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A leading authority on economic globalization argues that industrialization in the core countries of northwest Europe and its overseas settlements combined with a worldwide revolution in transportation to produce deindustrialization and an antiglobal backlash in industrially lagging poorer countries.

"This paper documents industrial output and labor productivity growth around the poor periphery 1870-1975 (Latin America, the European periphery, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia). Intensive and extensive industrial growth accelerated there over this critical century. The precocious poor periphery leaders underwent a surge and more poor countries joined their club. Furthermore, by the interwar the majority were catching up on Germany, the US and the UK, a process that accelerated even more up to 1950-1975. What explains the spread of the industrial revolution world-wide and this catching up? Productivity growth certainly made their industries more competitive in home and foreign markets, but other forces mattered as well. A falling terms of trade raised the relative price of manufactures in domestic markets, as did real exchange rate depreciation. In addition, increasingly cheap fuel and non-fuel intermediates from globally integrating markets seems to have taken resource advantages away from the European and North American leaders, and integrating world financial markets also reduced the cheap capital advantage of the leaders. However, ever-cheaper labor was not a serious cause of industrial catch up, offering little support for the Krugman-Venables (1995) model. Furthermore, tariffs did not foster industrial catch up either, but rather poor industry performance fostered high tariffs. Markets and policies mattered, not just institutions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

"Did independence push Latin America down a growth-inequality trade-off? During the late colonial decades, the region completed two centuries of growth unmatched anywhere and inequality reached spectacular heights. During the half century after insurgency and independence, inequality fell steeply and growth was so modest that the period is called the lost decades. With the appearance of the belle époque in the 1870s, growth rose to impressive levels, again even by world standards, and inequality surged to the highest levels ever, where they have remained for a century. This paper explores the connection"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

"W. Arthur Lewis argued that a new international economic order emerged between 1870 and 1913, and that global terms of trade forces produced rising primary product specialization and de-industrialization in the poor periphery. More recently, modern economists argue that volatility reduces growth in the poor periphery. This paper assess these de-industrialization and volatility forces between 1782 and 1913 during the Great Divergence. First, it argues that the new economic order had been firmly established by 1870, and that the transition took place in the century before, not after. Second, based on econometric evidence from 1870-1939, we know that while a terms of trade improvement raised long run growth in the rich core, it did not do so in the poor periphery. Given that the secular terms of trade boom in the poor periphery was much bigger over the century before 1870 than after, it seems plausible to infer that it might help explain the great 19th century divergence between core and periphery. Third, the boom and its de-industrialization impact was only part of the story; growth-reducing terms of trade volatility was the other. Between 1820 and 1870, terms of trade volatility was much greater in the poor periphery than the core. It was still very big after 1870, certainly far bigger than in the core. Based on econometric evidence from 1870-2000, we know that terms of trade volatility lowers long run growth in the poor periphery, and that the negative impact is big. Given that terms of trade volatility in the poor periphery was even bigger during the century before 1870, it seems plausible to infer that it also helps explain the great 19th century divergence between core and periphery"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

"In Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950 Jeffrey Williamson examines globalization through the lens of both the economist and the historian, analyzing its economic impact on industrially lagging poor countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Williamson argues that industrialization in the core countries of northwest Europe and their overseas settlements, combined with a worldwide revolution in transportation, created an antiglobal backlash in the periphery, the poorer countries of eastern and southern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America."--Jacket.