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Political economy in federal states: selected essays of Stanley L. Winer
In: Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance
Optimal representative taxation, information and tax reform
This paper moves toward the formulation of a normative theory of taxation that incorporates collective choice as an essential element. Such a theory has many interesting parallels to optimal taxation, including large information requirements for political agents. The paper discusses possible solutions to the information problem in a collective choice setting. The answer appears to lie in a decentralized information gathering and policy process rather than in the development of simplified guidelines for improving the decisions of central planners. The paper proposes a framework to examine the gains and losses in expected support from decentralized policy choices affecting taxation, and uses the analysis to discuss the influence of differences in constitutional structure on the adoption of informational strategies and to review the nature of tax reform.
Explaining the use of related tax instruments
A new view is emerging in the economic literature on how to analyze and interpret national and subnational revenue systems. Recent work has shown that such systems can be modelled successfully as sets of related policy instruments that are being shaped and used deliberately by vote-maximizing governments. We extend existing empirical work by estimating a two-equation system designed to investigate the use of related tax instruments by U.S. states. The model focuses on two decisions: how much to rely on personal income as a tax base and whether to introduce an income tax credit or rebate for local property taxes. We also raise some general methodological problems that empirical research in the expected vote-maximizing tradition must deal with in the future.
In Defense of Majoritarianism
In: Across Boundaries: Essays in Honour of Robert A. Young. Edited by A. Blais, C deClercy, A. Esselment and R. Wintrobe (eds). McGill-Queen's University Press 2020. Chapter 12.
SSRN
The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
In this chapter I provide an overview of the political economy of taxation in democratic states by considering the three most important issues in the field: (1) the evolution of the power to tax in (what are now) the mature constitutional democracies; (2) the nature and determinants of modern tax structures; and (3) redistribution in pluralistic societies over various horizons and in the face of economic shocks. The discussion considers the ideas and models that have arisen as scholars have grappled with these related issues, and points to some of the outstanding problems that may be worth pursuing in future research.
BASE
The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6252
SSRN
Working paper
The Role of Exchange Rate Flexibility in the International Transmission of Inflation in Long and Shorter Runs: Canada, 1953 to 1981
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 62
Money and Politics in a Small Open Economy
In: Public choice, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 221
ISSN: 0048-5829
Money and politics in a small open economy
In: Public choice, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 221-239
ISSN: 1573-7101
Some Evidence on the Effect of the Separation of Spending and Taxing Decisions
In: Journal of political economy, Band 91, Heft 1, S. 126-140
ISSN: 1537-534X
World Affairs Online
Political Competitiveness, Regression Discontinuity and the Incumbency Effect
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 10356
SSRN
Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation
In: Journal of development economics, Band 97, Heft 1, S. 46-57
ISSN: 0304-3878
Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation
In: Journal of development economics, Band 97, Heft 1, S. 46-57
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online