Suchergebnisse

Mit der Unterzeichnung des so genannten Vertrags von Rom am 25. März 1957 wurde die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) gegründet. Da die Landwirtschaft in Europa im Anschluss an den zweiten Weltkrieg zerrüttet und Europa somit auf umfangreiche Lebensmittelimporte angewiesen war, kam dem Bereich der Agrarpolitik in selbiger eine schwerwiegende Bedeutung zu. Im Zentrum des Interesses standen dabei, neben Produktivitätssteigerungen, die Stabilisierung der Agrarmärkte sowie die Sicherstellung einer angemessenen Lebenshaltung der Landwirte. Die zu diesem Zweck über die Jahre hinweg eingeführten Maßnahmen der EWG, wie Schutzzölle, Exportsubventionen, Mindestpreise und Preisausgleichszahlungen, erzielten zwar die gewünschte Wirkung, machten jedoch die Aufwendung enormer finanzieller Mittel zu ihrer Umsetzung notwendig und führten ferner zu einem Selbstversorgungsgrad von mehr als 100%, in dessen Folge eingelagerte Überschüsse, unter den Begriffen 'Milchseen', Butterberge' und 'Fleischhalden', öffentliche Bekanntheit erlangten. Trotz vielfacher Versuche erzielte Überschüsse zu bekämpfen und die Kosten für den Agrarsektor zu senken, lässt sich bis heute festhalten, dass lediglich 4,3% der Landwirte in der EU als Profiteure aus den staatlichen Markteingriffen der EU hervorgehen, wohingegen die Bürger als Konsumenten, 1. durch gestiegene Preise sowie 2. durch höhere Kosten für die Staatsausgaben, in doppelter Hinsicht beschnitten werden. Insgesamt verursacht die GAP daher immense volkswirtschaftliche Wohlfahrtsverluste, die eine Aufrechterhaltung selbiger in dieser Weise völlig unverständlich erscheinen lassen. Als möglicher Erklärungsansatz dafür, dass die Agrarpolitik mit einem Anteil von 44% am Gesamthaushalt (ca. 53 Milliarden Euro) unverändert den finanzstärksten Politikbereich in der EU darstellt, wird in dieser Untersuchung das Lobbying in der Agrarpolitik untersucht. So wird die These aufgestellt, dass verschiedenste Interessengruppen, durch direkte und indirekte Einflussnahme auf den politischen Entscheidungsprozess - hier insbesondere in der Generaldirektion Landwirtschaft der Europäischen Kommission - versuchen ihre sozio- ökonomischen Interessen durchzusetzen und so einschneidende Reformen im Bereich der GAP verhindern.

From the introduction: For more than two decades, scientific and political communities have debated whether and how to act on climate change. This discussion moved on. Today science is very clear about the magnitude of the risks imposed by unmanaged climate change: 'What we are doing is redifining where people could live and if we do that as a world than hundreds of million of people will move. Probably billions will move. We are talking about gambling the planet, we are talking about a radical change of the way in which human beings could live and where they could live and, indeed, how many of them." With regard to these risks the application of the precautionary principle telling us 'to better be safe than sorry" appears to be imperative and makes traditional cost-benefit analysis become obsolete. Thus combating global warming has become one of the most important issues facing the world in the 21. century. As nobody would be immune from the transformation the planet faces, avoiding this gamble should, in theory, be in the interest of all nations. Unfortunately, a common response in the scale necessary is hard to organize. While the industrialized countries fear the costs of the transformation from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy, it is the poorest people who are facing a double unequity as they 1. will be hit earliest and hardest by the adverse impacts of climate change, and 2. are least responsible for the stock of current concentrations in the atmosphere. This inequity consequently leads to a great sense of injustice in developing countries being asked cut emission, while knowing, that the developed world got rich on high-carbon growth. Without any doubt the outcome of this is a historical responsibility of industrialized countries to take over leadership in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases. However, bearing in mind that by 2050, approximately eight out of nine billion people in the world will be living in developing nations, it is impossible to get down to emission levels needed without at the same time covering the developing world as well. Against this background international climate protection is a sociopolitical, economical, and ethical challenge, concerning all nations, which have to understand that they are a community based on the principle of mutual solidarity. The international climate regime is regarded as the main platform to further cooperation between nations in order to succesfully combat global warming. Ever since the first world climate conference in 1979 the international community of states pursues the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions in the medium-term, before finally reducing them in the long-term. In the end of 2009 and 2010, the 15th and 16th Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aimed at achieving the final breakthrough with regard to framing new long-term mitigation commitments necessary in the scale needed to assure that global warming will not exceed 2° C above preindustrial levels; the line of demarcation from which on climate change is supposedly irreversible. Going from this initial situation this thesis will try to determine the driving-forces of the climate regime and research if the regime theory is a capable tool to explain them. In the following chapter it will be started by highlighting the scientific and economic consequences of anthropogenic climate change to amplify, why there is such an urgent need to fight global warming. Thereafter part three is going to deal with the regime theory. After presenting its interest-based, power-based, and knowledge-based school, these different approaches will, in a second step, be applied to the issue area of climate change. Basing on this analysis it is possible to hypothesize on how actors are supposed to behave within the regime. Due to the fact, that this thesis has a limited volume it will be focused on the three actors, which are regarded as not only most important for the regime's success but also possess the biggest influence within the international community, namely the United States, China, and the European Union. Thereby it will be strongly concentrated on the role of the United States. Understanding this role within the international climate regime is considered as absolutely central since the absolute emissions of the US surpass - with the exception of China - those of any other country and its per capita emissions are also amongst the highest in the world. As a result the US although containing just around one-twentieth of the world's population produce almost one-fifth of the world's total emissions of greenhouse gases. Being the world's largest economy the US moreover not only has considerable financial resources which could be directed to environmental problems abroad, but also a technological capability with huge mitigation potentials. Consequently there is a great chance that a possible decision of the US to take a leading role on addressing climate change would set an example that other countries would follow. On the other hand the rest of the world, and here especially developing countries, such as China or India, very likely will not agree to needed actions either, if the US chooses to reject such a leader-role. Therefore it is often spoken of a 'moral duty' of the US to take the lead in the response towards global warming, a duty which is amplified by the fact that the US alone is historically responsible for almost 30% of the total concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. While the EU has recognized its responsibility for anthropogenic climate change and implemented, as the first region worldwide, a comprehensive and demanding programme to fight the greenhouse effect, China's participation and cooperation in the climate change regime is particularly important for two reasons. First, China's impact on climate change is forecasted to be enormous: China's large population, rapid economic growth and heavy reliance on fossil fuels collectively imply large increases in CO2 emissions and thereby a disproportionate influence on climate change. The fourth part is divided in three sections. Since in isolation from its historical and institutional antecedents the global climate regime and the challenges it currently faces, cannot be properly understood, the first section will take a closer look at the current regime, which is founded on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on climate change and supplemented by its 1997 Kyoto-Protocol. In this context special attention will be given to the exit of the US from the Kyoto process as the slow progress in the international climate negotiations from that point on was mainly triggered by the reluctance of the US to endorse the Kyoto approach. The second section focuses on the main priorities of the actors within climate negotiations, which are in turn highly affected by their energy political situation. The negotiations in Copenhagen and to a minor extent in Cancun will from this basis offer valuable clues to the question to which extent the actors have been able to convert their interests within the regime. In the final part it will be possible to draw a conclusion regarding the driving-forces of the regime and how they affect its effectiveness and robustness. After giving a compressed outlook on potential future driving-forces an assumption will be issued whether the hypotheses developed in the third part can be coroborated as valid.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents 1.Introduction1 2.Scientific and economic consequences of anthropogenic climate change4 2.1.The natural and anthropogenic greenhouse effect4 2.1.1.The IPCC and its 4th Assessment Report6 2.1.2.The Stern Review and the economics of climate change10 3.The regime theory14 3.1.Three schools of thought within the theory of international regimes15 3.1.1.The interest-based approach15 3.1.1.1.Two-level games19 3.1.2.The power-based approach21 3.1.3.The knowledge-based approach23 3.2.Application of the three approaches to the issue are of climate change25 4.The issue area of climate change33 4.1.The current climate regime33 4.1.1.The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change34 4.1.2.The Kyoto Protocol35 4.1.2.1.The exit of the United States38 4.1.2.2.Basic weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol41 4.1.3.The Bali Action Plan42 4.2.Prorities of the main actors42 4.2.1.The United States of America44 4.2.1.1.Obama's new climate policy46 4.2.2.China48 4.2.2.1.China's plead for consumption-based inventories54 4.3.International negotiations for a post-2012 agreement in Copenhagen and Cancun58 5.Analysis of the driving-forces in the climate regime64 5.1.The effectiveness and robustness of the climate regime64 5.2.Analysis of the driving-forces with regard to the effectiveness of the international climate regime65 5.2.1.Analysis of the current climate regime65 5.2.2.Analysis of the negotiations for a post-2012 climate regime67 5.2.3.Outlook regarding the regime's potential future driving-forces75 5.2.3.1.A shift in Obama's political priority setting75 5.2.3.2.Developments at the state and local level in the US77 5.2.3.2.1.The ballot on Propostion 23 in California82 5.3.Conclusion83 References90 Table of figures Figure 1:Development of global annual average temperature and CO2-concentrations5 Figure 2: Examples of impacts associated with global average temperature change8 Figure 3: Example of a payoff matrix in the Prisoner's Dilemma17 Figure 4: Example of a payoff matriv in the Battle of the Sexes22 Figure 5: Classification of a country's support for international environmental regulations27 Figure 6: Types of domestic political interest28 Figure 7: Targets of the Kyoto Protocol and actual reductions39 Figure 8: Coal producing states in the US44 Figure 9: Cross-party voting on the ACES in the House of Representatives45 Figure 10: Total energy consumption in China, by type (2008)49 Figure 11: China's exports and CO2-emissions since 200256 Figure 12: C02-emissions from China's net exports in 2004 in comparison with total emissions from China and other countries57 Figure 13: Renewable alternative portfolio standards in the US79 Figure 14: Regional cap and trade programs in the US80 Figure 15: Total global investments in clean energy in $ bn from 2004 to 201085 Appendixes Appendix 1: World carbon dioxide emissions by region107 Appendix 2: National reduction targets in the Non-ETS-Sector in the EU108 Appendix 3: Global carbon dioxide emissions from coal use in million metric tons, by region from 2005 to 2035109 Appendix 4: Global carbon dioxide emissions in million metric tons, by regionfrom 2005 to 2035110 Appendix 5: Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in metric tons per person, by region and country from 2005 to 2035111 Appendix 6: China's coal deposits and major railway infrastructure112 Appendix 7: Copenhagen Accord emission mitigation goals of selected countries113 Appendix 8: New constructions of coal-fired power plants in Germany114 Appendix 9: World nuclear enery consumption, by region from 2005 to 2035115 Appendix 10: Transcript - Interview: Nicholas Stern116 Appendix 11: Transcript - Interview: Hermann Ott.120 Appendix 12: Transcript - Interview: Steve Kretzmann120Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3., The regime theory: The regime theory originated in the late seventies initially in the United States. It searched for answers to challenges in a time when especially crude oil induced shocks in industrial countries have plastically shown the practical consequences of the grown interdependency of economies. So the American study of regimes first and foremost concentrated on the field of the international political economy and was trying to ensure a better understanding of international cooperation. At the same time another phenomenom occured, namely the significant increase in the numbers of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, while the dominance of the United States in the world politics declined. This was a surprising development as, according to the at this time predominant approach of neorealism, international institutions like GATT or the IMF were supposed to become ineffective as a result of the US loosing its status as a global hegemon. To primarily get a better understanding of what international regimes actually are it is useful to study them as social institutions. By means of separating international regimes from international organisations, which are likewise social institutions, two of their main criteria - besides fulfilling the criteria of durability - become especially apparent: In contrast to international organisations, which often have an effect across problems, international regimes always refer to a specific problem area of international politics, like the protection of the ozon layer, trade liberalisations or the problem of climate change, While international organisations can act as cooperative actors, international regimes lack this attribute. In the following it will be concentrated on the interest-based, power-based and knowledge based approach to explain the emergence and characteristics of international regimes. The main focus of attention will be put on the work of Robert Keohane, who produced the most elaborate and also most widely discussed neoliberal approach. While Keohane's formulation had such a strong influence that it has been widely equated with 'regime theory' as such, the neoliberal school of thought, whose overriding emphasis has been on showing the role of international regimes in helping states to realize common interests, has come to represent the mainstream approach analyzing international regimes. Keohane's theory will be complement by Putnams theory of the two-level-games to factor in domestic influences on the interests of states in international negotiations. Thereafter not only the main criticisms of the neorealist school regarding the neoliberal theory will be pointed out, but also the cognitivist perspective will be shown. Hereby it will concentrate on the branch of weak cognitivism that regards the demand for regimes in international relations as depending on the actors' perception of international problems, which in turn are - e.g. in the case of environmental problems - heavily influenced by the information provided by scientists and so called epistemic communities. The cognitive perspective distinguishes itself from the other two approaches since it is the only one, which does not have a rational but sociological meta-theoretical orientation and is another useful complementation of Keohane's regime theory. While none of the present approaches denies regimes any impact, the degree of institutionalism varies considerably, what not least has something to do with the behavioural models on which neoliberals, realists and cognitivists base their analyses. 3.1, Three schools of thought within the theory of international regime: 3.1.1, The interest-based approach: The interest-based theory attributes international institutions a significant role in international politics and therefore dealt critically with the approach of neorealism, which during the first quarter century after WWII has been predominant in the international relations. Neoliberal and realist theories of international regimes though share their commitment to rationalism, which assumes that states, which act in anarchic structures are the most important actors in international politics. By following selfishly defined interests to maximize own profits they behave as rational egoists for whom altruistism never is a motivating force. Compliance to international rules and norms is according to rationalists not a result of a moral obligaion but of a situation where own short-term gains fail to outweigh own losses in the long-run. In contrast to neorealism the interest-based approach consequently stresses, that stable international cooperation is possible even beyond hegemonic power structures, when cooperation is due to increasing interdependent relations beyond national borders in the common interest of all involved states. Since the actions of a player in a field are driven by its interests and every player behaves as a utility maximizer problematic acting interdependencies might emerge, in which a better collective result can solely be reached through cooperation. A need for cooperation is typical for the utilization of global collective goods, which once provided can be used by everyone not only by its providers but also by free-riders, namely states not contributing to make the good available. This is a situation, entitled by Garrett Hardin as the 'tragedy of the commons", that entails two major problems. 1. unless it happens to produce significant side-effects in the form of private goods an individual actor, contemplating whether to contribute to the collective good or not, most likely won't find a unilateral effort that will pay off, and 2. concerning the collective good itself, the smaller the actor the more its own benefit-cost ratio for unilateral efforts will negatively deviate from that of the world. Although in this constellation players have a common interest in securing the common good, cooperation seems very unlikely since each player will regard it as irrational.