Business planning: 25 keys to a sound business plan
In: The New York times pocket MBA series
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In: The New York times pocket MBA series
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 3-24
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: The American journal of economics and sociology, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 351-374
ISSN: 1536-7150
Abstract. On September 26, 1985, the Communist Party of China Central Committee on the Seventh Five‐Year Plan adopted the outlines of the guiding principles for China's economic and social development for the period 1986–1990. Recently, these principles were reaffirmed with the election of a new Politburo composed of relatively (by Chinese standards) young men who are almost uniformly supportive of the economic reforms that began in China several years ago. These reforms have already considerably altered China economically and otherwise. A country that was once one of the more centralized socialist States in the world has embarked on an ambitious program to create a more efficient economy, one where market forces dire playing an increasingly important role and one where the individual consumer's wants and preferences are receiving substantially more attention. China's major issues resolve around reforming its management system.
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 625-634
ISSN: 1557-7821
The challenge: can you attain wealth in today's investment environment? -- Financial mathematics -- The securities markets and macroeconomics -- Financial statement analysis -- Forecasting techniques -- Analysis and fixed income securities -- Analysis of common stocks -- Futures and options -- Risk, uncertainty, utility and portfolio theory -- Capital market theory, efficiency and imperfections
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 247-263
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 233-247
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: The American journal of economics and sociology, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 17-36
ISSN: 1536-7150
Abstract. The cardinal postulate of neoclassical economics is that individuals and entrepreneurs seek to maximize their unique positions in the world. Yet behind this postulate is an even more fundamental premise: that men are rational and can discern their own best interests. From Adam Smith on, it has been accepted that reasonable men act to maximize their own pecuniary advantage and in most economic models even the potential for irrationality is ignored. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious from the research conclusions of other disciplines (psychology, philosophy, political science, and sociology in particular) that the simplistic notion of "economic man," posited so often in the economics literature, is more fancy than fact. There is an implicit recognition that the neoclassical assumptions may not be correct in the developing area of economic behaviorism. The economic behaviorists, however, adopt a more general definition of rationality, substituting what might be called a "modified rationality postulate" for the global rationality assumed in neoclassical theory. As a result, their conclusions do not differ greatly from those of the neoclassicists. Fortunately, ideas are now crystallizing in psychology which may enable us to shed light on decisions which previously would have had to be classified as non‐rational, irrational, or unexplainable. Some of those ideas are explored.
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 32-47
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: The American journal of economics and sociology, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 19-36
ISSN: 1536-7150
Abstract. Any realistic theory of the firm must take into account the governing structure of the enterprise. Unfortunately, neoclassical economic theory ignores most of the problems associated with firm goal structures and the issue of corporate governance. We argue that shareholder wealth maximization under less than perfectly competitive conditions has serious normative deficiencies. From a positive point of view, it appears that shareholders have such a weak position with respect to governance that they have little influence upon goal structures as well. It is observed that directors rarely function in the idealized trusteeship capacity. Efforts by government to make corporations more "responsible" may involve nothing more than attempts to strengthen the public sector at the expense of the corporate and, hence, may not be in the interest of shareholders at all.
With corporations subject to increased regulation and government controls, two questions emerge: First, who should control corporate diction making (The corporate governance question.) Second, what is the appropriate role of corporations in our society. (The corporate responsibility question.) Corporate governance refers to shareholders. Corporate responsibility refers to alleged responsibility of the corporation to something called the social needs of the community1
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 528-544
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 183-198
ISSN: 1557-7821