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Deliberation's effectiveness as a method of problem solving and democratic decision making is often seen as stemming from the persuasive power of the "forceless force" of argument to transform beliefs. However, because conflicts related to partisan polarization, conspiracy theories, and the COVID-19 pandemic often have deep connections to social identity, they may be difficult to resolve through a deliberative approach based on persuasion. Research shows that when the conclusions of an argument threaten participants' social identities they are likely to engage in motivated reasoning, which inhibits the ability of any argument to induce belief change. In conflicts closely related to social identity a deliberative approach based around co-creation — such as Mary Parker Follett's conception of integration — may be more productive than persuasion-based approaches. The contrast between these two approaches is illustrated in reference to contemporary conflicts between vaccine advocates and members of the "vaccine hesitancy and refusal" (VHR) community.

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Mary Parker Follett by scholars of management and public administration, but the acute relevance of Follett's work to deliberative democracy has yet to be fully appreciated. In her 1918 work The New State Follett articulates a normative political theory that I refer to as Integrative democracy, which can be seen as an alternative formulation of deliberative democracy that is based on an activity that Follett refers to as integration rather than deliberation. In this paper I first present two contemporary challenges faced by deliberative democrats: how deliberation itself ought to be defined, and whether or not deliberation produces epistemic benefits in comparison to non-deliberative voting. I then show how Follett's theory is able to respond to both of these criticisms. Finally, I discuss how Follett's theory may need to be extended or modified to deal with challenges highlighted by the recent systemic turn in deliberative theory.

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Mary Parker Follett by scholars of management and public administration, but the acute relevance of Follett's work to deliberative democracy has yet to be fully appreciated. In her 1918 work The New State Follett articulates a normative political theory that I refer to as Integrative democracy, which can be seen as an alternative formulation of deliberative democracy that is based on an activity that Follett refers to as integration rather than deliberation. In this paper I first present two contemporary challenges faced by deliberative democrats: how deliberation itself ought to be defined, and whether or not deliberation produces epistemic benefits in comparison to non-deliberative voting. I then show how Follett's theory is able to respond to both of these criticisms. Finally, I discuss how Follett's theory may need to be extended or modified to deal with challenges highlighted by the recent systemic turn in deliberative theory.

Analyses of operational ideology—the pattern of correlations between different political attitudes—in the American public generally assume "spatial" models of ideology. Using Latent Class Analysis, we relax many of these assumptions by treating operational ideology as a latent categorical variable and analyze the changing structure of American operational ideology between 2004 and 2020. We find that some Americans during this period held consistently liberal or conservative views and were well sorted into the "correct" political parties. For other Americans, however, we observe complex and shifting relationships between partisanship and economic, moral, and racial attitudes. We find that Racial Justice Communitarians consistently prefer to identify as Democrats, while Nativist Communitarians and Libertarians both tended to identify with whatever party won the most recent presidential election. Future studies of operational ideology should be wary of simplifying assumptions that obscure important dynamics in American politics.

AbstractResearch has repeatedly argued that increasing the rate at which Black people start businesses could reduce the racial wealth gap between Black and white families, but increasing the rate of Black entrepreneurship may actually exacerbate the racial wealth gap, due to the economic cost associated with business closure. Using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we find that, as past work suggests, Black-owned businesses are less likely to remain open 4 years later, compared to white-owned businesses, and that, due to this disparity, Black business owners are more likely to experience downward economic mobility and less likely to experience upward mobility, compared to their white counterparts. These results suggest that improving the rate at which Black entrepreneurs succeed, rather than increasing the rate at which Black people become entrepreneurs, should be the target of efforts to leverage business ownership to reduce the racial wealth gap.

This article is based upon an ethnographic study of two housing estates in two English cities. The data gathered have highlighted the gaps between policy and practice in relation to the inclusion of young people in local community safety initiatives. It argues that the discourse of community safety is underpinned by a limited notion of inclusion that is predicated upon adult 'law‐abiding' citizenship and a specific interpretation of the concept of community. Thus, it concludes that in order to include and de‐pathologise young people, the strategies of implementation need to match the rhetoric of inclusion.

AbstractThe Pew Research Center's 2020 survey of American Jews is a valuable resource to scholars of American Jewry, enabling interrogation of questions using data that no other source can reliably provide. One set of questions pertains to the reach and impact of Birthright Israel, the largest extant Jewish educational program targeted at Jewish young adults, on American Jews. Pew's nationally representative sample provides important validation of previous findings regarding Birthright's impact on participants and extends the generalizability of what has been learned. In this paper we use data from the 2020 Pew survey to assess the program's "reach" into different segments of the American Jewish population and to extend the validity of existing findings regarding the program's impact on participants' attitudes and behaviors related to Israel and Jewish life. Pew's data estimate that around 20% of American Jews ages 18–46 have participated in Birthright, and that among Jewish parents with a grown child, nearly 30% have an adult child who participated in the program. After controlling for preexisting differences between participants and those who have never been to Israel, Pew's data also confirm that Birthright has a significant impact on a broad set of Jewish outcomes. These results support a more optimistic view of the future for US Jewry and suggest that the investment in large-scale educational interventions can substantially alter the trajectory of the American Jewish community writ large.

AbstractTo what extent is it possible for American Jews to maintain a deep emotional connection to Israel while criticizing the actions of the Israeli government? This long-debated question echoes earlier investigations of different forms of patriotism toward one's home country. Drawing on two 2019 surveys of American Jews, we find that, like Americans in general, Jewish liberals and conservatives express different forms of patriotism toward both Israel and America. Jewish conservatives tend to oppose criticism of Israel and America for any reason, while Jewish liberals view criticism as an important part of "caring" about both countries. Both forms of patriotism are positively associated with stronger emotional connections to the relevant country. These results suggest that emotional connection to Israel represents a form of social identification with Israel and that lower levels of connection to Israel among some American Jews are driven more by apathy than active criticism or hostility.

AbstractAs individuals undergoing a developmental process characterized by identity exploration, Jewish young adults are particularly vulnerable to the disruption of social connections related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent research has demonstrated that young adults, including young Jews, have experienced higher rates of mental health difficulties than older individuals during the pandemic. Using data from a survey of Jewish young adults who applied to participate in Birthright Israel summer 2020 trips but were unable to participate due to the pandemic, we examined the factors contributing to young adults' mental health difficulties. We found that loneliness, rather than financial worries or concerns about the health impacts of COVID-19, was the single most important driver of reported emotional or mental health difficulties. Results also suggested that simply increasing the frequency of contacts between individuals is unlikely to reduce loneliness, unless these are positive, substantial connections, such as those among members of a "social support network." Building and rebuilding deep, meaningful social connections between Jewish young adults should be a top priority for Jewish organizations going forward.

AbstractSince 2016, a series of horrific acts motivated by antisemitism appear to have caused a fundamental shift in the prevalence of antisemitism in the United States. Little is known, however, about how the events during this time have affected the day-to-day experiences and concerns of American Jews. Using repeated cross-sectional data from surveys of Jewish young adults who applied to Birthright Israel, this paper analyzes recent trends in Jewish young adults' experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Despite the high-profile incidents during this period, there is no evidence of a major increase in experiences of antisemitic harassment among Jewish young adults—either on or off campus—between 2017 and 2019. At the same time, data show a substantial increase in concerns among young Jews about antisemitism in the United States and on college campuses, with concerns about antisemitism in the United States (but not on campus) being especially concentrated among liberal Jews. These results suggest that Jewish concerns about antisemitism are linked to broader views about the climate for marginalized populations in the United States. They also point to growing Jewish anxieties over violence, safety, and acceptance in the United States. In an era of widely disseminated antisemitic conspiracy theories, even young Jews who have no first-hand experience of antisemitic harassment have become concerned.