countries and thereby boost their export earnings, and (ii) to facilitate export diversification. While extensive research has confirmed that the first of these goals is typically met, the second goal seems to have been largely forgotten by researchers as well as in policy circles. The aim of this paper is therefore to analyse the impact of the EU's non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries on export diversification. Our estimation results suggest that some trade preference programs, such as the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), are associated with increasing ranges of export products. By contrast, preferences offered to Mediterranean countries typically have no significant effects, and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) preferences actually have negative effects toward the end of our time period, suggesting that ACP countries may respond to preferences by specializing into fewer goods.

This paper examines the effects of zero trade on the estimation of the gravity model using both simulated and real data with a panel structure, which is different from the more conventional cross-sectional structure. We begin by showing that the usual log-linear estimation method can result in highly deceptive inference when some observations are zero. As an alternative approach, we suggest using the Poisson fixed effects estimator. This approach eliminates the problems of zero trade and is shown to perform well in small samples.

Subsidizing polluting industries generally leads to increased pollution locally. However, given the diversity of production technologies across countries and international trade, the global impact of unilateral policies is not a priori clear. We use the agricultural sector model CAPRI to simulate the impact of removing the voluntary coupled support for ruminants, presently permitted under the EU Common Agricultural Policy. We find that this reduces greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. However, emissions leakage significantly diminishes the global mitigation effect since about 3/4 of the reduction in the EU is offset by increased emissions in the rest of the world.

AbstractSubsidizing polluting industries generally leads to increased pollution locally. However, given the diversity of production technologies across countries and international trade, the global impact of unilateral policies is not a priori clear. We use the agricultural sector model CAPRI to simulate the impact of removing the voluntary coupled support for ruminants, presently permitted under the EU Common Agricultural Policy. We find that this reduces greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. However, emissions leakage significantly diminishes the global mitigation effect since about 3/4 of the reduction in the EU is offset by increased emissions in the rest of the world.