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AbstractTaiwanese identity is distinct from and juxtaposed against the Chinese identity. What explains the emergence of a Taiwanese identity – specifically in the south? This identity formation is surprising considering the multiple decades of authoritarian rule where the government championed a Chinese identity. In this article, weargue that the Taiwanese identity manifested from a linguistic tension betweenHokloand Mandarinspeakers.And while the Kuomintang adopted a strict Mandarin monolingual policy, thehomogeneity of theHoklo speakers in the south – i.e., they constituted a minimal winningsizeand they were regionally concentrated –ensured the survival of theHoklovernacular. This vernacular would become the instrument for the formation of a Taiwanese identity. In contrast,we see initial push back from the Hakka speakers who were excluded from the narrative of Taiwanese identity. Likewise,in the north where there weregreater linguistic heterogeneity and increasing interethnic marriages, Taiwanese identity was not as coherent.

Abstract
Identifying a clear relationship between rebel group structures and the use of violence faces the challenge that group structures rarely change over time. We exploit the analytical advantage provided by long religious holidays to address this issue using the principal-agent framework. Religious holidays serve as a focal point and reduce group coordination costs, but also raise the societal costs of violence. We argue the principal of rebel groups is more sensitive to the increased societal costs than the agents and thereby attempts to restrain the agents from attacking during religious holidays. However, the success of these attempts depends on the group's institutionalization level. Long religious holidays exacerbate the principal-agent problem due to the high costs of restraining agents from attacking for an extended period, making them the most likely case for our analysis. We test the theory by first conducting microlevel analysis of Islamic separatist groups in three Southeast Asian countries and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of Islamic rebel groups. Results show that highly institutionalized groups that have a central command system and control over constituent groups are less likely to attack during long religious holidays than on other days, and vice versa for weakly institutionalized groups.

In Taiwan, where relations with China define the major political cleavage, voters have distinct preferences on the issue of independence. Do Taiwanese favor a symbolic or pragmatic approach to the Taiwan independence issue? What are the factors that account for their political preferences? We identify two types of voters, symbolic and pragmatic, according to whether their preferences on independence are conditional or unconditional on China's potential counter actions. Specifically, symbolic voters have unconditional preferences on independence, while pragmatic voters are more agreeable to independence under more favorable conditions. Using multiple wave data from the Taiwan National Security Surveys (TNSS 2002–2022), we investigate the individual- and macro-level factors and find that gender, age, education level, ethnicity, partisan strength, and economic growth rate shape the types of voters in Taiwan. This paper contributes to the study of political attitudes in Taiwan, and have important implications on the regional stability in East Asia.(J Contemp China / GIGA)

While authoritarian regimes are often characterized by their civil liberty restrictions, some dictatorships acknowledge the ethnolinguistic diversity of their population. Are minorities in multiethnic authoritarian states more likely to trust the government when their language is recognized? In this paper, we argue while recognition of a group's language improves trust in democracies through a substantive representation mechanism, the same cannot be said in authoritarian regimes. Instead, recognition is a mere symbolic gesture. Such window-dressing efforts call attention to the horizontal inequality between hegemon and minority groups—and such, minority language recognition is associated with negative political trust. We test our argument with the World Values Survey. By identifying which minority groups have been afforded linguistic recognition, we find evidence of a significant—but negative—link between recognition and political trust.

Data de publicació electrònica: 30-05-2022 ; Supplemental material file: online appendix ; While authoritarian regimes are often characterized by their civil liberty restrictions, some dictatorships acknowledge the ethnolinguistic diversity of their population. Are minorities in multiethnic authoritarian states more likely to trust the government when their language is recognized? In this paper, we argue while recognition of a group's language improves trust in democracies through a substantive representation mechanism, the same cannot be said in authoritarian regimes. Instead, recognition is a mere symbolic gesture. Such window-dressing efforts call attention to the horizontal inequality between hegemon and minority groups—and such, minority language recognition is associated with negative political trust. We test our argument with the World Values Survey. By identifying which minority groups have been afforded linguistic recognition, we find evidence of a significant—but negative—link between recognition and political trust.

A question central to the Covid-19 pandemic is why the Covid-19 mortality rate varies so greatly across countries. This study aims to investigate factors associated with cross-country variation in Covid-19 mortality. Covid-19 mortality rate was calculated as number of deaths per 100 Covid-19 cases. To identify factors associated with Covid-19 mortality rate, linear regressions were applied to a cross-sectional dataset comprising 169 countries. We retrieved data from the Worldometer website, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators, and Logistics Performance Indicators databases. Covid-19 mortality rate was negatively associated with Covid-19 test number per 100 people (RR = 0.92, P = 0.001), government effectiveness score (RR = 0.96, P = 0.017), and number of hospital beds (RR = 0.85, P < 0.001). Covid-19 mortality rate was positively associated with proportion of population aged 65 or older (RR = 1.12, P < 0.001) and transport infrastructure quality score (RR = 1.08, P = 0.002). Furthermore, the negative association between Covid-19 mortality and test number was stronger among low-income countries and countries with lower government effectiveness scores, younger populations and fewer hospital beds. Predicted mortality rates were highly associated with observed mortality rates (r = 0.77; P < 0.001). Increasing Covid-19 testing, improving government effectiveness and increasing hospital beds may have the potential to attenuate Covid-19 mortality.