Search results

This paper argues that new computer, smartphone, and universal ID technologies are reducing the incentives for political clientelism in the delivery of social programmes in India, especially by allowing party leaders to bypass local brokers to credit-claim for better service delivery and allowing politicians to deliver programmatic service delivery much more efficiently than in the past, with fewer diversions. Politicians are responding to these changed incentives, not surprisingly, by investing more money in large social programmes, supporting technological efforts to improve their efficiency, and increasing campaign expenditures to advertise these improvements and link them to party leaders at the expense of local brokers who used to monopolize these local party- voter linkages.

Strong institutionalized parties are often seen as vital for healthy democracies. The Indian case, therefore, represents a strange paradox: many parties are weak, corrupt and personalistic, yet democracy as a whole seems to be thriving, with increasing turnout and apparently strong popular support for democratic procedures and norms. This article explores some of the reasons for this strange outcome and suggests that the existing literature on party institutionalization might need some revision.

The past century of research has identified a host of economic, political, demographic, and other factors that seem to be associated with the prevalence of riots. The study of riots has, however, probably focused too much on these "push" factors that lead to violence and not enough on understanding the response of the state to riots. Understanding the political incentives that motivate democratic and authoritarian states to sometimes allow riots to take place and at other times to take the strongest possible law-and-order measures to prevent them is key to understanding variation in violence. Scholars also need to pay more attention to the psychological factors that encourage people to riot, and to the micro-logic of target choice within these larger events.

The past century of research has identified a host of economic, political, demographic, & other factors that seem to be associated with the prevalence of riots. The study of riots has, however, probably focused too much on these "push" factors that lead to violence & not enough on understanding the response of the state to riots. Understanding the political incentives that motivate democratic & authoritarian states to sometimes allow riots to take place & at other times to take the strongest possible law-&-order measures to prevent them is key to understanding variation in violence. Scholars also need to pay more attention to the psychological factors that encourage people to riot, & to the micro-logic of target choice within these larger events. Adapted from the source document.

The long transitions from military rule in Pakistan (1977-88) & Bangladesh (1975-90) deserve more attention, partly because, from the methodological point of view, the many similarities between them help us to isolate the most important factors that lead to successful transitions & democratic consolidation. The contrast between Bangladesh, which successfully consolidated its democracy in the 1990s, & Pakistan, which did not, demonstrates the general importance of three factors. (1) It lends support to Alfred Stepan's (1988) argument that cases where the "military as institution" is threatened by continuing in power -- as in Bangladesh -- will be more likely to make a successful transition. (2) The contrast between Bangladesh & Pakistan brings out the critical importance of an autonomous civil society -- which exists in Bangladesh but not Pakistan -- during a transition from authoritarian rule. At crucial moments in 1987, 1990 & 1996 civil society in Bangladesh forced reluctant & corrupt politicians to unite in opposition to the military government & then to successfully reform the new democracy's political institutions. (3) Ethnic polarization -- intensified, ironically, by several consociational policies designed to reduce conflict -- is a major factor hampering the development of a nonethnic civil society capable of pressuring the military & politicians to democratize. 3 Tables. Adapted from the source document.