Suchergebnisse

5.3.4 Research Design: Coalitional Durability -- 5.3.5 Results: Coalitional Durability -- 5.4 Application: Pakistan, Iran, And The Superpowers -- 5.5 Summary And Discussion -- 5.6 Appendix -- 5.6.1 Proofs -- 5.6.2 Victorious Coalitions And Their Members -- 6 Conclusion -- 6.1 Public And Private Stakes In International Cooperation -- 6.2 Allied And Nonallied Coalitions -- 6.3 The United States And Military Multilateralism -- 6.4 A Coalitions Research Agenda -- Bibliography -- Index.

I introduce this issue's symposium on the Russo-Ukrainian War by giving a brief overview of the bargaining framework, which asks why states sometimes use war to resolve disputes despite common knowledge that fighting is wasteful. I describe two types of mechanism—costly war and costly peace—and briefly discuss each symposium contribution in relation to its proposed mechanism(s). I also discuss the advantages of the bargaining framework for identifying and ruling out potential causal mechanisms in historical cases and close with some suggestions for continued work in the modeling dialogue between theory and evidence in the study of war.

Great powers often extract concessions whether they intervene during or after other states' wars. I analyze crisis bargaining between two primary disputants and a great power that may intervene to extract concessions from the victor. When disputants face commitment problems, the threat of intervention discourages declining states from attacking and enables rising states to make otherwise-incredible commitments to avoid war. When disputants face information problems, uninformed states find risking war less attractive, and informed states accept less favorable proposals, regardless of their private information. The mechanism by which the threat of intervention discourages war depends on great powers' military reach and the side(s) against which they intervene. The model shows how (i) changing great power capabilities can lead to the outbreak of war between other states, (ii) these effects are mediated by hierarchical relationships, and (iii) great powers can create international order not with principle but with selfishness.

Abstract
Great powers often extract concessions whether they intervene during or after other states' wars. I analyze crisis bargaining between two primary disputants and a great power that may intervene to extract concessions from the victor. When disputants face commitment problems, the threat of intervention discourages declining states from attacking and enables rising states to make otherwise-incredible commitments to avoid war. When disputants face information problems, uninformed states find risking war less attractive, and informed states accept less favorable proposals, regardless of their private information. The mechanism by which the threat of intervention discourages war depends on great powers' military reach and the side(s) against which they intervene. The model shows how (i) changing great power capabilities can lead to the outbreak of war between other states, (ii) these effects are mediated by hierarchical relationships, and (iii) great powers can create international order not with principle but with selfishness.

I analyze a three-actor model of crisis bargaining with two key features. First, diplomatic opposition raises the costs of war, but an informed state can avoid it by conveying restraint to a supporter. Second, the means of conveying restraint may fail to convince an enemy tempted to risk war of the informed state's willingness to fight. I derive three results. First, war is more likely when third parties believe the informed state to be generally restrained. Second, the threat of opposition that modestly affects the costs of war discourages risky bluffing. Third, the threat of opposition that substantially raises the costs of war can lead states to mask a true willingness to fight, securing diplomatic support at the price of an elevated risk of war despite the availability of a credible signal. Building diplomatic coalitions to prevent balancing can simultaneously make credible communication that averts war both easy and unattractive.

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting-strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.(International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

How do coalition partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining? I analyze a model in which a potential coalition leader faces a trade-off between signaling resolve to a target and retaining a partner's support by limiting the costs of war. The strength of the target conditions the partner's effect. When the target is strong, the need to ensure military cooperation reduces the probability of war by discouraging bluffing, though resolute types can signal resolve by foregoing coalitional support. When the target is weaker, a resolute coalition leader moderates threats to preserve military cooperation, foregoing the chance to signal resolve and increasing the chances of war, even as the partner successfully moderates the leader's bargaining posture. Thus, coalitions may face higher probabilities of war against weaker targets than stronger ones, coalitions are more likely against weak than strong targets, and partners can increase or decrease the probability of war. Adapted from the source document.