Arendt and political philosophy
In: Hannah Arendt: critical assessments of leading political philosophers Vol. 2
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In: Hannah Arendt: critical assessments of leading political philosophers Vol. 2
In: Hannah Arendt: critical assessments of leading political philosophers Vol. 4
In: Hannah Arendt: critical assessments of leading political philosophers Vol. 1
In: Hannah Arendt: critical assessments of leading political philosophers Vol. 3
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 37-54
ISSN: 1741-2730
Hannah Arendt is one of the few philosophers to examine the dynamics of political action at length. Intriguingly, she emphasises the disclosure of who the actor is as a specific distinction of political action. This emphasis is connected with some long-standing worries about Arendt's account that centre on its apparent unconcern for political responsibility. In this paper, I argue that Arendt's emphasis on disclosure actually harbours a profound concern with responsibility. I do so by examining three questions. The main part of the paper focuses on how disclosure is bound up with political actors' attempts to act with one another. It asks: what would it be for an actor to evade disclosure? And: what is involved in an actor acknowledging the fact of disclosure? - Looking at the matter negatively, attempts to evade disclosure and its implications lead to irresponsibility. Positively, for the actor to accept disclosure is to see herself as bound to her fellow actors and audience by relations of joint action and mutual accountability. The conclusion asks a third question: what would it mean for on-lookers to deny the relevance of actors' disclosure? I argue that Arendt's historiography - which revolves around stories in which political actors reveal who they are - reflects her conviction that people can and must take responsibility for their world. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
Hannah Arendt is one of the few philosophers to examine the dynamics of political action at length. Intriguingly, she emphasises the disclosure of who the actor is as a specific distinction of political action. This emphasis is connected with some long-standing worries about Arendt's account that centre on its apparent unconcern for political responsibility. In this paper I argue that Arendt's emphasis on disclosure actually harbours a profound concern with responsibility. I do so by examining three questions. The main part of the paper focuses on how disclosure is bound up with political actors' attempts to act with one another. It asks: what would it be for an actor to evade disclosure? And: what is involved in an actor acknowledging the fact of disclosure? – Looking at the matter negatively, attempts to evade disclosure and its implications lead to irresponsibility. Positively, for the actor to accept disclosure is to see herself as bound to her fellow actors and audience by relations of joint action and mutual accountability. The conclusion asks a third question: what would it mean for on-lookers to deny the relevance of actors' disclosure? I argue that Arendt's historiography – which revolves around stories in which political actors reveal who they are – reflects her conviction that people can and must take responsibility for their world.
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In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 37-54
ISSN: 1474-8851
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 366-371
ISSN: 1741-2730
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 37-54
ISSN: 1741-2730
Hannah Arendt is one of the few philosophers to examine the dynamics of political action at length. Intriguingly, she emphasises the disclosure of who the actor is as a specific distinction of political action. This emphasis is connected with some long-standing worries about Arendt's account that centre on its apparent unconcern for political responsibility. In this paper, I argue that Arendt's emphasis on disclosure actually harbours a profound concern with responsibility. I do so by examining three questions. The main part of the paper focuses on how disclosure is bound up with political actors' attempts to act with one another. It asks: what would it be for an actor to evade disclosure? And: what is involved in an actor acknowledging the fact of disclosure? – Looking at the matter negatively, attempts to evade disclosure and its implications lead to irresponsibility. Positively, for the actor to accept disclosure is to see herself as bound to her fellow actors and audience by relations of joint action and mutual accountability. The conclusion asks a third question: what would it mean for on-lookers to deny the relevance of actors' disclosure? I argue that Arendt's historiography – which revolves around stories in which political actors reveal who they are – reflects her conviction that people can and must take responsibility for their world.
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 366-371
ISSN: 1474-8851
Part of a symposium on Steve Buckler, Hannah Arendt and political theory: challenging the tradition (Edinburgh University Press, 2011). This short appreciation of Buckler's book highlights the two guiding features of Arendt's method that he brings to the fore. First, its concern with timeliness: are there specific feature of contemporary affairs that political theory must take account of, and if so how? Second, how can political theory abstract from specific political constellations while still remaining relevant to actual political questions? It concludes with a brief note on how Arendt's approach contrasts with other ways of approaching political philosophy.
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In: Distinktion: scandinavian journal of social theory, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 77-95
ISSN: 2159-9149
In: Politics and Ethics Review, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 8-23
In: Genomics, society and policy: GSP ; a peer reviewed academic journal, Band 1, Heft 2
ISSN: 1746-5354