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In recent decades, governments around the world have increasingly used various forms of state aid to try to attract and retain the business activity of foreign-owned multinational corporations. Yet, in most cases, this "commercialisation of state sovereignty" (Palan, 2002) has failed to catalyse foreign investment and economic growth as intended. This paper seeks to understand the general failure of such commercialised state strategies, while also explaining how demand and income growth in some notable exceptions can be understood. To this end, a simple demand-led model is presented that suggests that foreign-targeted state aid may lead to beggarthy-neighbour, FDI-driven growth in one economy if certain conditions are met, such as there being sufficiently little policy competition from other countries. It is shown that the exceptional cases tend to be the early movers, i.e. those few economies and special economic zones that engaged in the commercialisation of state sovereignty before the widespread competitive emulation that followed. This paper argues that state aid for the attraction of foreign multinationals is unlikely to be an effective growth strategy in the current environment of intense state competition and that international coordination on corporation tax and other forms of state aid is desirable.

Sraffian supermultiplier models, as well as Kaleckian distribution and growth models that make use of non-capacity creating autonomous demand growth to cope with Harrodian instability, have paid little attention to the financial side of autonomous demand growth as the driver of the system. Therefore, we link the issue of Harrodian instability in Kaleckian models driven by non-capacity creating autonomous demand growth with the associated financial dynamics. For a simple model with autonomous government expenditure growth, zero interest rates and no consumption out of wealth, we find that adding debt dynamics does not change the results obtained by Skott (2017) based on Lavoie's (2016) model without debt, each published in this journal. Hence, in this simple model, the long-run equilibrium is stable if Harrodian instability is not too strong and the autonomous growth rate does not exceed a maximum given by the long-run equilibrium saving rate. Introducing interest payments on government debt as well as consumption out of wealth into the model, however, changes the stability requirements: First, the autonomous growth rate of government expenditures should not fall short of the exogenous monetary interest rate. Second, this growth rate should not exceed a maximum given by the saving rate in the long-run equilibrium net of the propensity to consume out of wealth. Third, Harrodian instability may be almost as strong as in the simple model without violating long-run overall stability, particularly if the propensity to consume out of wealth is low. We claim that irrespective of the relevance or irrelevance of Harrodian instability, it is necessary to introduce financial variables into models driven by non-capacity creating autonomous demand in order to assess the long-run (in-)stability and sustainability of growth.

Sraffian supermultiplier models, as well as Kaleckian distribution and growth models making use of non-capacity creating autonomous demand growth in order to cope with Harrodian instability, have paid little attention to the financial side of autonomous demand growth as the driver of the system. Therefore, we link the issue of Harrodian instability in Kaleckian models driven by non-capacity creating autonomous demand growth with the associated financial dynamics. For a simple model with autonomous government expenditure growth, zero interest rates and no consumption out of wealth, we find that adding debt dynamics does not change the results obtained by Lavoie (2016) for a model without debt, i.e. the long-run equilibrium is stable if Harrodian instability is not too strong and the autonomous growth rate does not exceed a maximum given by the long-run equilibrium saving rate. Introducing interest payments on government debt as well as consumption out of wealth into the model, however, changes the stability requirements: First, the autonomous growth rate of government expenditures should not fall short of the exogenous monetary interest rate. Second, this growth rate should not exceed a maximum given by the saving rate in long-run equilibrium minus the propensity to consume out of wealth. Third, Harrodian instability may be stronger than in the simple model without violating long-run overall stability, in particular, if the rate of interest is very low and the growth rate of government expenditures is close to the mentioned upper limit. We claim that, irrespective of the relevance or irrelevance of Harrodian instability, it is necessary to introduce financial variables into models driven by non-capacity creating autonomous demand in order to assess the long-run (in-)stability and sustainability of growth.