Suchergebnisse

The extensive use of white collar workers, such as bookkeepers and clerks, played a crucial role in the formation of modern states during the early modern period. This article focuses on the formation of a Debt Office in Sweden, which was opened in 1719 in order to administer the liquidation of the debt accrued during the previous royal regime. By utilizing the available expertise that been working on the debt market, it was relatively easy for the new parliamentary rule to found the office. The office became part of the credit system when it interacted with various creditors. The clerical staff helped the market to function by providing intermediation, but their role became increasingly contentious. By examining the clerical staff, we learn how the authorities tried to build a trustworthy institution. The case thereby offers another perspective on credible commitment than research which concentrates on formal political institutions.

This article examines the connections between struggles over fiscal institutions and political change in Sweden during the period 17891809. The political situation was characterized by a divided fiscal authority: the absolute king controlled how resources were spent while the Diet controlled the operations of the Bank of Sweden and the National Debt Office. This division affected fiscal policies and how the country financed its wars. During the Napoleonic Wars, the king was unwilling to negotiate a deal with the Diet that relinquished his spending control in exchange for greater revenues to fight the war. As a consequence, he was unable to mobilize the necessary resources, which led to the loss of Finland and to his dethronement through a coup dtat organized by the elite in 1809.

Sweden commenced military operations against Prussia in 1757, following Austria's and France's efforts to include Sweden in the anti-Prussian alliance. Swedish politicians hoped that the coalition would lead to a quick victory without having to get too involved in the fighting, but that Sweden still would be rewarded for its support. Swedish military action was thus primarily designed to show the allies that Sweden participated in the war. Despite the low intensity warfare that characterized the fighting, the war was still extremely expensive. The Swedish state used mostly internal borrowing to finance the war, which led to negative economic and political consequences such as inflation and popular discontent. By participating in the war, the Swedish state sought to strengthen its commercial situation worldwide while preserving its military position in the Baltic region.

This article examines the connections between struggles over fiscal institutions and political change in Sweden during the period 17891809. The political situation was characterized by a divided fiscal authority: the absolute king controlled how resources were spent while the Diet controlled the operations of the Bank of Sweden and the National Debt Office. This division affected fiscal policies and how the country financed its wars. During the Napoleonic Wars, the king was unwilling to negotiate a deal with the Diet that relinquished his spending control in exchange for greater revenues to fight the war. As a consequence, he was unable to mobilize the necessary resources, which led to the loss of Finland and to his dethronement through a coup dtat organized by the elite in 1809.

This article compares the strategies the two Scandinavian states adopted in the European state system during the period 1720–65. Previous research has emphasized the difference in policies: Denmark sought neutrality and avoided war, while Sweden was involved in two wars. Inability of the Swedish political elite to adapt to a new position in the international state system has been presented as one major reason for the Swedish participation in wars. This article argues instead that the difference should be seen as a consequence of the assets the two states could offer the major powers. The Danish state's resources were highly sought after, which meant that the government could gain advantages such as subsidies and territory without fighting wars, while the Swedish state had less to offer the major powers and was thus forced to commit to one major power and war in order to try and gain the same types of benefits as the Danish state. ; Cet article compare les stratégies adoptées par les deux royaumes scandinaves dans le système politique européen entre 1720 et 1765. Des recherches ont déjà souligné les différences qui existaient entre leurs politiques : le Danemark adopte la neutralité et évite la guerre, alors que la Suède se trouve impliquée dans deux conflits. L'incapacité de l'élite politique suédoise à s'adapter à la nouvelle situation politique internationale a été présentée comme l'une des principales causes de l'engagement de la Suède dans des guerres extérieures. Cet article vise à montrer tout au contraire que la différence des choix effectués par les deux pays est liée aux atouts dont ils disposent pour les grandes puissances. Les avantages qu'offre le Danemark sont davantage recherchés, ce qui permet à son gouvernement d'obtenir des subsides et des territoires sans avoir à s'engager dans une guerre, alors que la Suède a moins à offrir et se trouve par conséquent contrainte de prendre des engagements avec de grandes puissances qui la pousse à s'engager dans des conflits dans l'espoir d'en retirer des bénéfices comparables à ceux des Danois.

This article compares the strategies the two Scandinavian states adopted in the European state system during the period 1720–65. Previous research has emphasized the difference in policies: Denmark sought neutrality and avoided war, while Sweden was involved in two wars. Inability of the Swedish political elite to adapt to a new position in the international state system has been presented as one major reason for the Swedish participation in wars. This article argues instead that the difference should be seen as a consequence of the assets the two states could offer the major powers. The Danish state's resources were highly sought after, which meant that the government could gain advantages such as subsidies and territory without fighting wars, while the Swedish state had less to offer the major powers and was thus forced to commit to one major power and war in order to try and gain the same types of benefits as the Danish state. ; Cet article compare les stratégies adoptées par les deux royaumes scandinaves dans le système politique européen entre 1720 et 1765. Des recherches ont déjà souligné les différences qui existaient entre leurs politiques : le Danemark adopte la neutralité et évite la guerre, alors que la Suède se trouve impliquée dans deux conflits. L'incapacité de l'élite politique suédoise à s'adapter à la nouvelle situation politique internationale a été présentée comme l'une des principales causes de l'engagement de la Suède dans des guerres extérieures. Cet article vise à montrer tout au contraire que la différence des choix effectués par les deux pays est liée aux atouts dont ils disposent pour les grandes puissances. Les avantages qu'offre le Danemark sont davantage recherchés, ce qui permet à son gouvernement d'obtenir des subsides et des territoires sans avoir à s'engager dans une guerre, alors que la Suède a moins à offrir et se trouve par conséquent contrainte de prendre des engagements avec de grandes puissances qui la pousse à s'engager dans des conflits dans l'espoir d'en retirer des bénéfices comparables à ceux des Danois.

From 1716 to 1718, Sweden experienced a shock of liquidity when the absolutist regime of Charles XII issued large amounts of fiat coins (mynttecken) in order to finance the Great Northern War. After the death of the king in November 1718, the new parliamentary regime decided to partially default on the coins. In international literature, this episode is largely unknown, and in Swedish historiography, scholars have often claimed that the country's currency collapsed in hyperinflation. We assess the performance of the new coins by studying how prices of commodities in various geographic locations developed. We also study bookkeeping practices in order to see how accountants treated the new coins. Our results show that there was a complex relationship between prices and liquidity. Prices of products in high demand by the military increased more than other prices. Accountants did not treat mynttecken and other currencies differently in 1718. It was only after the death of the king that accountants started to differentiate between different types of coins. The value of the fiat coins was linked to the actions and the legitimacy of the royal regime, which is in line with the State theory of money.