The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Edited by John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 721p. $55.00
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 3, S. 632-633
ISSN: 1537-5943
23 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 3, S. 632-633
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Public choice, Band 80, Heft 1-2, S. 1-8
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 239-255
ISSN: 1460-3667
Retrospective considerations do influence vote choice. But the manner in which voters incorporate retrospective evaluations is still an empirical question. This essay compares two voting rules: a traditional retrospective rule and a retrospective-prospective rule. The rules are differentiated based on the information costs associated with each. It is assumed that the traditional retrospective rule is less costly since voters need only make evaluations about the incumbent, whereas using a retrospective-prospective rule, voters must acquire additional information about the challenger. This essay argues that a choice of voting rule is a function of whether voters perceive the electoral environment as being stable or unstable (in terms of the issue positions candidates adopt over time). Laboratory experiments are conducted to test this proposition. In general, the results show that voters show a greater tendency to rely on a traditional retrospective rule when they perceive a stable electoral environment.
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 239
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Public choice, Band 80, Heft 1-2, S. 1-8
ISSN: 0048-5829
This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1] postulates that players might be of different types, each corresponding to the level of reasoning in which they engage. Furthermore, to postulate the effect of financial incentives on subjects' choice, we used the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) concept. In a QRE, players' decisions are noisy, with the probability of playing a given strategy increasing in its expected payoff. Hence, the choice probability is a function of the magnitude of the financial incentives. Our results show that low complexity promotes the highest degree of level-k strategic reasoning in every payment treatment. Standard financial incentives are enough to induce equilibrium behavior, and the marginal effect of extra incentives on equilibrium behavior seems to be negligible. High complexity, instead, decreases the rate of convergence to equilibrium play. With a sufficiently high complexity, increasing payoff amounts does promote more strategic behavior in a significant manner. Our results show with complex voting games, higher financial incentives are required for the subjects to exert the effort needed to complete the task.
BASE
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 409-438
ISSN: 1460-3667
The efficient aggregation of information is a prerequisite for the operation of a democratic system. In order for political office-holders to act responsively so that policy outcomes reflect public sentiments, sufficient levels of information about their actions must be aggregated within the electorate. This is fundamental since very few citizens will be aware of the office-holder's actions. One way in which information is aggregated is through public opinion polls. This mechanism extracts information from informed citizens and transmits it in a manner so that collectively the electorate behaves as if it were fully informed. We examine this aggregation process within a principal-agent model of elections. We further assume novice incumbents whose choices are more uncertain than experienced public officials. A rational expectations equilibrium is specified in which uninformed citizens condition their beliefs on poll results. Laboratory experiments are conducted to test the predictions of the model. We find that, compared to competing models, a rational expectations hypothesis best explains the aggregation process.
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 409-438
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Economics & politics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 21-41
ISSN: 1468-0343
This paper experimentally investigates individual level search within a spatial election model. In our model the voter is required to cast a ballot for one of two candidates. However, the voter's task is made non‐trivial since, even though the location of one candidate is known, the location of a second candidate is unknown. To reduce uncertainty regarding the unknown candidate's location, the voter may undertake an information search. We find that search in this environment is a function of the cost of search, the quality of information, and the voter's location on the issue space.
In: Economics & politics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 21-42
ISSN: 0954-1985
"Increasingly, political scientists use the term 'experiment' or 'experimental' to describe their empirical research. One of the primary reasons for doing so is the advantage of experiments in establishing causal inferences. In this book, Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth C. Williams discuss in detail how experiments and experimental reasoning with observational data can help researchers determine causality. They explore how control and random assignment mechanisms work, examining both the Rubin causal model and the formal theory approaches to causality. They also cover general topics in experimentation such as the history of experimentation in political science; internal and external validity of experimental research; types of experiments - field, laboratory, virtual, and survey - and how to choose, recruit, and motivate subjects in experiments. They investigate ethical issues in experimentation, the process of securing approval from institutional review boards for human subject research, and the use of deception in experimentation"--Provided by publisher
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 51-67
ISSN: 1537-5943
Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes.
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 51-67
ISSN: 0003-0554
Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 51-68
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: American journal of political science, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 1008
ISSN: 1540-5907