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In: Working paper series 9301
In: Working paper series 9304
In: Working paper series 9305
In: Working paper series 9204
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 18, Issue 1, p. 33-55
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 15, Issue 1, p. 29-49
A survey of network formation models : stability and efficiency / Matthew O. Jackson -- Models of network formation in cooperative games / Anne van den Nouweland -- Farsighted stability in network formation / Frank H. Page, Jr., and Samir Kamat -- Learning in networks / Sanjeev Goyal -- Group formation : the interaction of increasing returns and preferences diversity / Gabrielle Demange -- Games and economies with near exhaustion of gains to scale / Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders -- Coalitions and clubs : tiebout equilibrium in large economies / John Conley and Stefani Smith -- Secession-proof cost allocations and stable group structures in models of horizontal differentiation / Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber -- Political parties and coalition formation / Amrita Dhillon -- Power in the design of constitutional rules / Mika Widgrén -- Group and network formation in industrial organization : a survey / Francis Block -- Institution design for managing global commons : lessons from coalition theory / Carlo Carraro -- Inequality and growth clubs / Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf, and Fabien Moizeau -- Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation / Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray -- Spontaneous market emergence and social networks / Marcel Fafchamps.
In: Nota di lavoro 2003, 119
In: KNOW, Knowledge, technology, human capital
In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on e so that there exists a Nash e-equilibrium in pure strategies consistent with conformity. We also introduce a new concept of conformity that allows players to conform and yet perform different actions. This is achieved by the endogenous assignment of roles to players and by allowing actions to be conditional on roles. We conclude by relating our research to some experimental literature.
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 12, Issue 2, p. 105-137
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 6, Issue 3, p. 285-306
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 6, Issue 1, p. 27-48
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 3, Issue 4, p. 313-327
In: The Rand journal of economics, Volume 16, Issue 2, p. 282
ISSN: 1756-2171