Suchergebnisse

Chapter one."Is social justice an empty abstraction?" /Jean Bethke Elshtain --Chapter two."All justice is social but not all justice is social justice" /Nicholas Wolterstorff --Chapter three."Social justice isn't what you think it is" /Michael Novak --Chapter four."On the origins of the concept of social justice and a misunderstanding of Aquinas" /John Finnis --Chapter five."The search for Universal ethics: the church, natural law, and social justice /Joseph Koterski --Chapter six."Social justice, charity, and Catholic social doctrine" /Robert G. Kennedy --Chapter seven."The USCCB approach to social justice and the common good" /J. Brian Benestad.

The role of the United States Supreme Court has been deeply controversial throughout American history. Should the Court undertake the task of guarding a wide variety of controversial and often unenumerated rights? Or should it confine itself to enforcing specific constitutional provisions, leaving other issues (even those of rights) to the democratic process?

Traces legal scholar Ronald Dworkin's developing work in legal & political philosophy; describes both his constructive theory of law & his understanding of liberal equality; & summarizes his argument about the ethical foundations of liberalism. Dworkin views law as an interpretive concept & general theories of law as constructive interpretations. His definition of liberal equality links equality, liberty, & community into a general political ideal that emphasizes the need for compensatory strategies to reduce inequalities. Other issues discussed include Dworkin's recent defenses of the foundations of liberalism; distinctions he draws between volitional & critical interests; & dilemmas associated with critical interests. A look at differences between the impact model & the challenge model of value notes that Dworkin believes the ethical roots of political liberalism are found in the challenge model of ethics. Dworkin's most recent work is summarized to conclude that his legal theory needs further philosophical development, especially in regard to his argument about the superiority of the challenge model. J. Lindroth

Leading liberal theorist Ronald Dworkin builds a case against paternalism, rooted in his liberal ethical theory, especially the requirement of ethical integrity. But his case is successful only against less sophisticated forms of paternalism. His argument focuses too much on profound ethical convictions, failing to recognize the frequency with which people hold relatively unreflective convictions and the inevitable role of the law in helping to shape convictions. He makes concessions regarding paternalistic actions that come to be endorsed by the persons who are subject to them, but then tries to impose arbitrary limits on such endorsement. Finally, he rests his case against paternalism on the denial of transcendent standards, but is unable to avoid employing such standards himself. Building a case for certain forms of paternalism in a pluralistic liberal democracy is a difficult but necessary task, that can only proceed after removing fallacious objections like Dworkin's.