Suchergebnisse

The Arrow War (1856–60) involved all the world's major powers, and could almost be called a world war because of the global economic and diplomatic issues driving it. For twenty-five years Dr John Wong has been trying to discover the true origins of the war. What began as a study of an alleged insult to the British flag supposedly flying over the boat Arrow led to an analysis of complex Chinese and British diplomacy; of the even more complex Chinese tea and silk exports; of British India's jealously guarded economic strategies and opium monopoly; of cotton supplied to the Lancashire mills by the Americans, who thereby made up their trade deficit with China occasioned by their heavy purchases of tea; of intricate Westminster politics and British global trade; of French pride and cultural priorities; of Russian intrigues and territorial designs; and of America's apparent aloofness and real ambitions

Generally speaking, there are two dominant schools of thought with regard to the British annexation of Sind in the Indian sub-continent in 1843. One takes the view that individuals on the spot make history. It was a harsh, bitter and frustrated soldier by the name of General Sir Charles Napier who was determined to seek glory and wealth for himself by annexing Sind. In this respect, the eminent historian and former Special Commissioner for Sind (1943–46), H. T. Lambrick, has put his case extremely well. The other school interprets the annexation in strategic terms, as part of a search for a defence system which would safeguard British India from the dangers of attack from the northwest. In about 600 pages, the distinguished historian M. E. Yapp has achieved his goal with remarkable success. Furthermore, Yapp has done so without discounting the first school of thought. Indeed, the two are not mutually exclusive. In this paper I wish to suggest that there is a third dimension, an economic one; and that the three are not mutually exclusive either. Indeed, all three appear to have different weights at different levels of the policy-making process.

In my article entitled 'TheArrowIncident: A Reappraisal',1I recently analysed the existing documentary evidence relating to theArrowincident. But an investigation of this incident in itself does not reveal the process which transformed a small dispute into a war between Great Britain and China. In this article I shall attempt to study this crucial transformation. Such a study would amount to an examination of the role of Harry Parkes in British diplomacy in Canton immediately after the incident. Before embarking on this project, however, it might be useful to give a brief introduction to Parkes and his background.