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Cover -- Contents -- List of Illustrations and Tables -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- 1. Sites of Conflict -- An End to Corporate Impunity or American Imperialism? -- How Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Leads to the Rise of Negotiated Corporate Justice -- Market Power and Legal Irritants -- Unfolding the Argument -- 2. The Moral Economy of Corporate Justice -- Legal Change across Boundaries -- Legal Traditions and Corporate Criminality -- Moral Economies -- Conclusion -- 3. Corporate Prosecutions in the United States -- The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Enforcement -- Overview and Trends -- Global Enforcement-Home Advantage -- Possible Explanations for Home Bias -- Conclusion -- 4. Extraterritoriality through Market Power -- Law and Territory -- Unilateral Expansion of Jurisdiction -- The Long Arm of American Law -- Conclusion -- 5. Economic Lawfare -- Economic Rivalries in an Interdependent World -- Economic Lawfare in Support of Geoeconomic Strategies -- Targeting Companies to Win Geoeconomic Advantage -- Conclusion -- 6. The Rise of Negotiated Justice -- Institutional Change through Irritation -- Negotiated Corporate Justice -- Comparing Institutional Change -- Varieties of Negotiated Justice -- 7. Crime and Punishment in the Global Economy -- Globalization as the Competitive Transformation of Corporate Justice -- The Challenges of Negotiated Corporate Justice -- Lessons from Abroad -- Geopolitics vs. Democratic Legitimacy -- Appendix -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1974

Cover -- FIRM INTERESTS -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Free-Marketeers despite Themselves? -- 2 Business Interests in Political Economy -- 3 When Trade Turns into Regulatory Reform -- 4 Basic Telecommunication Services -- 5 International Air Transport -- 6 Who Captures Whom? -- 7 Business Influence and Democratic Decision-Making -- Appendix: Interviews Conducted -- Bibliography -- Index

Cover; Zum Inhalt_Autor; Titel; Vorwort zur sechzehnten Auflage; Inhaltsverzeichnis; Erster Teil: Grundlagen der Volkswirtschaftslehre; 1. Kapitel: Volkswirtschaftslehre als Wissenschaft; I. Gegenstand und Probleme; Was heißt Volkswirtschaftslehre?; Unterteilungen der Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Nachbarwissenschaften; II. Werturteile und Methoden; Werturteile und Wissenschaft; Entstehung und Überprüfung von Theorien; 2. Kapitel: Ausgangstatsachen der Wirtschaft; I. Knappheit und Wahlhandlung; Warum muß man wirtschaften?; Grundsätze des Wirtschaftens

"Bank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm's length. Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions"--

Main description: Der Name "Woll" sagt bereits alles über dieses Lexikon. Das Wollsche Wirtschaftslexikon erfüllt das verbreitete Bedürfnis nach zuverlässiger Wirtschaftsinformation in vorbildlicher Weise. Längst ist der "Woll" das Standardlexikon im Ausbildungsbereich. Es umfasst die Kernbereiche Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Volkswirtschaftslehre und die Grundlagen der Statistik, aber auch die wirtschaftlich bedeutsamen Teile der Rechtswissenschaft. Besonderer Wert wurde auf eine möglichst knappe, jedoch zuverlässige Stichwortabhandlung gelegt.

What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying busines-government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services.

The national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, seems to be an example of strong and unified interest organization, especially since its reform in 1998. Through a study of the collective action of firms in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression. In fact, a central employers' and industry association only constituted itself in France in response to state and trade union activism and struggled throughout history once these external threats lost importance. Like all encompassing business associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of groups of business actors and constantly has to manage its internal interest heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its latest reform demonstrates that the recent media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that MEDEF can claim legitimately as its responsibility.

Lobbying by economic actors constitutes a central element of a large part of the literature on trade policy-making. However, it is mainly considered as inputʺ into the political system, which then aggregates the demand of different societal interests. As such inputs, the preferences of economic actors are often simply deduced from economic theory. This paper raises doubts about the usefulness of this analytical parsimony and tries to distinguish more clearly between stable interests, preferences and strategic choices. In particular, it suggests a model that clarifies how abstract interests are translated into concrete policy choices. By examining the lobbying carried out by service providers in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in telecommunications and air transport, it then shows that the deduction of trade policy preferences from economic theory does not account well for the general support of multilateral trade liberalization by EU service providers. In particular, changes in identity, causal beliefs and strategic environments in the US and the EU create a variety of lobbying choices that goes beyond the material incentives of trade liberalization. By studying the learning process and the constraints on lobbying imposed by political institutions, the paper suggests that even the political preferences of strong economic actors are sometimes more appropriately dealt with as endogenous to the trade policy process.