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According to recent international relations research, an actor's status ultimately depends on commonly accepted ratings of that actor's valued attributes (e.g., wealth, competence, culture, or coercive capabilities). This manuscript argues that asymmetric reciprocal roles (leaders versus followers, patrons versus clients, teachers versus students, etc.) constitute another, even more fundamental, kind of stratification that can provoke far more acrimonious status conflicts. Such role-based hierarchies remain stable as long as subordinate actors deem their superiors entitled to deferential treatment. Disputes over asymmetrical roles arise when subaltern actors begin to question the right of dominant actors to command, or when actors fear that co-equal parties are trying to establish their social dominance through a series of faits accomplis. In such circumstances, defiance is the status tactic of choice because it directly undercuts disconcerting patterns of deference. By systematically theorizing defiance in status hierarchies, the paper provides an overdue addition to the literature on the breakdown of cooperation and the dissolution of order. It first sketches a theory that lays out the motives and forms of defiant behavior in international status disputes and then illustrates its value in explaining Russian and Greek resistance to domineering Western "partners."

AbstractAccording to recent international relations research, an actor's status ultimately depends on commonly accepted ratings of that actor's valued attributes (e.g., wealth, competence, culture, or coercive capabilities). This manuscript argues that asymmetric reciprocal roles (leaders versus followers, patrons versus clients, teachers versus students, etc.) constitute another, even more fundamental, kind of stratification that can provoke far more acrimonious status conflicts. Such role-based hierarchies remain stable as long as subordinate actors deem their superiors entitled to deferential treatment. Disputes over asymmetrical roles arise when subaltern actors begin to question the right of dominant actors to command, or when actors fear that co-equal parties are trying to establish their social dominance through a series of faits accomplis. In such circumstances, defiance is the status tactic of choice because it directly undercuts disconcerting patterns of deference. By systematically theorizing defiance in status hierarchies, the paper provides an overdue addition to the literature on the breakdown of cooperation and the dissolution of order. It first sketches a theory that lays out the motives and forms of defiant behavior in international status disputes and then illustrates its value in explaining Russian and Greek resistance to domineering Western "partners."

Status has once again become a prominent topic in international relations. However, vague, incomplete, and incompatible definitions continue to stifle the development of a cohesive research program. Even the most sophisticated conceptualizations proposed fail to comprehend the full range of status conflicts and ambitions. Current research centers on collective beliefs about the traits that are valued in individual actors, so it especially fails to properly account for status differentiations that emerge through bilateral interactions and for defiant acts that upend local status hierarchies. It also neglects the most intense status infringements: acts and relationships that are humiliating. To remedy this conceptual weakness, this article will first review conceptual work in International Relations and beyond. It will then present an integrated model of two distinct status hierarchies — prestige and role status — and their causal linkages. In so doing, the article will attempt to clarify how "status" relates to similar concepts, such as "authority," "prestige," "honor," and "glory." The explanatory value of this consolidated status framework will be demonstrated through a more nuanced and consistent discussion of Russia's seemingly erratic status disputes with "the West."