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The emergence of autonomous weapons remains a hot topic in international humanitarian law. Much has been said by States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and academics on the matter in recent years. However, no agreement has been reached on how best to regulate this nascent technology. In the absence of any such agreement, the best approach is to analyse autonomous weapons through the lens of the principles of international humanitarian law. After humanity and military necessity are debunked as false principles, this article tests the compatibility of autonomous weapons with distinction, proportionality and precaution. It argues that autonomous weapons are not currently able to comply with these principles, owing primarily to a lack of sufficiently advanced artificial intelligence and contextual awareness. However, it also argues that the path to international humanitarian law-compliant autonomous weapons is shorter, and more clearly defined, than many realise. Indeed, the article highlights various ways in which future technological advances could enable autonomous weapons to comply with the principles of international humanitarian law more rigorously than human beings. The article does not seek to address the compatibility of autonomous weapons with other aspects of international law or the morality of such weapons.

Abstract
Non-international armed conflict between States and organised armed groups is a reality of warfare. Since the emergence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this form of conflict has been regulated by international humanitarian law. However, a subset of this category known as 'transnational armed conflict' has seen aggressive proliferation over recent decades as groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have taken advantage of the internet and other technologies to expand their reach beyond national frontiers and strike States around the world. This phenomenon has left the geographical extent of international humanitarian law – which has historically relied on State boundaries to determine its ambit – unclear. This article examines the main options for delimiting the geographical reach of the regime in transnational armed conflict. It considers approaches based on international boundaries; 'hot battlefields'; 'global application' and 'territorial control' before ultimately concluding that a method based on 'military presence' would be the most suitable standard.

The notion of 'precautions in attack' is an important concept in the law of armed conflict. It requires attackers to verify their targets, to ensure that only proportionate strikes are launched, to mitigate the potential for collateral damage in the selection of means and methods of warfare and, where possible, to issue warnings in advance of attacks. The emergence of 'autonomous weapons' requires us to review how these precautions might apply in a new era of delegated warfare in which the fulcrum around which the regime revolves – the human combatant – would be replaced by artificial intelligence-powered machines. This paper contends that technology is fast approaching the point at which the use of autonomous weapons will be compatible with the requirements of precaution. The author pushes further than most commentators in demonstrating just how capable the technology is becoming; in explaining how close it is to supplanting humans on the battlefield and in showing the potential for machines to discharge precautionary obligations better than humans in at least some areas. However, the article recognizes that technological innovations are still required before this transition comes to pass and so it also illuminates the way forward by identifying where remaining deficiencies linger.

AbstractThe law of armed conflict requires 'distinction' between civilians and combatants and provides that only the latter may be targeted. However, for proper implementation, distinction requires advanced observation and recognition abilities as well as the capacity to exercise judgement based on situational awareness. While the observation and recognition abilities of machines may now surpass those of humans, the capacity of machines to exercise judgement remains significantly more limited than our own. Consequently, this article contends that the deployment of 'autonomous weapons' based on current levels of technological sophistication would be incompatible with distinction and that, as such, their use in conflict would be unlawful.

Humanity and military necessity are often said to be 'principles' of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). However, for Dworkin, a concept must satisfy certain criteria in order to earn the status of a principle. First, principles carry different weightings to each other so that one may triumph in the event of a clash. Secondly, principles are capable of superseding positive rules so that coherence in the regime over which they preside is maintained. This article contends that neither criterion is satisfied by humanity or military necessity. Consequently, it argues that these concepts are not truly principles and that, instead, they are better viewed as 'pillars' of the LOAC.