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This article calls into question the conventional wisdom that incumbent parties are rewarded when unemployment is low and punished when it is high. Using county-level data on unemployment and election returns for 175 midterm gubernatorial elections and 4 presidential elections from 1994 to 2010, the analysis finds that unemployment and the Democratic vote for president and governor move together. Other things being equal, higher unemployment increases the vote shares of Democratic candidates. The effect is greatest when Republicans are the incumbent party, but Democrats benefit from unemployment even when they are in control. The explanation for these findings is that unemployment is a partisan issue for voters, not a valence issue, and that the Democratic Party "owns" unemployment. When unemployment is high or rising, Democratic candidates can successfully convince voters that they are the party best able to solve the problem.

The Elinor Ostrom Prize committee has announced first Elinor Ostrom prize winner for the best paper in the Journal of Theoretical Politic. Covering volume 22 of calendar year 2010, the award goes to John R. Wright for 'Ambigius Statutes and Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies.'. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The Supreme Court's Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language.

The Supreme Court's Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This paper presents an empirical measure of pivoting in the electoral college from 1880 to 2004. The measure derives from established theoretical concepts of power and pivoting first introduced by Shapley and Shubik (Am. Political Sci. Rev. 84:787--792, 1954). Pivotal states identified by this approach generally conform to popular interpretations--Ohio in 2004, Florida in 2000, and so forth--but, historically, pivotal states are also frequently small or medium-sized states. Also, pivotal states by this approach are not necessarily competitive states. In general, whether or not a state is pivotal is mainly a function of its size and bellwether tendency--i.e., its tendency to mirror the national voting trend. A state's pivot position is also an excellent predictor of how presidential candidates allocated time and money across states in the general elections of 2000 and 2004. Controlling for a state's pivot position, size and electoral competitiveness have little effect on the allocation of campaign resources. Adapted from the source document.