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In this article, we summarize recent research on collective angst (i.e., concern for one's group's future vitality) and collective nostalgia (i.e., sentimental longing for the in-group's past) and emphasize their interconnections and predictive utility. We also put forth the supposition that the source of the collective angst that group members are feeling can influence the content of collective nostalgia (i.e., what group members are longing for), which has consequences for the attitudes and actions that group members will support to protect the group's vitality. Political rhetoric tends to capitalize on the relation between these emotions by making specific existential threats salient to elicit specific associated collective nostalgizing, followed by promises to "bring back the good old days"—days when the source of the threat was (ostensibly) absent. In sum, the content of collective nostalgia matters for understanding what action tendencies group members will support to assuage the specific (perceived) threats to their group.

We examine the consequences of threat to the ingroup for emotional reactions to ingroup harm doing. It was hypothesized that reminders of a past threat to the ingroup would induce collective angst, and this emotional reaction would increase forgiveness of the ingroup for its harmful actions toward another group. In Experiment 1, Americans read an article about the war in Iraq that implied Americans would soon experience another attack or one where such implied future threat to the ingroup was absent. When the ingroup's future was threatened, forgiveness for the harm Americans have committed in Iraq was increased, to the extent that collective angst was induced. In Experiment 2, Americans experienced more collective angst and were more willing to forgive their ingroup for their group's present harm doing in Iraq following reminders of either the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compared to when the victimization reminder was irrelevant to the ingroup. We discuss why ingroup threat encourages ingroup forgiveness for current harm doing.

Two experiments examined the impact of ingroup extinction threat on willingness to compromise with an adversary group. Specifically, Israel's ability to cope with a nuclear capable Iran was manipulated and Israelis' willingness to compromise with Hamas (Experiment 1) or the Palestinian Authority (Experiment 2) was assessed. In Experiment 1, extinction threat decreased willingness to compromise with Hamas—an effect mediated by heightened collective angst. Conversely, in Experiment 2, extinction threat increased willingness to compromise with the Palestinian Authority, again via collective angst. The reason for this inverted effect in Experiment 2 was perceived reciprocal threat reduction—the belief that compromise with the Palestinian Authority would reduce the Iranian threat (a belief not relevant to the issue of compromise with Hamas). Implications for the understanding of intergroup conflicts and peace making are discussed within the context of the role played by collective angst.

The present study assessed gambling appraisals and specific coping styles among 400 young male (n = 230) and female (n = 170) gamblers. Of particular interest was to determine whether gender variations in stress-related responses are associated with the degree of gambling pathology, depressive symptoms, and attitude to seeking treatment. Results showed that greater appraisals of threat, illusions of control, and negative outcome expectancies were associated with higher levels of gambling pathology, particularly among males. Further, among women, gambling propensity was associated with reduced social support seeking, whereas for men gambling pathology was primarily accounted for by increased use of wishful thinking. These coping strategies, combined with other internally oriented emotion-focused strategies, mediated the relation between gambling and depressive symptoms. Not surprisingly, more positive attitudes to treatment seeking were reported by those with a greater propensity to use problem-solving and support seeking coping efforts. The utility of assessing specific components that comprise a gambler's stress-response is discussed.

Although it is well-established that interpersonal apologies promote forgiveness, the apology–forgiveness link at the intergroup level is more tenuous. A possible reason for this tenuous relationship is that many intergroup apologies focus on the offender group's feelings about the transgression as opposed to the victimized group's suffering. In this spirit, we manipulated focus of a collective apology in two experiments. Consistent with predictions, a victim-focused apology (relative to offender-focused apology) heightened perceptions of offender group remorse, perceived empathy of the offender group, and trust in the offender. In turn, perceptions of remorse, empathy, and trust uniquely increased intergroup forgiveness. Results have implications for facilitating restorative effects between groups in situations of social injustice.

The world has entered into an "age of apology," in which governments, armies, and corporations have increasingly begun apologizing for their role in committing historical and contemporary harms. Although it is widely assumed that such apologies help promote intergroup forgiveness, this assumption has not been subjected to a great deal of empirical investigation, and the little research that exists presents a mixed picture. In this article, we present some of the political and ideological arguments for and against providing intergroup apologies. We then critically review the research on the outcomes of apologies, with an eye to developing concrete strategies for maximizing apology effectiveness. Drawing on these discussions, a staircase model for effective intergroup apologies is offered that has implications for social policy. Although we present some pessimism regarding the outcome of intergroup apologies, this article provides arguments for the necessity of formal intergroup apologies and for policy that maximizes their positive effects.

A growing body of evidence suggests that support for a strong non-democratic leader is driven, in part, by low economic development and economic inequality at the country level, and low income and interpersonal trust at the individual level. In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that although such a pattern predicts support for a strong non-democratic leader in democracies, it should produce decreased support for a strong non-democratic leader in non-democracies (where the presence of such leaders is the political status quo). Using three waves of World Values Survey data (2005-2020), as predicted, we found that in democracies, low economic development, high inequality, and low interpersonal trust predicted support for a strong non-democratic leader. However, in non-democracies, support for a strong non-democratic leader was higher in more economically developed countries and among individuals with higher social trust. These results contradict modernization theory's proposition that development promotes support for democratic rule and suggest that economic development reinforces support for the existing political system.

A growing body of evidence suggests that support for a strong non-democratic leader is driven, in part, by low economic development and economic inequality at the country level, and low income and interpersonal trust at the individual level. In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that although such a pattern predicts support for a strong non-democratic leader in democracies, it should produce decreased support for a strong non-democratic leader in non-democracies (where the presence of such leaders is the political status quo). Using three waves of World Values Survey data (2005-2020), as predicted, we found that in democracies, low economic development, high inequality, and low interpersonal trust predicted support for a strong non-democratic leader. However, in non-democracies, support for a strong non-democratic leader was higher in more economically developed countries and among individuals with higher social trust. These results contradict modernization theory's proposition that development promotes support for democratic rule and suggest that economic development reinforces support for the existing political system. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

European and Chinese Canadians' perceptions and expectations of the Canadian government's apology for the head tax placed on Chinese immigrants during the early twentieth century were examined, along with Chinese Canadians' willingness to forgive the transgression. Among both European and Chinese Canadians, beliefs about the importance attributed to the event and perception of the apology as deserved and sincere heightened expectations of improved intergroup relations. Collective guilt acceptance among European Canadians heightened the relation between perceived sincerity and positive expectations, whereas collective guilt assignment by Chinese Canadians heightened the relation between sincerity and forgiveness. A one‐year follow‐up of whether Chinese Canadians were equally satisfied with the apology indicated that their willingness to grant forgiveness had waned, and although on the whole expectations of improved relations were met, those who assigned more collective guilt were less convinced. Intergroup apologies and their effectiveness at facilitating intergroup relations are discussed.