Brain-drain taxes for non-benevolent governments
In: Journal of development economics, Band 95, Heft 1, S. 68-76
ISSN: 0304-3878
15 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Journal of development economics, Band 95, Heft 1, S. 68-76
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 95, Heft 1, S. 68-76
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Skilled Immigration Today, S. 285-314
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 152-155
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 152
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Economics & politics, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 241-258
ISSN: 1468-0343
This paper studies an election game between two politicians, in which each provides income transfers to special‐interest groups in return for political contributions. It is shown that a move to a more inefficient form of transfers may lower the total excess burden created by these transfers, because the politicians are induced to reduce their provision of transfers. For the case in which the income transfers are indirectly provided as trade protection to import‐competing industries, a switch from production subsidies to tariffs as the form of protection reduces the equilibrium level of excess burden and makes both politicians better off.
In: Journal of international economics, Band 29, Heft 3-4, S. 199-215
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Economics & politics, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 97-117
ISSN: 1468-0343
This paper constructs a model in which taxation and public expenditure decisions are made by two decision makers: a "benevolent planner," who treats all consumers equally in the measurement of welfare; and a "Leviathan planner," who places more weight on the utilities of "favored consumers." The benevolent planner can restrict the Leviathan planner's power to tax, but cannot control the allocation of expenditures between desirable public goods and income transfers to favored consumers. Several types of tax restrictions are shown to be welfare‐improving from the benevolent planner's viewpoint. These restrictions include a reduction in the size of the tax base, although administrative costs already prevent the Leviathan planner from taxing all commodities.
In: Journal of political economy, Band 95, Heft 4, S. 835-856
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 95, Heft 4, S. 835-856
ISSN: 0022-3808
World Affairs Online
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 201-224
In: Journal of international economics, Band 42, Heft 1-2, S. 67-90
ISSN: 0022-1996
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 9-43
ISSN: 0276-8739