Suchergebnisse

How does income distribution affect citizens' willingness to defend their country? In this article, I argue that perceived unfair income distribution reduces citizens' attachment to their country and inhibits their willingness to fight. Using mediation analysis with data collected by the World Values Survey in Taiwan in 2019, I find that perceived distributive unfairness reduces non-rich citizens' willingness to fight for their country via dampening their national pride, a key element in psychological attachment to national identity. This finding suggests that distributive unfairness threatens national security and contributes to the literature on the perils of economic inequality.

Recent studies find that single-party dictatorships are more open to trade due to their larger coalitions than other types of dictatorships. However, this line of research assumes that the preference for trade policies is homogeneous among members of the coalition. This assumption means existing studies fail to explain why single-party dictatorships have more dispersed and complex tariffs rates, an alternative form of protectionism. In this article, I argue that the heterogeneous preferences for free trade among social groups lead to tariff complexity under dictatorships with large coalitions. When dictators need to build larger coalitions, they do not need to exclude all special interest groups but to respond to heterogeneous demands of trade policies in a more selective way. Thus, politicians under single-party dictatorships are more likely to set ad hoc tariffs to favor different members in their coalitions, resulting in complex tariff schedules.

While previous studies find that individual preferences for trade policies are shaped by economic and non-economic factors, it is still unclear whether people's perception of their government's role in citizens' lives affects their attitudes toward free trade. In view of the "developmental state" legacy in East Asia, I investigate how the "big government sentiment" in East Asians' mindset is associated with their support for protectionism. Based on the data of the third-wave Asian Barometer Survey conducted during 2010 and 2012, I find that when people think that government should bear a major responsibility for the wellbeing of its people, they are more supportive of protectionist policies. This finding contributes to studies of East Asian political economy as well as the formation of individual trade policy preference.

Diplomatic protests convey one government's displeasure with the policies of another government. Yet, public support for their own government's policies can be influenced by the actions of others, so diplomatic protests have the potential to increase domestic support for the policy within the target country. A rally-'round-the-flag effect has been found to be associated with wars, crises, and sanctions. Here, we assess the existence of such an effect in relation to diplomatic protests by foreign governments. Using a survey experiment, we assess the impact of foreign government protests—specifically protests by China—against US arms sales to Taiwan on public support for Taiwan's government and its policies. We find that who lodges the protest, whether it is an adversary or a supporter, is more important than the language of the protest itself. We argue that diplomatic protests create a dilemma—lodging complaints about the behavior of other governments can increase public support for those very policies in the target country.

ObjectivesWe seek to investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on coups d'état. We argue that signing PTAs lowers the risk of coups because it acts as a credible commitment of signatory countries to pursuing long‐term economic benefits, which further reduces potential challengers' incentives to initiate coups. In addition, the effect of PTAs is larger in democracies because democratic signatories are perceived to be more credible in upholding treaty commitments than their authoritarian counterparts.MethodsWe employ binary time‐series cross‐sectional (BTSCS) models to examine a sample of 154 countries between 1960 and 2012.ResultsWe find that signing PTAs reduces risks of coups, especially in countries with higher levels of democratic development.ConclusionsOur study sheds light on how PTAs can prolong leader survival through reducing the likelihood of coups and contributes to emerging studies on the consequences of signing PTAs in the age of economic globalization.

This paper evaluates the progress and impact of the literature on comparative authoritarianism, showing not only how its development over the previous two decades can help us understand China's authoritarian politics better, but also how the latter can move the former forward. We focus on two important topic areas in the literature: authoritarian power-sharing and autocratic politics of information (e.g., partial media freedom and government censorship). For the first topic, we shall review the literature on the authoritarian power-sharing between dictators and their allies and explicate how this conceptual innovation helps us understand the institutional foundation of China's regime stability and phenomenal economic performance before Xi Jinping. The analysis then provides us a baseline for assessing China's economic and political future under Xi Jinping given his clear departure from the pre-existing power-sharing framework. Finally, this paper also assesses the relevance of the literature on authoritarian politics of information to the Chinese context. In sum, we not only emphasize the conceptual contributions of the literature of comparative authoritarianism to the field of Chinese politics, but also identify lacunae in the current literature and avenues for future research that post-Xi political developments have made visible to us.

This paper investigates the political and economic consequences of signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in authoritarian countries. Based on the Heckscher –Ohlin model of international trade and theories of inequality and regime transition, this paper argues that dictators sign PTAs as a means of consolidating their authoritarian rule. Specifically, PTAs help dictators reduce economic inequality by enriching poor laborers and thereby attenuating the threat of regime collapse. We support our theory with the data from seventy-odd authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 2006, and contribute to ongoing debates about the effects of both income inequality and economic globalization on autocratic resilience.

Recent studies revisit the debate over whether tourism promotes peace via intergroup contacts. In this article, we examine the case of China-Taiwan confrontation and argue that the increase of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan contributes to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, the touristic experiences and interactions with Taiwanese improve Chinese people's understanding of Taiwan, fostering a patient and peaceful attitude toward the prospect of cross-Strait relations. With the survey data collected during July and September 2013, we find that Chinese people who were visiting Taiwan for the first time were less likely to support a rapid pace to the unification between China and Taiwan or unification by force than those who had never visited Taiwan. Additionally, the attitude is stronger among independent tourists than those who came in escorted tour groups. Our findings suggest that contacts between tourists and locals are effective in alleviating political tension across the Taiwan Strait.