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We examine the consequences of threat to the ingroup for emotional reactions to ingroup harm doing. It was hypothesized that reminders of a past threat to the ingroup would induce collective angst, and this emotional reaction would increase forgiveness of the ingroup for its harmful actions toward another group. In Experiment 1, Americans read an article about the war in Iraq that implied Americans would soon experience another attack or one where such implied future threat to the ingroup was absent. When the ingroup's future was threatened, forgiveness for the harm Americans have committed in Iraq was increased, to the extent that collective angst was induced. In Experiment 2, Americans experienced more collective angst and were more willing to forgive their ingroup for their group's present harm doing in Iraq following reminders of either the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compared to when the victimization reminder was irrelevant to the ingroup. We discuss why ingroup threat encourages ingroup forgiveness for current harm doing.

The world has entered into an "age of apology," in which governments, armies, and corporations have increasingly begun apologizing for their role in committing historical and contemporary harms. Although it is widely assumed that such apologies help promote intergroup forgiveness, this assumption has not been subjected to a great deal of empirical investigation, and the little research that exists presents a mixed picture. In this article, we present some of the political and ideological arguments for and against providing intergroup apologies. We then critically review the research on the outcomes of apologies, with an eye to developing concrete strategies for maximizing apology effectiveness. Drawing on these discussions, a staircase model for effective intergroup apologies is offered that has implications for social policy. Although we present some pessimism regarding the outcome of intergroup apologies, this article provides arguments for the necessity of formal intergroup apologies and for policy that maximizes their positive effects.

A growing body of evidence suggests that support for a strong non-democratic leader is driven, in part, by low economic development and economic inequality at the country level, and low income and interpersonal trust at the individual level. In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that although such a pattern predicts support for a strong non-democratic leader in democracies, it should produce decreased support for a strong non-democratic leader in non-democracies (where the presence of such leaders is the political status quo). Using three waves of World Values Survey data (2005-2020), as predicted, we found that in democracies, low economic development, high inequality, and low interpersonal trust predicted support for a strong non-democratic leader. However, in non-democracies, support for a strong non-democratic leader was higher in more economically developed countries and among individuals with higher social trust. These results contradict modernization theory's proposition that development promotes support for democratic rule and suggest that economic development reinforces support for the existing political system.

A growing body of evidence suggests that support for a strong non-democratic leader is driven, in part, by low economic development and economic inequality at the country level, and low income and interpersonal trust at the individual level. In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that although such a pattern predicts support for a strong non-democratic leader in democracies, it should produce decreased support for a strong non-democratic leader in non-democracies (where the presence of such leaders is the political status quo). Using three waves of World Values Survey data (2005-2020), as predicted, we found that in democracies, low economic development, high inequality, and low interpersonal trust predicted support for a strong non-democratic leader. However, in non-democracies, support for a strong non-democratic leader was higher in more economically developed countries and among individuals with higher social trust. These results contradict modernization theory's proposition that development promotes support for democratic rule and suggest that economic development reinforces support for the existing political system. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

European and Chinese Canadians' perceptions and expectations of the Canadian government's apology for the head tax placed on Chinese immigrants during the early twentieth century were examined, along with Chinese Canadians' willingness to forgive the transgression. Among both European and Chinese Canadians, beliefs about the importance attributed to the event and perception of the apology as deserved and sincere heightened expectations of improved intergroup relations. Collective guilt acceptance among European Canadians heightened the relation between perceived sincerity and positive expectations, whereas collective guilt assignment by Chinese Canadians heightened the relation between sincerity and forgiveness. A one‐year follow‐up of whether Chinese Canadians were equally satisfied with the apology indicated that their willingness to grant forgiveness had waned, and although on the whole expectations of improved relations were met, those who assigned more collective guilt were less convinced. Intergroup apologies and their effectiveness at facilitating intergroup relations are discussed.

Collective nostalgia is a bittersweet emotion that reflects sentimental longing for valued aspects of the past of one's group. Given that conservatism is typically associated with a general desire to preserve the societal status quo or return society to its traditional way of being, nostalgia has been theorized to be characteristic of those on the political right (i.e., conservatives). In the current work, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that collective nostalgia is experienced by both conservatives and liberals, but the content of their nostalgizing differs. Across three studies in three socio-political contexts—United States (Study 1, MTurk, N = 352), Canada (Study 2, student sample, N = 154), and England (Study 3, online panel, N = 2,345)—we found that both conservatives and liberals experienced collective nostalgia for a more homogenous and open society. However, conservatives experienced more homogeneity-focused collective nostalgia, whereas liberals experienced more openness-focused collective nostalgia. Replicating previous findings, homogeneity-focused nostalgia emerged as a positive, whereas openness-focused nostalgia emerged as a negative, predictor of intergroup attitudes. The results have both theoretical and practical significance for understanding political attitudes and behaviors. To the point, variance in the conservative and liberal political agendas is, in part, a function of a difference in their respective predisposition to nostalgize about and thus desire the return of a particular aspect of the in-group's past.

There is evidence that democracies are under threat around the world while the quest for strong leaders is increasing. Although the causes of these developments are complex and multifaceted, here we focus on one factor: the extent to which citizens express materialist and post-materialist concerns. We explore whether objective higher levels of democracy are differentially associated with materialist and post-materialist concerns and, in turn, whether this is related to the wish for a strong leader. Testing this hypothesis across 27 countries (N = 5,741) demonstrated a direct negative effect of democracies' development on the wish for a strong leader. Further, multi-level mediation analysis showed that the relation between the Democracy Index and the wish for a strong leader was mediated by materialist concerns. This pattern of results suggests that lower levels of democracy are associated with enhanced concerns about basic needs and this is linked to greater support for strong leaders. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

There is evidence that democracies are under threat around the world while the quest for strong leaders is increasing. Although the causes of these developments are complex and multifaceted, here we focus on one factor: the extent to which citizens express materialist and post-materialist concerns. We explore whether objective higher levels of democracy are differentially associated with materialist and post-materialist concerns and, in turn, whether this is related to the wish for a strong leader. Testing this hypothesis across 27 countries (N = 5,741) demonstrated a direct negative effect of democracies' development on the wish for a strong leader. Further, multi-level mediation analysis showed that the relation between the Democracy Index and the wish for a strong leader was mediated by materialist concerns. This pattern of results suggests that lower levels of democracy are associated with enhanced concerns about basic needs and this is linked to greater support for strong leaders. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published