Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach
In: Decisions in economics and finance: a journal of applied mathematics, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 463-487
ISSN: 1129-6569, 2385-2658
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In: Decisions in economics and finance: a journal of applied mathematics, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 463-487
ISSN: 1129-6569, 2385-2658
In: Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance Volume 16
In: Dynamic modeling and econometrics in economics and finance, 16
Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game theory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality.
We extend a well known differential oligopoly game to encompass the possibility for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap is set so as to fix the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the resulting equilibrium investment in green R&D is indeed concave in the structure of the industry. Our analysis appears to indicate that inverted-U-shaped investment curves are generated by regulatory measures instead of being a "natural" feature of firms' decisions.
BASE
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 76, S. 146-157
This article introduces a social planner version of a model central to the New Economic Geography for explicitly answering whether the symmetric equilibrium outcome of the decentralized market economy is socially desirable. We find that savings incentives are too weak, resulting in an inefficiently low capital stock and therefore an inadequate number of product varieties. The optimal subsidy and taxation scheme to remedy these distortions resulting from the monopolistic competition structure is shown to be a sales subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax that results in marginal cost pricing. Interestingly, implementing this optimal policy might actually destroy the stability of the symmetric equilibrium and result in unintended agglomeration processes.
BASE
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 578-593
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: Central European journal of operations research, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 543-556
ISSN: 1613-9178