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AbstractPrevious research has shown that corruption risks may distort market incentives in high-risk contexts. However, there is a dearth of evidence on the potential impact of corruption in settings characterized by low corruption and high-quality institutions. Against that background, this paper delves deeper into the alleged consequences of corruption by examining the link between corruption risks in public procurement and the profitability of firms in the Swedish construction industry. We introduce a novel measure of corruption risk based on the share of single bidder contracts that a firm has won. Validity analysis confirms that our measure is correlated with an alternative corruption measure and local tender winners. Our results reveal that firms that win many single bidder contracts have higher profitability than other firms in the sector: 10 percentage points higher single bidding rate firms have a 0.2–0.6-percentage-point higher sales margin. The findings underscore that public procurement corruption risks distort markets and economic incentives, and that this risk is present even in low-corruption contexts such as in Sweden.

Transparency is recognized as a crucial condition for accountability, good governance and democracy. As right to information (RTI) laws have spread, it is crucial to ask whether ambitious legislative frameworks translate to de facto transparency. In this article, we test how well local governments in Sweden – a 'most-likely country' for implementing RTI-laws – comply with its comparatively ambitious Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. As a side-effect, we also gauge if New Public Management-reforms, here illustrated by increased public ownership of enterprises in local government, implies lessened compliance with RTI-legislation. Requesting information from 462 randomly selected public administrations and municipally owned enterprises, counter-intuitive findings are observed. Less than half of the organizations respected the RTI-legislation, and no significant differences were found between the public administrations and publicly owned enterprises. The findings have methodological as well as empirical implications. They highlight the importance of not only studying legislative frameworks, but also analyzing actual implementation of RTI-frameworks in everyday situations. Also, they demonstrate that problems relating to openness can be observed in low-corrupt, mature democracies with strong bureaucratic capacity that traditionally are hailed for their long history of ambitious RTI-laws. Lastly, and contrary to much popular belief, the findings indicate that publicly owned corporations not necessarily do imply a 'accountability deficit'.

Being elected to a governing body for the first time has been described as both a unique and transforming experience. Accordingly, theorists of elite political socialisation assume that deepened political participation fosters internal political efficacy and satisfaction with democracy. Does this assumption hold for individuals who step up from being grass-root members to become local councillors? In a novel, explorative approach to the question, a longitudinal panel design is employed where perceptions and attitudes of 71 elected and 66 unelected candidates that stood for the 2014 local elections in Sweden are traced over a four-year period. The respondents answered three surveys: right before the 2014 election, mid-term 2016, and close to the 2018 election. We test if the elected newcomers' internal efficacy and satisfaction with decision-making structures became stronger the more deepened, formal political experience they got. However, this hypothesis is solidly rejected. Contrary to theoretical expectations, strengthened internal efficacy and increased satisfaction with decision-making structures do not follow from four years of formalised political experience as a councillor.

Does corruption affect the incentives for potential entrepreneurs to start businesses? The traditional view holds that entrepreneurship is inhibited. However, a few recent studies indicate the contrary, supporting a "grease the wheels" perspective. In a novel approach to this question, we combine a local government corruption index and individual-level register data on start-ups in a low-corruption setting: Sweden. We disaggregate the analysis to individual entrepreneurs, focus on corruption in local institutions and hypothesize that local corruption deters potential entrepreneurs. Our findings are twofold. First, rejecting the "grease the wheels" hypothesis, local corruption has a strong local deterring effect on potential entrepreneurs. Second, a minority of entrepreneurs relocate their start-ups from home municipalities to elsewhere. However, contrary to expectations, relocaters could embody "non-productive" or "destructive" entrepreneurship: they migrate from relatively low-corrupt to relatively high-corrupt municipalities. While migrating is uncommon, and the effect is weak, it nonetheless indicates that relocaters are attracted to conditions where rent-seeking opportunities are present.

Transparency is recognized as a crucial condition for accountability, good governance and democracy. As right to information (RTI) laws have spread, it is crucial to ask whether ambitious legislative frameworks translate to de facto transparency. In this article, we test how well local governments in Sweden – a 'most-likely country' for implementing RTI-laws – comply with its comparatively ambitious Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. As a side-effect, we also gauge if New Public Management-reforms, here illustrated by increased public ownership of enterprises in local government, implies lessened compliance with RTI-legislation. Requesting information from 462 randomly selected public administrations and municipally owned enterprises, counter-intuitive findings are observed. Less than half of the organizations respected the RTI-legislation, and no significant differences were found between the public administrations and publicly owned enterprises. The findings have methodological as well as empirical implications. They highlight the importance of not only studying legislative frameworks, but also analyzing actual implementation of RTI-frameworks in everyday situations. Also, they demonstrate that problems relating to openness can be observed in low-corrupt, mature democracies with strong bureaucratic capacity that traditionally are hailed for their long history of ambitious RTI-laws. Lastly, and contrary to much popular belief, the findings indicate that publicly owned corporations not necessarily do imply a 'accountability deficit'.

Transparency is recognized as a crucial condition for accountability, good governance and democracy. As right to information (RTI) laws have spread, it has become crucial to ask whether ambitious legislative frameworks translate to de facto transparency. In this article, we test how well local governments in Sweden – a 'most likely country' for implementing RTI laws – comply with its comparatively ambitious Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. As a side effect, we also gauge if New Public Management reforms, exemplified by increased public ownership of enterprises in local government, imply lessened compliance with RTI legislation. Requesting information from 462 randomly selected public administrations and municipally owned enterprises, counterintuitive findings were observed. Fewer than half of the organizations respected the RTI legislation, and no significant differences were found between the public administrations and publicly owned enterprises. The findings have methodological as well as empirical implications. They highlight the importance of not only studying legislative frameworks – as has frequently been done in previous work – but also of analyzing actual implementation of RTI frameworks in everyday situations. Additionally, the findings demonstrate that problems relating to openness can be observed in low corrupt, mature democracies with strong bureaucratic capacity. Lastly, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings indicate that publicly owned corporations do not necessarily imply an 'accountability deficit'.

Local governments are increasingly relying on municipally owned corporations (MOCs) to provide public services. Some describe this development as a rational response to austerity challenges and emphasise the cost-efficiency of MOCs ('the optimistic view'). Others identify complications and associate MOCs with weak supervision, lack of accountability, and corruption risks ('the sceptical view'). Hitherto, no studies have analysed these opposing claims on MOCs in the one and same inquiry. We address this gap by focusing on Sweden, which has experienced a dramatic growth in the number of MOCs. We examine the association between the number of MOCs, the business climate, satisfaction with local government, local tax rates, and a corruption index for all 290 Swedish municipalities. Putting the 'optimistic view' into doubt, results indicate that municipalities relying heavily on MOCs are associated with more perceived corruption and higher taxes but do not have more satisfied citizens nor a better business climate. ; Funding: VetenskapsradetSwedish Research Council [2014-01478]; Swedish Research CouncilSwedish Research CouncilEuropean Commission [2014-01478]

Across the globe, local governments have increasingly begun to rely on municipally owned corporations (MOCs) to provide public services, mounting to what scholars describe as a burgeoning corporatization in local government. Some studies have described this development as a rational response to financial stress and contemporary austerity challenges, and emphasise the cost-efficiency of MOCs (the optimistic view). However, several scholars have identified problems associated MOCs relating to weak steering and supervision, lack of accountability, and heightened corruption risks (the sceptical view). Hitherto, no studies have tested these diametrically opposing expectations on the effects MOCs in the one and same analysis. This paper addresses the competing views by studying Sweden, a country with a dramatic growth in the number of MOCs since the 1970s. We examine the association between the number of MOCs, citizen satisfaction with local government, local tax rates and a survey-based corruption measure for all 290 Swedish municipalities. Ultimately questioning the 'optimistic view', the results indicate that municipalities that rely heavily on MOCs in service delivery have higher taxes, not more satisfied citizens, and are associated with higher corruption levels.

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.