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The apparent success of independent central banks in conducting monetary policy has led many to argue that some form of policy delegation should also be applied to the macroeconomic aspects of fiscal policy. A number of countries have recently established Fiscal Councils, although their role is typically to give advice on paths for government debt and deficits rather than decide upon and implement policy. This paper examines how useful a comparison between monetary and fiscal policy can be in motivating and guiding Fiscal Councils. Simple analogies between inflation bias and deficit bias can be misleading, and the motives for delegating aspects of fiscal policy may be rather different from those generally associated with monetary policy. In addition, lack of knowledge about the desirable goals of long run debt policy, compared to a greater understanding of the objectives of monetary policy, may help explain key differences in the nature of delegation between the two. The paper ends by making some comparisons between the delegation of monetary and fiscal policy in the United Kingdom.

The apparent success of independent central banks in conducting monetary policy has led many to argue that some form of policy delegation should also be applied to the macroeconomic aspects of fiscal policy. A number of countries have recently established Fiscal Councils, although their role is typically to give advice on paths for government debt and deficits rather than decide upon and implement policy. This paper examines how useful a comparison between monetary and fiscal policy can be in motivating and guiding Fiscal Councils. Simple analogies between inflation bias and deficit bias can be misleading, and the motives for delegating aspects of fiscal policy may be rather different from those generally associated with monetary policy. In addition, lack of knowledge about the desirable goals of long run debt policy, compared to a greater understanding of the objectives of monetary policy, may help explain key differences in the nature of delegation between the two. The paper ends by making some comparisons between the delegation of monetary and fiscal policy in the United Kingdom.

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). We use this model to examine three issues that arise from either literature. First, we consider the extent to which electoral competition gives rise to a debt or deficit bias, as one party seeks to win elections and tie the hands of a potential successor, when all debt is defined in nominal terms. Second we examine the extent and nature of the electoral cycle introduced by having two parties reflecting different preferences over either the composition or amount of government spending. Third, we examine whether electoral competition has any impact on the conventional business cycle stabilisation policy, compared to the standard analysis that assumes a single benevolent government.

Most recent work deriving optimal monetary policy utilising New Neo-Classical Synthesis (NNCS) models abstract from the impact of monetary policy on the government's finances, by assuming that any change in the government's budget can be financed through lump sum taxes. In this paper, we assume that the government does not have access to such taxes to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint in the face of shocks. We then consider optimal monetary and fiscal policies under discretion and commitment in the face of technology, preference and cost-push shocks. We confirm that the optimal precommitment policy implies a random walk in the steady-state level of debt. We also find that the time-inconsistency in the optimal precommitment policy is such that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilise their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We show that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level. This implies that under a discretionary policy the random walk result is overturned: debt will always be returned to this initial steady-state even although there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilise the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policy, but can be significant for discretionary policy.

Theory suggests that government should as far as possible smooth taxes and its recurrent consumption spending, which means that government debts should act as a shock absorber, and any planned adjustments in debt should be gradual. This suggests that operational targets for governments (e.g. for 5 years ahead should involve deficits rather than debt, because such rules will be more robust to shocks. Beyond that, fiscal rules need to reflect the constraints on monetary policy, and the extent to which governments are subject to deficit bias. Fiscal rules for countries in a monetary union or fixed exchange rate regime need to include a strong countercyclical element. Fiscal rule should also contain a 'knock out' if interest rates hit the zero lower bound: in that case the fiscal and monetary authorities should cooperate to formulate a fiscal expansion package that allows interest rates to rise above this bound. In more normal times, the design of fiscal policy rules is likely to depend on the extent to which governments are subject to deficit bias, and the effectiveness of any national fiscal council. For example, governments that had not shown a history of deficit bias could aim to target deficits five years ahead (rolling targets), and these would not require cyclical adjustment. In contrast, governments that were more prone to bias could target a cyclically adjusted deficit at the end of their expected period of office. In both cases fiscal councils would have an important role to play, in ensuring plans were implemented in the first case and allowing for departures from target when exernal shocks occurrred in the second.

We consider optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need - analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, firstly, that this is even true when allowing for inflation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as long as there in no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative prices rather than demand.

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). We use this model to examine three issues that arise from either literature. First, we consider the extent to which electoral competition gives rise to a debt or deficit bias, as one party seeks to win elections and tie the hands of a potential successor, when all debt is defined in nominal terms. Second we examine the extent and nature of the electoral cycle introduced by having two parties reflecting different preferences over either the composition or amount of government spending. Third, we examine whether electoral competition has any impact on the conventional business cycle stabilisation policy, compared to the standard analysis that assumes a single benevolent government.

Most recent work deriving optimal monetary policy utilising New Neo-Classical Synthesis (NNCS) models abstract from the impact of monetary policy on the government's finances, by assuming that any change in the government's budget can be financed through lump sum taxes. In this paper, we assume that the government does not have access to such taxes to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint in the face of shocks. We then consider optimal monetary and fiscal policies under discretion and commitment in the face of technology, preference and cost-push shocks. We confirm that the optimal precommitment policy implies a random walk in the steady-state level of debt. We also find that the time-inconsistency in the optimal precommitment policy is such that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilise their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We show that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level. This implies that under a discretionary policy the random walk result is overturned: debt will always be returned to this initial steady-state even although there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilise the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policy, but can be significant for discretionary policy.

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy, which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises.

This paper summarises research on the labour market done over the past two years at the National Institute. It incorporates research into the determinants of employment—including the role of forward-looking behaviour—wage inflation and real wage models, and comments on some policy issues which have arisen in the past five years or so. The research was not aimed at producing a single approach to labour market behaviour, but touched on several separate topics. In part the present paper reflects this relative heterogeneity, although we will try to emphasise common themes where these are relevant.

Fiscal watchdogs, so-called fiscal councils, have been proposed as a method to counter deficit bias of fiscal policy. The paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surveys empirically the activities of existing councils. Case studies of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council and the UK Office for Budget Responsibility are done. It is concluded that fiscal councils should be advisory, rather than decision-making, and work as complements, rather than substitutes, to fiscal rules. Although no panacea, fiscal councils could play a useful role by at the same time strengthening fiscal discipline and allowing rules-based fiscal policy to be more flexible. A key issue is their political fragility and how their long-run viability should be secured. Three ways of guaranteeing their independence are suggested: (1) reputation-building; (2) formal national rules; and (3) international monitoring.