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In: Journal of political economy, Band 113, Heft 4, S. 785-810
ISSN: 1537-534X
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 113, Heft 4, S. 785-810
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 380
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The Bell journal of economics, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 275
In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 6, S. 1399-1429
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study a common value, first-price auction in which the number of bidders is endogenous: the seller (auctioneer) knows the value and solicits bidders at a cost. The number of bidders, which is unobservable, may thus depend on the true value. Therefore, being solicited conveys information. This solicitation effect may soften competition and impede information aggregation. Under certain conditions, there is an equilibrium in which the seller solicits many bidders, yet the resulting price is not competitive and fails to aggregate any information. More broadly, these ideas are relevant for markets with adverse selection in which informed traders initiate contacts. (JEL D44, D82)
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 19, Heft 5-7, S. 1283-1292
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: The Economic Journal, Band 98, Heft 391, S. 484
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 408
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 176
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Quarterly journal of political science, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 103-128
ISSN: 1554-0626
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists budget constraints and legislators preferences determine the winner and the payments. When lobbyists are budget constrained then the preferences of all legislators can matter, and a lobbyists relative strength increases more steeply with a budget increase than with an increase of equal magnitude to the legislators original preferences for this lobbyists position. When lobbyists are not budget constrained then only the preferences of near median legislators matter and the preferences of these legislators and the budget enter equally in determining the winner. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of political economy, Band 116, Heft 2, S. 351-380
ISSN: 1537-534X
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.
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We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.
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We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties' budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.
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