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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Where Our Path Has Led -- 2 The Lost Lessons of the Second World War -- 3 The Anti-Monopoly Tradition -- 4 Peak Anti-Monopoly -- 5 The Tech Explosion of the 1980s and 1990s -- 6 Neoliberalism's Triumph -- 7 The Problem of Global Monopoly -- 8 The Rise of the Tech Giants -- Conclusion: Breaking Up Global Economic Power -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- Index.

The Internet Age: on the face of it, an era of unprecedented freedom in both communication and culture. Yet in the past, each major new medium, from telephone to satellite television, has crested on a wave of similar idealistic optimism, before succumbing to the inevitable undertow of industrial consolidation. Every once free and open technology has, in time, become centralized and closed; as corporate power has taken control of the 'master switch.' Today a similar struggle looms over the Internet, and as it increasingly supersedes all other media the stakes have never been higher. Part

It was just one line, nearly a throwaway; technically a subordinate clause. Yet that one clause from Oliver Wendell Holmes's Abrams dissent breathed life into a metaphor, the "marketplace of ideas," whose lasting power is undeniable. Nor is it difficult to understand why. Yes, it may be incomplete, inaccurate, and possibly cribbed from John Stuart Mill, but the metaphor matches something we all see. Ideas and ideological programs are out there looking for adherents or "buyers." In Holmes's time, progressives, socialists, and fascists courted supporters, just as similar groups do now. Specific ideas like the flat tax or the legalization of marijuana seek their own buyers and usually go nowhere but may suddenly catch on, just as in the world of real products. I leave it to others to criticize the metaphor. What I want to suggest here is that it isn't taken seriously enough. Despite all the talk, the First Amendment offers incomplete protection for the marketplace of ideas. If we were halfway serious about the premise that the marketplace of ideas needs protection by courts, we'd be interested in all the ways that government or private parties can distort or block competition. But the First Amendment has no interest in most such distortions – especially those created by disinformation campaigns, which have rapidly become the speech control technique of choice in the early 21st century.

We live in a time when concerns about influence over the American political process by powerful private interests have reached an apogee, both on the left and the right. Among the laws originally intended to fight excessive private influence over republican institutions were the antitrust laws, whose sponsors were concerned not just with monopoly, but also its influence over legislatures and politicians. While no one would claim that the antitrust laws were meant to be comprehensive anti-corruption laws, there can be little question that they were passed with concerns about the political influence of powerful firms and industry cartels. Since the 1960s, however, antitrust law's scrutiny of corrupt and deceptive political practices has been sharply limited by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides immunity to antitrust liability for conduct that can be described as political or legal advocacy. The doctrine was created through apparent First Amendment avoidance, based on the premise that the Sherman Act could not have been intended to interfere with a right to petition government. The Noerr decision, dating from 1961, was strained when it was decided and has not aged well. As an interpretation of the antitrust laws, it ignored Congressional concern with political mischief undertaken by conspiracy or monopoly. Its legitimacy has always rested on avoidance of the First Amendment, and while Noerr itself may have legitimately reflected such avoidance, the subsequent growth of a Noerr immunity has blown past any First Amendment-driven defense of its existence. For that reason, others have suggested a reformulation of the doctrine. The better answer is that, lacking constitutional or statutory foundation, Noerr should be overruled. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, and "to petition the government for a redress of grievances." It therefore protects efforts to influence political debate as well as legitimate petitioning in the legislative, judicial or administrative processes. The First Amendment does not, however create a right to bribe government officials, deceive agencies, file false statements, or abuse government process through repeated filings designed only to injure a competitor. Nonetheless, each of these activities has, in some courts at least, been granted immunity under the overgrown Noerr immunity. It is an extra-constitutional outlier ripe for reexamination. Overruling Noerr would not make political petitioning illegal. It would, instead, require defendants to rely on the First Amendment when seeking to defend what would otherwise be conduct that is illegal under the antitrust laws. Doctrinally, this is to force courts to address whether conduct in question is actually an antitrust violation, and if, so whether it is protected by the First Amendment or not, drawing on an established jurisprudence for some of the problems presented in the Noerr context.

The First Amendment was brought to life in a period, the twentieth century, when the political speech environment was markedly different than today's. With respect to any given issue, speech was scarce and limited to a few newspapers, pamphlets or magazines. The law was embedded, therefore, with the presumption that the greatest threat to free speech was direct punishment of speakers by government. Today, in the internet and social media age, it is no longer speech that is scarce – rather, it is the attention of listeners. And those who seek to control speech use new methods that rely on the weaponization of speech itself, such as the deployment of "troll armies," the fabrication of news, or "flooding" tactics. This Essay identifies the core assumptions that proceeded from the founding era of First Amendment jurisprudence, argues that many of those assumptions no longer hold, and details the new techniques of speech control that are used by governmental and nongovernmental actors to censor and degrade speech. It concludes by arguing that protection of free speech may now depend on law enforcement recognizing its role in the protection of the American speech environment.

The consumer welfare standard in antitrust has been heavily criticized. But would, in fact, abandoning the "consumer welfare" standard make the antitrust law too unworkable and indeterminate? I argue that there is such a thing as a post-consumer welfare antitrust that is practicable and arguably as predictable as the consumer welfare standard. In practice, the consumer welfare standard has not set a high bar. The leading alternative standard, the "protection of competition" is at least as predictable, and arguably more determinate than the exceeding abstract abstract consumer welfare test, while being much truer the legislative intent underlying the antitrust laws. More concretely, we should return to asking, in most antitrust cases, the following question: Given a suspect conduct (or merger): Is this merely part of the competitive process, or is it meant to "suppress or even destroy competition?" This standard actually already forms a part of antitrust doctrine. What changes is eliminating "consumer welfare" as a final or necessary consideration in every case.

We live in an age of extreme corporate concentration, in which global industries are controlled by just a few giant firms – big banks, big pharma, and big tech, just to name a few. But concern over what Louis Brandeis called the "curse of bigness" can no longer remain the province of specialist lawyers and economists, for it has spilled over into policy and politics, even threatening democracy itself. History suggests that tolerance of inequality and failing to control excessive corporate power may prompt the rise of populism, nationalism, extremist politicians, and fascist regimes. In short, as Wu warns, we are in grave danger of repeating the signature errors of the twentieth century. In The Curse of Bigness, Columbia professor Tim Wu tells of how figures like Brandeis and Theodore Roosevelt first confronted the democratic threats posed by the great trusts of the Gilded Age – but the lessons of the Progressive Era were forgotten in the last 40 years. He calls for recovering the lost tenets of the trustbusting age as part of a broader revival of American progressive ideas as we confront the fallout of persistent and extreme economic inequality. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1062/thumbnail.jpg