Suchergebnisse

Russia's failure to become a democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union is not an inevitable product of its history. On the contrary, it has been shaped by the adoption of a constitutional system of centralised power in the office of the president. Long term democratic reform will require more than just Putin leaving the office of the presidency. Avoiding a system of 'Putinism without Putin' will also require a new Russian constitutional foundation that breaks with centralisation and reshapes the later structural chapters of the constitution to balance power between institutions.

Over the weekend, the world's attention was gripped as a well-equipped Russian private military company led by Evgeny Prigozhin seized control of a key Russian city and military hub, and marched on Moscow. Prigozhin's actions reveal a deeper truth about Putin's Russia: the absence of formalised, legal mechanisms for peacefully resolving high-level, intra-elite disputes. As the war in Ukraine drags on, what Ernst Fraenkel called the 'prerogative state' is expanding. This lawless realm of unchecked public power has no rules or institutions that can settle disputes among the Russian elite; these can only be resolved by Putin himself.

AbstractThis article will place the 2020 amendments to the Russian Constitution in comparative perspective. Although these amendments were officially justified as strengthening the Russian state in order to tackle emerging new problems, they constitutionalise already-existing legislative trends from the last twenty years. They therefore do little to overcome existing problems of Russian state building. What was the reform process about then? It was intended to project the image of reform by involving the people in a staged process of constitutional change while further entrenching the power of the current political elite. The constitutional reforms therefore demonstrate the symbolic role that constitutional law can play in seeking to ensure the survival of mature or later-stage forms of authoritarian populism. This kind of 'theatrical constitution-making' is a broader reminder of how the expressive aspects of constitutional change can be (ab)used by established authoritarian regimes.

Abstract
This Article will examine an important - but largely ignored - approach to constitution- making: The use of restored constitutional orders as the basis for the creation of a new constitutional order. Looking at this 'restoration constitution-making' in post-communist constitutional transition, it will describe how restoration held both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, restoration improved the politics of constitution-making by helping to avoid the elite manipulation of extraordinary institutions during constitutional drafting. On the other hand, the restoration of decades-old constitutions also led to restored laws that privileged past generations and undermined broad popular participation. Finally, restoration was an important part of gaining international recognition for independence. This international component suggests that constitution-making is about more than just domestic politics. These findings are an important first step in understanding the potential of restoration to ensure a successful constitutional transition.