Suchergebnisse

During the summer of 1949 Winston Churchill invited a surviving member of the German opposition to his home in Chartwell, Kent. He informed his guest that 'during the war he had been misled by his assistants about the considerable strength and size of the German anti-Hitler resistance'. In the light of recent archival research, we now know this statement to be not entirely truthful. Using previously unpublished material from the Guy Liddell diaries, the memoirs of the late Hugh Trevor-Roper, and a selection of Foreign Office (FO) minutes and wartime interrogation reports, this article will aim to overturn the prevailing view that the July bomb plot and its antecedents represented a British 'intelligence failure' as opposed to a failure of political judgement and imagination on the part of Churchill, Eden, and the FO. It will be asserted that, because of a mixture of political indifference and 'group think', crucial intelligence concerning the existence of a determined anti-Hitler resistance was ignored. Documentary evidence confirms that when von Stauffenberg's bomb exploded the officially held view that no such element existed in Germany, senior figures in Whitehall were 'naked' in the face of events. These officials were victims not only of their own political misjudgement, but ultimately of the Churchillian policy of 'absolute silence' which ensured that the intelligence cupboard was bare at the very moment they, as 'consumers' of intelligence, were most hungry for information.

In a previous article, 'British Intelligence and the July Bomb Plot of 1944: A Reappraisal', it was recorded that in 1949 Winston Churchill had stated to a surviving member of the German opposition that 'during the war he had been misled by his assistants about the considerable strength and size of the German anti-Hitler resistance'. It also highlighted the fact that historians have argued consistently that the July bomb plot and its antecedents represented 'an embarrassing failure by British intelligence' due to an alleged inability to warn its political 'consumers' of a developing anti-Hitler conspiracy within the Third Reich. New evidence has now surfaced proving categorically that British intelligence informed Churchill not only of the potential strength of the German army opposition, but also of its determination to overthrow Hitler and his Nazi cohorts by means of a coup d'état. The present article argues that this fresh evidence, in the shape of PREM 7/7, consigns, once and for all, these accusations against British intelligence to the dustbin of history.

Emerging infectious animal and zoonotic diseases can inflict significant losses on animal production and public health, and threaten the safety and security of the food system. Threat analysis (forecasting), which monitors the measurable risk indicators of disease emergence, should be in place before the emergence of any threat Animal and public health authorities develop and regularly re-evaluate disease preparedness, response and recovery plans, based on the 'One Health' principle. These plans should include surveillance, biosecurity measures, communication channels and training for personnel. Scenarios for outbreaks of natural emerging infectious disease or bioterrorist events should be prepared and practised. National and international legislation should be regularly updated to provide a robust legal basis to manage outbreaks. Reference laboratories should have reliable and validated diagnostic tools for rapid, high-throughput testing. Strict biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity control measures must be implemented in laboratories in order to prevent the accidental or malicious release of pathogens. The pharmaceutical industry should be incentivised to develop vaccines and/or antiviral drugs against disease outbreaks. Conventions between public authorities and the pharmaceutical industry should guarantee adequate stockpiling of the pharmaceuticals needed to control large-scale outbreaks. In the early phase of disease emergence (early warning), veterinarians and stakeholders play an important role in early detection at the farm level. Upon notification, veterinary authorities must take rapid response measures to limit disease spread. National and international short-and medium-term strategic research agendas should be developed, based on a comprehensive gap analysis and horizon scan. This planning will help to guide funding agencies and non-governmental organisations in their quest to support relevant research. ; Peer reviewed