Suchergebnisse

Advancing an explanation based on political parties' constitutional preferences, this volume investigates the nature and variation of parliamentary rights in European Union affairs across countries and levels of governance.

AbstractThe European Union (EU) is a democratic organization but faces severe cases of democratic backsliding. The literature deems the EU a hospitable environment for and reluctant to reign in backsliding. This study focuses on the tactics that backsliding governments employ to preserve this hospitable environment and the conditions under which they succeed. I argue that backsliding governments seek to repurpose the practice of accommodation that permeates EU decision-making for the protection of their backsliding projects. Doing so promises backsliders an escape from their precarious bargaining position in a democratic organization but comes with constraints. Backsliders must limit opposition carefully to a subset of EU competences, backsliding-inhibiting competences, that threaten their backsliding projects the most. Moreover, they can only rely on accommodation in the Council if the democratic member states perceive opposition as justified and remain insulated from political accountability by Europe's parliaments. I present evidence based on quantitative and qualitative analyses of bargaining positions, processes, and outcomes in EU decision-making. The results have implications for understanding the EU's autocratic predicament, the opportunities of backsliding governments, and the role of autocracies in regional and international organizations.

Does differentiated integration undermine the motivation of parliamentarians from less integrated member states to become involved in European Union affairs? Focusing on the European Union's new interparliamentary conferences in economic governance, and justice and home affairs, this study examines whether voluntary and involuntary as well as comprehensive and partial differentiation influence parliamentary involvement, measured as participation in interparliamentary conferences. Based on new data and Coarsened Exact Matching, the results indicate that the effect of differentiation depends on its political origins and design. Only voluntary and comprehensive differentiation depress parliamentary involvement. The results can be seen as favourable regarding the legitimacy of differentiation and compatible with the European Union's ambition to limit the institutional implications of differentiation. They also indicate a targeted parliamentary response to differentiated integration.

This article reviews the literature on the institutional position of national parliaments in the EU. It focuses on new institutional developments, explanations, and effects discussed over the course of the last decade. Existing datasets on parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs and economic governance have been extended to 2020 to inform the discussion. A systematic overview of new analyses of the effects of oversight institutions in EU and domestic politics is offered as well. Cutting across the debate as to whether parliaments are multi-level or domestic players in the EU, this review concludes that the last decade has seen growing policy specialization in the institutional position of national parliaments at the European and national levels, and that the causes and consequences of this development remain largely unstudied.

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.