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The principle of equality is a multi-faceted category. Within the EU, it may be, for instance, considered in formal or material dimension, as the equality of Member States and the equality of citizens and the institutions of the Member States. This paper focuses on the latter aspect. Keywords: principle of equality, Discrimination, Court of Justice, dignity, freedom and solidarity.

The principle of equality is a multi-faceted category. Within the EU, it may be, for instance, considered in formal or material dimension, as the equality of Member States and the equality of citizens and the institutions of the Member States. This paper focuses on the latter aspect. Keywords: principle of equality, Discrimination, Court of Justice, dignity, freedom and solidarity.

The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie polityczności konstytucji i jej naukowego opisu z punktu widzenia czystej Kelsenowskiej teorii prawa. Proponujemy w nim tezę, że choć polityczność nie jest przedmiotem poznania prawniczego, to jest ona koniecznym warunkiem ontologii konstytucji. Zgodnie z tą teorią poznanie i opis konstytucji (metaforycznie mówiąc: jej epistemologia) odnoszą się do treści obowiązujących norm, jej ontologia zaś składa się z dwóch elementów: upoważnienia prawnego i woli politycznej. Ontologia konstytucji ma dwojaki charakter: po pierwsze, jej powstanie i skuteczność opierają się przede wszystkim na woli twórcy konstytucji oraz na woli podmiotów stosujących konstytucję (aspekt polityczny); po drugie, jej obiektywnie obowiązująca ważność zakłada posiadanie przez twórcę konstytucji normatywnego upoważnienia do jej ustanowienia (aspekt prawny). Uwzględnienie przez czystą teorię prawa tego, co polityczne na poziomie ontologicznym, jest równoczesne z całkowitym usunięciem go z pola epistemologicznego. Konsekwencją takiego oczyszczenia pola poznawczego jest, po pierwsze, uzależnienie opisu od warunku skuteczności, czyli ostatecznie od aktów woli podmiotów wykonujących funkcje organów państwowych, a po drugie, "bezbronność" w przypadku stwierdzenia przez badacza prawa niezgodności treściowej między konstytucją a aktami jej stosowania.

The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie polityczności konstytucji i jej naukowego opisu z punktu widzenia czystej Kelsenowskiej teorii prawa. Proponujemy w nim tezę, że choć polityczność nie jest przedmiotem poznania prawniczego, to jest ona koniecznym warunkiem ontologii konstytucji. Zgodnie z tą teorią poznanie i opis konstytucji (metaforycznie mówiąc: jej epistemologia) odnoszą się do treści obowiązujących norm, jej ontologia zaś składa się z dwóch elementów: upoważnienia prawnego i woli politycznej. Ontologia konstytucji ma dwojaki charakter: po pierwsze, jej powstanie i skuteczność opierają się przede wszystkim na woli twórcy konstytucji oraz na woli podmiotów stosujących konstytucję (aspekt polityczny); po drugie, jej obiektywnie obowiązująca ważność zakłada posiadanie przez twórcę konstytucji normatywnego upoważnienia do jej ustanowienia (aspekt prawny). Uwzględnienie przez czystą teorię prawa tego, co polityczne na poziomie ontologicznym, jest równoczesne z całkowitym usunięciem go z pola epistemologicznego. Konsekwencją takiego oczyszczenia pola poznawczego jest, po pierwsze, uzależnienie opisu od warunku skuteczności, czyli ostatecznie od aktów woli podmiotów wykonujących funkcje organów państwowych, a po drugie, "bezbronność" w przypadku stwierdzenia przez badacza prawa niezgodności treściowej między konstytucją a aktami jej stosowania.

Poland has been in a phase of change since 2015. The constitutional system of the Third Republic is being restructured. The Judiciary, media, schools and universities are the main focus of attention. This restructure is being celebrated by the government as a renewal of the Polish state, but is being branded by the opposition as the destruction of the Polish Republic in favour of an illiberal democracy. In this already very difficult situation, Poland was confronted with the major challenges posed by a pandemic. What effects will the crisis have on the restructuring of the constitutional system? At present, it seems that the pandemic is acting as a catalyst for those changes. This book aims to provide an informed commentary on those developments and what they mean for the Third Polish Republic.