Suchergebnisse

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Henry Hansmann (1988), 'Ownership of the Firm', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, IV (2), Fall, 267-304 -- Paul H. Rubin (1978), 'The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract', Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (1), April, 223-33 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 -- Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2005), 'Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (1), February, 131-71 -- Peter T. Leeson (2007), 'An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization', Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1049-94 -- Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1996), 'Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (4), Fall, 139-58 -- L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1954), 'A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System', American Political Science Review, 48 (3), September, 787-92 -- David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn (1989), 'Bargaining in Legislatures', American Political Science Review, 83 (4), December, 1181-206 -- Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Tonja Jacobi and Barry R. Weingast (2006), 'The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics', in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A.Wittman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Chapter 11, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 199-222 -- Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983), 'Separation of Ownership and Control', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (2), June, 301-25 -- Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman (1990), 'The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1), February, 155-65 -- Donald Wittman (2005), 'The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice', Kyklos, 58 (1), February, 121-44 -- Ronald Wintrobe (1990), 'The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship', American Political Science Review, 84 (3), September, 849-72 -- Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson (2004), 'Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule', Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2-3), April-May, 162-92 -- Donald Wittman (2013), 'Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions', British Journal of Political Science, 44 (4), October, 717-39 -- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984), 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1), February, 165-79 -- James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich (1984), 'Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections', Journal of Politics, 46 (2), May, 459-78 -- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996), 'Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics', Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), April, 265-86 -- Donald Wittman (2009), 'How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median', Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1324-43

Providing students with a solid grounding in the economic analysis of the law, this reader brings together edited versions of diverse and challenging journal articles into a unified collection. Chosen to provoke thought and discussion, these carefully streamlined articles apply economic theories to many aspects of the law, from intellectual property, corporate finance, and contracts to property rights, family law, and criminal law.Provides real-life examples and implications of economic theory. Creates a unified vision of the law, showing the interconnections between the various fields. Covers

Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalized and when a person's age may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. It thus explains what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, over time. The study also applies the methodology to politics more generally by looking at elections in Venice and Genoa in the eighteenth century and the appointment of leaders in present-day China. Adapted from the source document.

Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalized and when a person's age may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. It thus explains what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, over time. The study also applies the methodology to politics more generally by looking at elections in Venice and Genoa in the eighteenth century and the appointment of leaders in present-day China.

Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy, or something akin to a monarchy, where heredity plays a primary role. This variation allows for a comparative study of their organization. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control over church doctrine and finance. And they also induce different institutional responses. I show where screening is highly institutionalized and when the age of a person may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. I am thus able to explain what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, overtime. In a nutshell, this paper is about politics and strategic behavior in the large (democracy versus autocracy) within the context of the small (religious institutions).

Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, aparliamentary democracy, or something akin to a monarchy, where heredity plays aprimary role. This variation allows for a comparative study of their organization.These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in thefight for control over church doctrine and finance. And they also induce different institutional responses. I show where screening is highly institutionalized and when the age of a person may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. I am thus able to explain what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, overtime. In a nutshell, this paper is about politics and strategic behavior in the large (democracyversus autocracy) within the context of the small (religious institutions).

This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.